

# EAST EUROPE

*A Monthly Review of East European Affairs*

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# EAST EUROPE

*Formerly NEWS FROM BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN*

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## THE MONTH IN REVIEW

### TROUBLE IN THE BALKANS

LIFE IS NEVER quiet for very long in the Balkans, which have contributed more than their share to the world's political quarrels. Stalin seemed almost to have subdued them after World War II, when for a brief time his writ was law in Belgrade, Bucharest, Tirana and Sofia, and nearly became so in Athens. The illusion started to crumble in 1948, when Tito was read out of the Cominform for being Yugoslav first and Communist second. Soon afterward Stalin was forced to give up his designs on Greece, and now—only a dozen years later—it seems unlikely that Khrushchev will hold Albania. The factors which have led to Albania's departure are documented elsewhere in this issue by Mr. William E. Griffith, who suggests that the Communist bloc has now clearly lost its monolithic unity and is, for the first time since Stalin's triumph in the 1920's, about to become truly international.



One rule of international relations is that their complexity increases with the square of the number of participants. So long as Tito stood alone against the Soviet bloc, the game seemed relatively simple. The other parties uniformly denounced him or ignored him, and they differed only in the degree of hostility they saw fit to display. Now that Albania has defied Moscow and sided with China in the secret parleys of the Communist world, there are three political currents at work in the Balkans. The Yugoslavs are pitted against all of the other Communist countries; the Albanians denounce the Yugoslavs, praise the Chinese and struggle quietly against Moscow; and Moscow's remaining satellites ignore what is happening in Albania while pretending that the chief threat to Communist unity is not China but Yugoslavia.

### BULGARIA IN THE MIDDLE

THE DELICACY of this situation was dramatized when a headline in a Bulgarian newspaper recently became an international incident. The trial in Tirana of a former commander-in-chief of the Albanian navy, a major-general, two other officers and six civilians on charges of plotting with Yugoslavia against the Hoxha regime, had been ignored by the press of the Soviet-bloc countries. Then, on May 28, the trade union newspaper *Trud* (Sofia) ran a two-inch report from Tirana on the outcome of the trial under the head, "A Just Sentence Against the People's Enemy in Albania." The item was picked up and broadcast by Radio Sofia on the same day. The Yugoslav government took immediate umbrage and protested to the Bulgarian ambassador in Belgrade. The Yugoslavs assumed, officially at any rate, that the incident was not a journalistic accident, and complained that "the Bulgarian press" had joined in "the anti-Yugoslav campaign of the Albanian leaders, thus supporting their attempts to spoil the atmosphere of mutual relations in the Balkans." The Albanians for their part were glad to use the incident as evidence of Bulgarian support for them. "Socialist Albania and socialist Bulgaria," bragged the Tirana newspaper *Zeri i Popullit* on June 11, "are a great factor of peace and stability in the Balkans. Their path is an example exerting influence not only on the peoples of this area, but also on the whole Mediterranean basin."

This was no doubt embarrassing to the Bulgarian regime of Todor Zhivkov, which as a faithful satellite of Moscow must find Hoxha's praise more distressing than Tito's

criticism. The item in *Trud* may, of course, have been an accident. On the other hand, Bulgarian politics seems lately to have become more complicated than the Bulgarians will admit. Since the beginning of May there have been rumors that Zhivkov is faced with substantial opposition within the ranks of his Party. According to these reports, the opposition is based on (1) a strong disapproval of the Party's economic policy in 1959 and 1960—the years of the “great leap forward”—which brought hardship to the people and strained Bulgaria's economy without even approaching the intended goals, and (2) a desire among some Communists for a more independent Bulgarian policy, perhaps resembling that pursued by Tito in Yugoslavia.

The existence of two Communist extremes in the Balkans—those of Tito and Hoxha—is bound to make difficulties for neighboring Bulgaria. The Sofia regime can hardly expect to have amicable relations with Moscow, Tirana and Belgrade simultaneously. Moreover, the antagonistic forces may work like a magnet upon dissidents in Bulgaria who will be inclined to look across the border for support either from Yugoslavia or from the Albanians and Chinese. While there is no reason to assume that any major schism is in fact developing, the troubled state of affairs in the Party is shown by the rash of dismissals of important functionaries in recent weeks and the denunciation of “fractional and anti-Party manifestations.” (See Current Developments.)

At the same time, the Zhivkov regime has become involved in a quarrel with Greece—toward which it had lately been making overtures of peace. This began when the Yugoslav newspaper *Nova Makedonija* charged on May 27 that 5,000 “Macedonians” living in Poland had forcibly been taken to Bulgaria and settled near the Greek border. These were Communist partisans who had fled Greece in 1949 after the Markos rebellion was crushed. The charge brought two immediate consequences: it revived the old quarrel between Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia over their Macedonian minorities, and it created an uproar in the Greek press. The Greek foreign ministry confirmed the Yugoslav charge, the Bulgarian government denied it, and relations between the two countries reached a new low. One Greek newspaper called Bulgaria and Albania “as wretched a pair of neighbors as any country could be cursed with.”

#### HOXHA'S ATTACK

THE INTENSITY of Moscow's headache in Albania was portrayed on June 9 by two British newspapers which published accounts of the speech which Enver Hoxha made at the Moscow conference of Party leaders last November. It had long been known that Hoxha delivered a violent attack on Khrushchev, who was said to have answered: “Comrade Hoxha, you have poured a bucket of dung over me, and now you will have to wash it off.” According to this latest report, Hoxha sided completely with the Chinese: “Anyone who does not see that imperialism is preparing for war is blind. Anyone who sees it and refuses to admit it is a traitor. . . . Khrushchev has distorted the theses of Lenin to suit his own purposes.” He cited a number of instances in which Moscow had used unfair tactics to coerce its satellites, and alleged that the Russians had exerted economic and military pressure in an effort to force Albania into line. Hoxha implied that the conspirators who were tried and sentenced in Tirana in May were not agents of Yugoslavia, Greece, NATO and the United States—as charged in the indictment—but of Moscow. “The Russian ambassador and the rest of the Russian embassy in Tirana are continuing their attacks against some elements of the leadership of the Albanian Party,” said Hoxha. “These are the corrupt elements that have sown trouble in our Party and gone so far as to precipitate a revolution in the army.”

This confirmed what some observers had long suspected: that the Russians, who have invested over a billion rubles in Albania, are unable to control Hoxha by standard political methods. Since more primitive measures have failed also, the question before the world seems to be: who will pick up the pieces in the Balkans?





Victory parade in Tirana in 1944. First row, left to right: Koci Xoxe, Enver Hoxha, Omer Nishani, and Muslim Peza. Second row: Mehmet Shehu, Spiro Moissi, Medar Shtylla. Today Hoxha defies the Soviet Union from his position as First Secretary of the Party.

East Europe photo

## An International Communism?

### Peiping, Tirana and Moscow: Polycentrism in Practice

by WILLIAM E. GRIFFITH

*Last year's dispute between the Soviet Union and Communist China over issues of foreign policy gave rise to much discussion in the West. The discussion has since been heightened by the emergence of a tacit alliance between China and Albania. Mr. Griffith, of the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, explores the background of the Peiping-Tirana axis and examines the mass of material that has already been written on this increasingly complex question.*

THIS IS AN age of nationalism. Even the Communist parties of the Sino-Soviet Bloc have not been able to resist the encroachment of national interests upon the monolithic unity of the Bloc.<sup>1</sup> The 1956 upheavals in Poland and Hungary were visible evidence of the national strains underlying the supra-national ideology, but the threat they raised to the unity of the Bloc was successfully overcome in the years that followed.<sup>2</sup> The Sino-Soviet

dispute of 1960, however, was a much more difficult problem: it is now clear that the dispute has led to a new relationship among the Communist parties of the Bloc which will have profound consequences for our time.<sup>3</sup>

The Chinese Communist Party had all the necessary prerequisites for challenging Moscow's domination of the Bloc and of the international Communist movement: a proven and united leadership under a master strategist and tac-

tician, Mao Tse-tung, and a country with an area, potential resources, population, and a long tradition of nationalism and xenophobia, potentially capable through rapid forced industrialization of becoming a great power. Stalin's miscalculation in Korea led to Chinese intervention in the war, resulting not only in frustrating the American objective of a reunified democratic Korea but also in modernized Chinese ground and air forces.<sup>4</sup> The Chinese Communists took advantage of the post-1953 succession struggle in the Soviet Union and the 1956 ferment in the East European satellites first to encourage the Poles to obtain greater domestic autonomy,<sup>5</sup> then (they now maintain) to press Moscow to intervene in Hungary to prevent its escape from the Bloc,<sup>6</sup> and finally to urge the Soviet Union toward a renewed break with Yugoslavia in 1957.<sup>7</sup> In 1960 the increasing Chinese policies of rapid communization internally, major risk-taking in the "struggle against imperialism" abroad, and influencing the world Communist movement, led to the open Sino-Soviet dispute.

In the fall of 1958 the establishment of the Chinese people's communes was a brief and unsuccessful challenge to Soviet ideological predominance on the issue of transition to Communism.<sup>8</sup> Early in 1960 Peiping initiated open polemics with Moscow.<sup>9</sup> The dispute reached a high point at the Moscow conference of 81 Communist parties in November 1960,<sup>10</sup> encompassing the proper policy toward the risks of general (thermonuclear) and limited war, toward smaller Communist parties within and without the Bloc (the issue of "fractionalism"), toward the United States and toward the underdeveloped areas of Africa, Asia and Latin America. The resultant December 1960 Moscow statement, although "on points" a major Soviet victory, contained enough of the Chinese position to make clear that it was a compromise. The Chinese reportedly insisted upon their right to form a "fraction" in the international movement, i.e., to agitate against the Soviet Union in it at their pleasure:<sup>11</sup> a Chinese defiance of the CPSU bound to lead to further disunity. By 1961, for the first time since 1929, there again exists a genuinely *international* Communist movement no longer completely dominated by the Soviet Union. In the near future there will probably be neither genuine reconciliation nor an open and total split between the Soviet Union and China, but continued "divergent unity"<sup>12</sup> with resultant permanent and increasing polycentrism.

### Three Possibilities

The effect in Eastern Europe of continuing Sino-Soviet "divergent unity" has already been significant; it will probably become more so. Albania, successfully defying major Soviet attempts to reassert control over it but remaining within the Bloc, has opted for the Chinese and obtained continuing Chinese support. The East European satellites where some pro-Chinese sympathies had existed (East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria)<sup>13</sup> have since June 1960 under pressure by Moscow returned to a pro-Soviet line. Ulbricht has publicly attacked the Albanians for "dogmatism and sectarianism."<sup>14</sup> More recently, Togliatti has become the second party leader to denounce the Al-

banians by name.<sup>15</sup> Yugoslavia has become a more active factor in Bloc affairs.

All this has led to more potential freedom of maneuver for many Communist parties. They now can perhaps gain increased domestic autonomy through three not necessarily mutually exclusive courses of action: decisively supporting Moscow or Peiping; maneuvering between Moscow and Peiping; and balancing one against the other, or mediating between them.<sup>16</sup> The first is true of Poland toward the Soviet Union and of Albania toward China. The second is true of North Vietnam and probably of North Korea.<sup>17</sup> The third may well already be true of some parties, but we do not know where and to what extent. Finally, the continuing Sino-Soviet controversy, the successful Albanian option against the Soviet Union and for China, and the involvement of Yugoslavia have probably produced some increased polarization within the Bulgarian Communist Party, the left probably retaining some sympathy for the Chinese, the center (in power) continuing to support the Russians, and the right becoming more anti-Soviet and nationalist.

With the exception of Albania, these Eastern European developments are still in a very preliminary stage. The Albanian developments of the last year, however, are of major significance in the history of the world Communist movement. Difficult to define, defying previous categories and unpredictable for the future, they are as significant as they are little understood.

### The Albanian Defection

WHAT HAS happened in Albania?<sup>18</sup> The Albanian Communist leadership by 1959 had become increasingly disturbed at the prospects of a renewed Soviet rapprochement with Yugoslavia, inherent, they felt, in Khrushchev's policy of international détente. Their apprehension was the greater since the previous 1955-1956 period of international détente and Soviet rapprochement with Yugoslavia had in their opinion confronted them and the independence of Albania with a challenge they had only barely survived. (Khrushchev's 1959 trip to Albania,<sup>19</sup> in retrospect, may well in part have been a serious but unsuccessful attempt to forestall the repercussions of the renewed danger Tirana saw from Moscow.) In 1960 Tirana took advantage of a new factor which had not existed in 1956: the increasing Chinese challenge to Soviet total control of the Bloc. When in that year public polemics between Moscow and Peiping began, the Albanians took the side of the Chinese against the Russians.<sup>20</sup> At the June 1960 Bucharest meeting of Communist parties the Albanian delegation, which was relatively low-level,<sup>21</sup> strongly supported the Chinese against the Russians.<sup>22</sup>

Thereupon, reports indicate and Hoxha has indirectly confirmed,<sup>23</sup> the Soviets quite likely were seriously and unsuccessfully involved in one or more attempts to remove Hoxha and Shehu from the Albanian leadership. There may have been Yugoslav involvement also, but some aspects of the plot or plots were probably exclusively Albanian. This "plot" allegedly involved among others an Albanian rear admiral, Teme Sejko, his brother Taho (ex-editor-in-

chief of *Zeri i Popullit*), a general and a local government official. It may also have involved or been connected with the anti-Hoxha and probably pro-Soviet activities of the Albanian Party leaders Liri Belishova and Koci Tashko. The attempted coup was crushed by Hoxha, who removed and arrested its leaders.<sup>24</sup> (Some, not including Belishova and Tashko, were tried in May 1961, and four, including Teme Sejko, sentenced to death and executed.<sup>25</sup> The trial, however, provided only a few very indirect indications that the Soviets may have been involved in the "plot.") Soviet economic aid to Albania was probably curtailed, but also without success.<sup>26</sup>

The Chinese made good on their earlier promises of political, propagandistic and economic support to Albania.<sup>27</sup> Peiping's and Tirana's public statements and reciprocal visits of high officials made clear their extremely favorable attitude toward each other.<sup>28</sup> The contrast between their pronouncements on the one hand and those of Moscow on the other continued to be sharp.<sup>29</sup> The Chinese, although because of widespread famine very short of grain, gave some to the Albanians.<sup>30</sup> Chinese specialists were assigned to Tirana.<sup>31</sup>

In the autumn of 1960, alone among the Eastern European Communist leaders, the Albanian Party First Secretary Enver Hoxha did not attend the UN General Assembly in New York. The Albanian Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu, who did, was ostentatiously slighted by the other Communist leaders<sup>32</sup> while Khrushchev publicly embraced Tito,<sup>33</sup> the Albanians' chief enemy. (Shehu later made clear his opposition to Soviet-sponsored proposals for disarmament and troop control in the Balkans and elsewhere.<sup>34</sup>) At the November and December 1960 Moscow meetings of the 81 Communist parties Hoxha was the most extreme in his support of the Chinese defiance to the Soviet Union and in the passion and violence of his attacks upon Soviet policy and upon Khrushchev personally. Hoxha reportedly accused Khrushchev of attempting to overthrow the Albanian Party leadership through intrigues against it in the Albanian Party and armed forces. The CPSU, he continued, had unsuccessfully tried to pressure the Albanian leadership into abandoning its support of the Chinese at the June 1960 Bucharest conference and thereafter, thus itself being guilty of "fractionalism." Marshal Malinovsky, he added, had attacked Albania at a Warsaw Pact meeting, Marshal Grechko had threatened to exclude Albania from the Warsaw Pact, and (Hoxha obliquely indicated) Khrushchev had threatened to exclude Albania from the "socialist camp." Hoxha concluded by saying that Moscow had deliberately withheld sufficient wheat from Albania during the severe drought of 1960. Khrushchev reportedly shouted in reply: "Comrade Hoxha, you have poured a bucket of dung on me, and you will have to wash it off."<sup>35</sup> Hoxha and Shehu left the conference a week early.<sup>36</sup>

Although since December 1960 open Sino-Soviet polemics have ceased and recent developments indicate that both Moscow and Peiping have with some success attempted at least to limit the areas and violence of their disagreement,<sup>37</sup> their differences over Albania have if anything intensified.<sup>38</sup> The Albanians have increased their ideological and propagandistic defiance of Soviet positions,



Enver Hoxha speaking in Tirana after the Communist victory in 1944.

East Europe photo

and the Soviets have continued, via "esoteric communication," to indicate their displeasure.<sup>39</sup> The Albanians have received continued political and ideological<sup>40</sup> and increased economic<sup>41</sup> support from the Chinese. The Albanian Party Congress, held in Tirana in February (after two postponements), confirmed Albania's defiance of Soviet pressure, Chinese support of Tirana, and in general the same line-up of smaller parties as in Moscow.<sup>42</sup> Although Hoxha and the other Albanian leaders acknowledged that the "socialist camp" was led by the Soviet Union, "esoteric" Albanian criticism of the Soviet Union was clear. Shehu put it perhaps the most clearly (for "revisionists" read CPSU, for "Trojan horse," Yugoslavia):<sup>43</sup>

"The revisionists call us dogmatic, because we are unblemished Marxists, persistent to the end, and do not allow the teachings of Lenin to be called old or to say that they need to be revised. They call us sectarians, because we are not opportunists, because we do not call our enemies our friends as they do, and because we do not allow the Trojan horse to enter our house. They call us fanatic nationalists, because we are consistent internationalists. They say we are people who do not understand a thing about Marxism, because we reject their anti-Marxist, revisionist theories. . . ."

Recent Soviet-Albanian trade agreements<sup>44</sup> indicate that Moscow's earlier pledge of a 300 million ruble credit for the Albanian Third Five Year Plan (1961-65)<sup>45</sup> has not been honored.<sup>46</sup> The Albanians have continued their (at



least in part anti-Soviet) purges, arresting, publicly trying and executing a rear-admiral<sup>47</sup> of the Albanian Naval Staff (perhaps in part because of his close liaison with the Soviet submarine base at Valona) as well as local government and Party officials, and arresting and shooting two Albanian foreign office officials for showing Albanian Politburo minutes to the Russians.<sup>48</sup> In June 1961, apparently authoritative Western press reports indicated, Moscow declared the Albanian military attache in the USSR, persona non grata, and several Soviet submarines left the Sasseno base en route back home. Soviet Embassy officials in Tirana, in spite of protests by Moscow, are reportedly under Albanian police surveillance.<sup>49</sup> At the late March 1961 Warsaw Pact conference the Albanian delegation was again low-level.<sup>50</sup> Press reports indicate that Moscow may be trying to mobilize support among other Communist parties in Eastern Europe against Albania.<sup>51</sup> In late April, at the Albanian Trade Union Congress, CC Secretary and Politburo member Rita Marko, in phrases even more violent than the Chinese have used, declared:<sup>52</sup>

"Peace and freedom cannot be obtained by waiting with tied hands. . . . They are won by war, struggle and organized revolutionary activity of the masses and are protected by war. . . ."

In May 1961, encouraged by their success to date, the Albanians appeared determined to continue their defiant option to Moscow and support for Peiping.

Why have the Albanians so far succeeded? There are three main reasons:

1. Their geographical isolation from the Bloc, which makes impossible intervention by the Red Army as in Hungary.
2. Their support by the Chinese and Moscow's consequent reluctance further to worsen its relations with Peiping by too drastic moves against Peiping's one total ally, Tirana.
3. The unity of the Albanian party leadership, held together by Hoxha's ruthlessness and (as traditionally in Albania) by blood ties<sup>53</sup> in its defiance of the Soviet Union, and the inability of Moscow to infiltrate, factionalize it, and thus gain a pro-Soviet majority in it. Geographical isolation and Chinese support have clearly been two essential preconditions for the Albanian defiance of Moscow, but why has the Albanian leadership been so united and decisive in its defiance? Three elements in Albanian history are of importance in answering this question: (1) the menace to Albania's independence of its hostile neighbors, (2) its lack of internal ethnic, religious and social unity, and (3) the xenophobia of its people coupled with the internationalism of many of its elite.

### Ghegs and Tosks

Albanian history<sup>54</sup> has traditionally been dominated by fear, and when possible defiance, of its powerful, nationalistic, ethnically hostile, and encircling foreign neighbors (Yugoslavia, Greece, and Italy), and by constant search for more powerful and distant foreign protectors. As a British nineteenth-century traveller wrote in a passage

whose analogies with the present day, *aliquis aliquandis*, are striking:<sup>55</sup>

"Whatever political influence is exercised by any foreign power on the Christians of North Albania is in the hands of Austria, from which country almost all the Roman Catholic bishops come; the priests who are introduced from that country he [Mr. Read, the British consul at Scodra] regarded as being injurious, from the political ferment which they occasionally cause, and the jealousy they arouse among the native priests. As to the relations of the Turks and Montenegrins, he seemed to think they were in a very precarious position, and that war might break out any day. There were faults on both sides. The Turks were unreasonably hard in pressing points in regard to the frontier line, and similar questions and if the British embassy at Constantinople were to urge them to a more conciliatory course, it was highly probable they would consent. On the other hand, the Montenegrins were ever ready to take up a matter, however slight, and make it a course of quarrel."

Albania became independent only in 1912. Its partition, decreed by the secret 1915 Treaty of London, was prevented only by Lenin's publication of the treaty in 1917 and Wilson's 1919 veto at Versailles of its being carried out. After gaining power in 1924 with Yugoslavia's help, the Gheg chieftain Zog first tried to enlist British protection; unsuccessful, he thereupon exchanged Belgrade for Rome as a protector. In 1941 the Albanian Communists, fighting the Italians, Germans and their Albanian allies, turned to the Yugoslav Communists, only to desert them in 1948 for the Russians. The major cause of the Albanian option in 1960 against Moscow and for Peiping is the historic Albanian hostility to Yugoslavia.

The foreign threat was greatly increased by the ethnic, religious and class disunity of pre-1944 Albania. Thraco-Illyrian by stock and language and after the Turkish conquest 70 per cent Moslem, Albanians are divided into two groups, the northern Ghegs and the southern Tosks. The largely illiterate and semi-barbaric Ghegs, partly Roman Catholic (from Italian influence) and fiercely hostile to the Orthodox Serbs, lived until the Second War in a mountain tribal society characterized by blood feuds and fierce clan loyalties. They traditionally lorded over the Tosk plainsmen, who were more civilized from centuries of Greek and Italian influence as well as foreign travel but whose landless and largely Orthodox peasantry was in the grip of Moslem landlords (beys) and of a one-crop grain economy subject to violent economic fluctuations—a classic pattern for the growth of communism.

Although the population was xenophobic, the Albanian elite had long played a role on the international scene. In the multi-national Ottoman empire Albanians were a part of the ruling elite; from 1453 to 1623 eleven out of forty-nine grand viziers were Albanian, as were the Sultan's Guard, the Constantinople garrison<sup>56</sup> and Mehmet Ali's dynasty in Egypt. The Sultans spread Albanian military colonies throughout Greece. However, Turkish domination of Albania also produced a large-scale, mostly Tosk emigration, from nationalistic and economic motives, first to Italy and Greece and then Egypt, Romania, Bulgaria and

the United States. When after the increasingly successful efforts of the Great Powers to partition the declining Ottoman Empire, and the Young Turks' insistence on forcing an ethnically Turkish character upon what remained of it, the resultant Albanian nationalist movement won independence, some six to seven hundred thousand Albanians in the Kosovo-Metohija ("Kosmet") region were incorporated into Serbia. Thus the primarily Gheg Albanian elite was deprived of its international role, made even more anti-Serb by its failure to retain the Kosmet, and condemned to a constant search for foreign protectors. An initial attempt at reform at home and a pro-Russian policy abroad by the Tosk Bishop Fan Noli, briefly Prime Minister after the First War, was crushed by Zog. Noli fled back to Boston (where in 1912, after graduating from Harvard, he had founded the autonomous Albanian Orthodox Church), but a few of his young leftist adherents went to Moscow.<sup>57</sup> They included the poet Sejfulla Malleshova, the intellectual Lazar Fundo and the self-educated Ali Kelmendi. In late 1930 Kelmendi returned to Albania and began organizing Communist groups but, forced to flee by Zog in 1936, fought in the International Brigade and died in Paris in 1939. Kelmendi and Malleshova in 1938 reportedly enticed Fundo to Moscow, where Malleshova's attempt to have him killed by the NKVD was frustrated only by the intervention of Georgi Dimitrov. Fundo then returned to Paris, broke with communism, and went home to Albania during the Second War, only to be clubbed to death by Hoxha's partisans in 1944. In the late 1930s the Communists in Albania fell into factional struggles and impotence.

Albanian communism arose out of a mixture of nationalist and ethnic hostilities, internationalist tradition, economic discontent and Western Communist influence. In the interwar period many young Tosk intellectuals had turned to communism. They had no roots in Gheg tribal society, they hated the traditionalist Moslem Tosk beys, they had been educated in France (Hoxha) or in French schools in Albania, they no longer could have a career in the Ottoman bureaucracy, and the lack of economic development and the ruthless autocratic rule of Zog's interwar dictatorship frustrated their natural desire to use their Western education for their own and their country's advancement. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, in Romania or Croatia, many similarly frustrated intellectuals turned to fascism. In Albania as in Serbia, however, fascism was the ideology of the Italian enemy, and for the Albanians of the hated Greece of Metaxas as well; like such young Yugoslav intellectuals as Djilas, many young Tosk intellectuals became Communists. There were also some young Communists in Albania of proletarian origin, such as the tinsmith Koci Xoxe and the carpenter Tuk Jakova, and antagonism grew between them and the intellectuals.<sup>58</sup>

When emissaries of the Yugoslav Communist partisans, headed by Miladin Popovic and Dushan Mugosha, arrived in 1941 to organize an Albanian Communist Party and partisan movement, they found this antagonism alive in the various groups of Albanian Communists. The three most important of these were the oldest one in Korca (including Hoxha, Xoxe, Tashko and Spiro), another in

Shkoder (including Jakova and the woman intellectual Liri Gega), and third, the "youth group" (including Hysni Kapo, an intellectual from Valona, and Bedri Spahiu, an officer from Gjinokaster).

The Albanian Communist partisans, by making clear their intention to bring about a social and economic revolution in the country, so antagonized the nationalistic Gheg chieftains and the Tosk landlords that these two elite groups were inclined if necessary to come to some terms with the Italians and later with the Germans to prevent this revolution and to keep the Kosmet, which the Italians had given the Albanian puppet government in 1941, and whose retention the Albanian Communists, due to their domination by the Yugoslavs, could not support. With some British and more Yugoslav help, the Albanian Communists carried on a long and finally successful partisan struggle.

After 1945 Albania remained a Yugoslav rather than a Soviet satellite. Like Yugoslavia, it followed extremist, "Stalinist" policies at home and abroad. The Yugoslavs, allowed by the Russians to deal with Albania pretty much as they wished, distrusted the intellectuals like Hoxha because they were too international, too westernized, and not sufficiently amenable to Belgrade's desires; instead, they supported those of proletarian origin, particularly Xoxe. Tito's pre-1948 Balkan federation plans involved, with Soviet consent,<sup>59</sup> the incorporation of Albania, probably including the Kosmet, as one of the constituent republics, thus guaranteeing that Ghegs (and probably Kosmet Ghegs) would swamp the overwhelmingly Tosk Albanian Communist leadership. The sole remaining Albanian "Muscovite," the poet Malleshova, was purged, probably by Xoxe, in 1946. Xoxe was also probably responsible for the purges of Shehu and Spahiu, the forced suicide of Spiro and the demotion of Belishova; by 1948 he was probably getting ready to dispose of Hoxha. When in 1948 Stalin expelled Tito from the Bloc, the Albanian Communist Party thus had no significant Muscovite faction, but, in spite of Xoxe's purge, it certainly had an anti-Yugoslav one, composed of people like Hoxha and Shehu, threatened by the pro-Yugoslav Xoxe. Its leadership was still primarily intellectual, educated not in Moscow but in the West or in Western schools, strongly nationalistic, and anti-Yugoslav both by national tradition and by their desire to regain their party's independence from Yugoslav domination. At the same time, the Albanian party's wartime partisan struggles (even if under Yugoslav direction) had given its leadership and cadres a feeling of mutual struggle, sacrifice, and victory by their own efforts shared only by the Yugoslav and the Chinese. (It is hardly an accident that exactly these three parties have successfully defied Moscow.)

The Albanian Communists, like the Yugoslav, are both genuinely nationalist and genuinely internationalist; each tendency reinforces the other. They are genuinely nationalist in that they want the end of tribal feuds and Gheg-Tosk hostility and the creation of an Albanian industrial base which, they feel, must be the foundation of genuine national independence. They are genuinely internationalist both as a result of the long international tradition of the Albanian elite and also because only an international



framework such as the world Communist movement can give them protection from domination by their Communist or anti-Communist neighbors, plus, as under the Ottoman Empire, the opportunity to exercise their talents in a context larger than Albania alone. The Albanian Communist leadership has remained primarily intellectual (Hoxha is today the only Eastern European Party head who has had a university education and speaks a foreign language), characterized by tribal (Tosk) and clan groupings,<sup>60</sup> and, being composed of *arrivistes* in power, fearful lest any liberalization might endanger their rule. Like all Communist intellectuals in underdeveloped areas, they are strongly nationalist (particularly fearful of Yugoslavia and Greece), highly elitist, and contemptuous of mass support.<sup>61</sup> To the majority of Albanians, Communist and non-Communist, the Soviets in 1948 were far preferable to the Yugoslavs. After the Moscow-Belgrade break the Soviet Union was no longer geographically linked with Albania, which therefore could hope to maintain some degree of autonomy of Moscow. Furthermore, the Soviet Union was hostile to all three of Albania's traditional enemies, Italy, Greece and Yugoslavia, and both willing and able to give economic aid for Albania's industrialization.

### Internal Struggles

In the best tradition of Balkan blood feuds, the Albanian Communists after 1948 clearly demonstrated their determination and willingness to purge and liquidate any deviationist elements. First it was the turn of the genuinely pro-Titoist Xoxe, secretly tried and executed in 1949,<sup>62</sup> after his initial attempt to jump on the anti-Yugoslav bandwagon had been foiled by Hoxha's gaining Moscow's approval to purge him. (Hoxha and Shehu, not Xoxe, were the genuine Albanian "national Communists.") After Xoxe's liquidation<sup>63</sup> Shehu rose rapidly, replacing Jakova as Minister of the Interior and in August 1953, after Stalin's death, becoming Deputy Prime Minister.<sup>64</sup> Only in 1954 did Hoxha relinquish the Prime Ministership, remaining First Secretary, while Shehu became Prime Minister.<sup>65</sup> Then and later there were many rumors of hostility between the two and it seems *prima facie* probable, but nothing specific about it is known. By 1953 only three of the original Central Committee of the Albanian party, Hoxha, Jakova and Spahiu, were still members; the latter two had already been demoted and all the others had been purged. By 1961 Hoxha alone was still a member.<sup>66</sup>

When in 1955 part of Tito's price for the success of Khrushchev's rapprochement with Belgrade was the removal of his most bitter enemies in the satellites, Hoxha, with the possible exception of the Hungarian First Secretary Rakosi, stood at the top of Tito's purge list. Furthermore, Albania's Stalinist internal policies were threatened by Khrushchev's de-Stalinization program. The Yugoslavs, probably with Soviet agreement, tried unsuccessfully to have Hoxha removed.

Recent Yugoslav reports, probably with some if not entire foundation in fact, indicate that there may well have been considerable internal dissatisfaction in Tirana with the

Hoxha-Shehu leadership in late 1956.<sup>67</sup> At the April 1956 Tirana Party conferences, this material states,<sup>68</sup>

"Several delegates demanded a discussion of the 20th CPSU Congress, the cult of personality, the case of Koçi Xoxe, relations with Yugoslavia, party democracy, and the standard of living."

Internal Albanian revisionism probably existed, arising from the Western education of many young intellectuals, the proximity and example of Yugoslav liberalization, and the impact of de-Stalinization. The fear of renewed domination by the hated Yugoslavs, plus his own ruthlessness, are probably the major reasons why Hoxha remained in control. Having thus been seriously threatened by pro-Yugoslav Soviet policies in 1955 and 1956, it is quite natural that Hoxha—and the Chinese—were the first and most violent in renewing the attack on the Yugoslavs after the Hungarian Revolution.<sup>69</sup> For the first time the Chinese joined them, albeit for other reasons; the Chinese "hundred flowers" liberalization campaign had gravely disappointed the Peiping leadership, who, alarmed by the Hungarian Revolution, became convinced that Yugoslav influence was dangerous even to their concept of Bloc cohesion. Still there was until 1959 little indication that the Albanians received serious support from Peking. Only when the Chinese decided, obliquely in 1958 and openly in 1960, to challenge Soviet domination of the Bloc did they seriously look around for allies and were ready and willing to support them. In 1959-1960 the Albanian leadership also became increasingly alarmed at Khrushchev's renewed policy of "peaceful coexistence" and international détente, which, they correctly assumed, might well result in a renewed Soviet rapprochement with Yugoslavia. Finally, the Albanian Party leadership had remained extremist—indeed, Stalinist—in its internal policies and quite naturally sympathized with Chinese extremism. As Mr. Brzezinski has pointed out,<sup>70</sup> Mao and Hoxha in 1960, like Tito in 1948, were "left extremist" deviationists vis-à-vis Moscow; this seems characteristic of indigenously-based deviationist Communist regimes (as opposed to Gomulka, whose party, not strong enough to be extremist, can only successfully be moderate with Moscow's support). By 1960 all the prerequisites for another Albanian shift of alliances were present: geographic isolation, hostility to Yugoslavia, guaranteed foreign support from Peiping, and a menacing, potentially pro-Yugoslav Soviet policy.

To the Albanians this must have seemed an excellent opportunity to desert their potentially pro-Yugoslav protectors in Moscow for a new ally, who, like Wilson at the Versailles conference, was far enough away not to be dangerous to their independence and who now had ambitions within the world Communist movement which made necessary the acquisition of allies and the willingness to expend support to get and keep them. Peiping could count upon some support in many Asian Communist Parties, particularly the Indian, Indonesian, Malayan, Burmese, and Japanese, and upon the near-neutrality of the North Koreans and the North Vietnamese.<sup>71</sup> It had hoped for some support in the Middle East, but the extremist faction in the Iraqi Party had been defeated.<sup>72</sup> It did have some long-term favorable prospects in some Latin American and

African parties. For Peiping, Albania's support guaranteed that China would not be isolated among "ruling" parties. Albania's geographical isolation made it probable that it could resist Soviet attempts to reverse its policy or overthrow its leadership, while its needs in economic aid, although a large part of its own budget, were small enough to be carried even by a famine-stricken China. Finally, Albania's geographical isolation guaranteed that its defiance of Soviet control could not be alleged by Moscow to be a result of Chinese pressure and therefore could be presented by the Chinese and the Albanians as originating solely in Albanian desire for more national independence in the face of Soviet domination.

By their frequent reversals of policy towards Yugoslavia the Soviets had effectively deprived themselves of major assets within the Albanian party leadership. The latter had no purely Muscovite faction; Xoxe had disposed of some of their potential supporters (such as Belishova's husband Spiro and Malleshova); and the Albanian leadership had something of the equivalent of the Yugoslav partisan tradition—pride, nationalism, and self-confidence. Some of them, like Hoxha, had a Western education and therefore some international inclinations, while their Balkan background was still strong enough to overcome any Western veneer which might mask their ruthlessness against their opponents; and they all had in full measure both Balkan vanity and a lively consciousness of Albania's past glories.

Albania's defiance<sup>73</sup> remains difficult without Chinese support. Successful persistence is probable unless genuine reconciliation or a total break replaces the present "divergent unity" between Moscow and Peiping; either would deprive it of effective Chinese support. The extent of Albania's defiance will remain largely a function of the extent of Sino-Soviet differences. The persistence of one aspect of the Chinese challenge to the Soviet Union remains essential for its continued success: Chinese ambitions for influence in the world Communist movement. As long as this continues—and it seems likely to do so—it is difficult for Peiping to abandon Albania to Moscow. Such a step would make clear to all Communist parties that continuation of Chinese support to a rebellious party cannot be counted upon in the face of Soviet demands for its cessation. Thus the Albanians have some freedom of movement vis-à-vis the Chinese. The Chinese may not be able to restrain them as completely as they often would like since they need the Albanians as a symbol of their ability to gain and maintain allies in their drive for influence in the world Communist movement.

### ***Consequences in Eastern Europe***

LESS NEED BE said about the effects in other Eastern European countries of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Why the East Germans, the Czechs and the Bulgarians, upon Soviet demand, gave up their flirtations with the Chinese in June of 1960 is clear. They need Soviet support against their own restive populations. They do not have the same degree of nationalistic and territorial grievances against the Yugoslavs as do the Albanians. (The Bulgarians do to a lesser degree, in particular over the Macedonian issue.) They do not enjoy geographic isolation, an indispensable

precondition of successful Albanian defiance of Moscow. Their leaders know that refusal to obey Soviet orders to cease flirtations with the Chinese could risk their Soviet-arranged removal. Gomulka was one of Khrushchev's chief supporters against the Chinese and Albanians in the Moscow discussions in November 1960.<sup>74</sup> This was to be expected. On all the substantive issues at dispute between Moscow and Peiping Gomulka's position is far closer to Khrushchev's than to Mao's and Hoxha's,<sup>75</sup> and he has worked out a successful *modus vivendi* with Khrushchev which allows considerable autonomy to the Polish Party and the continuation of such Polish domestic deviations as the effective end of forcible agricultural collectivization.<sup>76</sup> The Poles are genuinely appalled by the extremism of Chinese domestic and foreign policy. Khrushchev's support by Poland, the country in Eastern Europe to which he has granted the largest degree of autonomy, enables him to demonstrate, contrary to Chinese and Albanian charges, that Moscow does not demand Stalinist conformity from the smaller ruling Communist parties. Gomulka's support of Khrushchev, on the other hand, gives him some greater internal and external freedom of maneuver. As long as the Sino-Soviet dispute and particularly the Albanian defiance of Moscow continue, Khrushchev will benefit importantly from Polish support and will therefore be less likely to put pressure on Gomulka toward further retrogression in Polish domestic policies. It is thus more likely now than before that such Polish deviations as the discontinuance of agricultural collectivization will continue.<sup>77</sup> In a speech to the Polish Central Committee about the Moscow meeting, Gomulka made clear in theory what he in the past has done and, he hopes, again may be able to do in practice:<sup>78</sup>

"Within the framework of the international policy of the socialist camp, each and every socialist country can and should undertake various steps and initiatives connected with its specific interests and with its geographical and political situation. But these steps should be subordinated to the general direction of action jointly agreed upon. . . ."

The Rapacki plan was one such initiative; perhaps Gomulka will undertake others in the future.

In one Communist party, the Bulgarian, some polarization may be underway as a result of the Sino-Soviet dispute and the Albanian defiance. Chervenkov, the Stalinist former Bulgarian First Secretary, was removed from his position (presumably at Khrushchev's initiative) in the post-Stalinist period but allowed to remain as a member of the Bulgarian Politburo; in the late 1950's he demonstrated considerable sympathy for Chinese developments.<sup>79</sup> In the same period some Bulgarian party leaders such as Terpeshov and Panov had been purged, presumably for rightist deviation, i.e., anti-Soviet attitudes, desire for greater national autonomy for the Bulgarian Party, and perhaps even some willingness to obtain and utilize Yugoslav support to this end. (Yugoslavia's position vis-à-vis Bulgaria is complicated by the fact that the existence of a Macedonian Republic in Yugoslavia is considered by the Bulgarians, with reason, as a potential menace to Bulgaria's

*(Continued on page 41)*

# Men in the News

## Edvard Kardelj

IN THE FALL of 1960, Moscow's *Pravda* printed a lengthy and irate article on the "ideological pitfalls" of a treatise entitled *Socialism and War*. The author of the offending tract was Yugoslavia's Vice-President Edvard Kardelj, who had been so bold as to enter the Sino-Soviet controversy on the possibilities of peaceful coexistence with the West and the likelihood of a Third World War. Kardelj's chief crime was his refusal to abide by either the Chinese or the Soviet interpretation of the world situation; instead, he expatiated on the logic behind his nation's neutralist position, based, he emphatically implied, on a mistrust of the power blocs of both East and West. In response, Moscow declared:

"The main theoretical sin of Kardelj lies in the fact that, in analyzing the problems of war, he does not establish a link between wars and the struggle of classes, he does not regard war as a continuation of policy by forcible means. . . .

"The apostle of Yugoslav revisionism states with familiarity that the founders of Marxism did not consider the victory of socialism in any country an absolute obstacle to war. This is monstrous but a fact: Kardelj admits that a socialist state could wage a predatory war! Thus, the Yugoslav revisionists, beginning with the fiction of 'socialist hegemony,' with the affirmation that the striving to rule over other countries is inherent in the 'socialist bloc' as well as in the imperialist, have come to a logical conclusion; they have placed beforehand the responsibility for a possible unleashing of war on the socialist states." (See *East Europe*, October 1960, pp. 54-56.)

In the main, Kardelj's book was conceived as a retort to the Chinese Communists who, in their militant "orthodoxy," have propagated the theory of "just wars" and cheerfully visualized the victory of communism in the atomic rubble of World War III. However, because he in no way exonerated the USSR of blame in igniting world tensions, he added still another affront to the list of Yugoslav "heresies" against the Soviet Union.



*Komunist* (Belgrade), April 20, 1961

The son of a Ljubljana school janitor, Kardelj has been the chief ideological spokesman for the Yugoslav Communist League since the death of Moshka Pijade in 1957, and, as such, is no new thorn in Moscow's side. Now fifty-one, he joined the illegal Communist youth movement in Yugoslavia in 1927, and, for a start, ran a mimeograph machine in one of the Party's underground cells; later, he rose from the ranks to become a member of the local committee of the youth movement in Ljubljana and, by the end of 1929, paid the price of his dedication by receiving a two-year prison sentence for subversive activity. Much of these two years he spent at hard labor and, when he had the chance, in reading widely in economics, history and philosophy. According to all accounts he has remained over the years a studious man.

Trained as an elementary school teacher, Kardelj never held any teaching post in prewar Yugoslavia because of his Communist affiliations. In the Soviet Union, where he settled in the early thirties, he fared better. He entered the Moscow school for foreign Communists and from 1934 to 1936 taught the history of communism and gave a course



in Slovenian social problems at the University of Sverdlovsk. In 1937 the Party sent him back to Yugoslavia, where he once again resumed underground work.

From his subsequent career it is apparent that Kardelj's Moscow training did little to inhibit his national pride. While he is the only top Yugoslav who owns the prized Soviet Order of Lenin, the Stalinist concept of Soviet satellite relations evidently went against his grain; a few years ago, one of Kardelj's colleagues characteristically pooh-poohed the importance of his Russian background. "He [Kardelj] was just a student there. It was not an important part of his life, and anyhow, you learn more in your own country." This, of course, was after 1948.

Between 1937 and the end of the war, Kardelj followed a path not uncommon to many East European Communists. After his return to Yugoslavia, he became a member of the regional Party Politburo in Slovenia and played a leading role in rebuilding the Communist organization which the government had smashed. It was in this period that he met Tito, and the two men reportedly took to each other at once. What they had in common—aside from communism—was an ability to view men and situations in their entirety, without being distracted by details. They became and remained close collaborators, despite personality differences. Unlike Tito, for instance, Kardelj appears to be indifferent to luxury and prefers a scholarly life.

His circumstances, however, were far from quiet in the pre-Communist period. He became an ardent proselytizer, contributed under the pen name of "Sperans" (The Hopeful) to Slovenian leftist papers and periodicals, published a voluminous book on the social history of Slovenia, outlining social and political reforms, and, in 1941, after Hit-

ler's attack on Russia, took a leading role in setting up the National Liberation Movement, a non-Party mass patriotic movement which became the nucleus of Communist power. Late in 1941, the Communist revolution in Slovenia was begun, and Kardelj, as president of the Party in Slovenia, formulated and issued the main battle orders.

When the revolution was completed, Kardelj took up a post in Tito's headquarters, where he began planning the future constitution of Communist Yugoslavia. He also prepared other basic legislation for the forthcoming "people's democracy." His value to the Party was duly recognized in 1943, when he was named Vice-President of the anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia. In March 1945, he became a Vice-Premier in the first Tito government and head of the Ministry for the preparation of the Constituent Assembly. In 1946, he headed the Yugoslav delegation to the Paris Peace Conference and signed the Peace Treaty with Italy. And between 1948 and 1953, he was Vice-Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs, thus heading numerous Yugoslav delegations to the UN.

Kardelj is considered by many to be the number two man in the ruling hierarchy of Communist Yugoslavia, but this classification is by no means indisputable. Whether he is likable or not depends on the viewer. Descriptions of his personality have included such words as: stubborn, excitable, cool in debate, chauvinistic, charming, and—for those unimpressed by his intelligence—preponderantly dull. Most observers would agree, however, that although he is cautious by nature, he has been consistently inflexible in carrying out policies he believes necessary for the Party's good.

### *From the Yugoslav press*

#### **"A NEW WORLD IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS"**

*The heretical Communist government of Yugoslavia has been pursuing active relations with the "uncommitted countries" of Africa and Asia. Recently the Belgrade government called a meeting of representatives from such countries to be held in September. On June 4 the newspaper BORBA (Belgrade) carried an article explaining and defending the Yugoslav policy, from which we print the following excerpts:*

*"Since the majority of mankind is outside blocs, we want that majority not to watch passively while someone else tailors its fate, but to participate. And the more there are of us the stronger we shall be, not by the number of our guns and atomic bombs, of course, but as a moral factor. And today the moral factor plays a very important role in the world."—Marshal Tito*

**M**ANY FACTS bespeak the need for much closer cooperation among the uncommitted countries, especially the following:

1) The policy of blocs has wound up in a veritable blind alley. By the fact that it relies on force, it is unable to deal with a single outstanding international question. Its antagonistic

way of approaching international problems is incompatible with the interests of peace. The policy of relying on force continuously creates new complications and more and more dangerous crises.

2) The countries which are not aligned in blocs have already affirmed themselves. The orientation of the uncommitted countries not aligned in blocs has already affirmed itself. The orientation of the uncommitted countries toward international cooperation has assumed a definite shape. A new force has begun to operate in world politics. With the appearance of the uncommitted world, a new perspective has been opened for the international community.

3) The changed objective state of affairs in the world,

one of the most positive characteristics of which is the very appearance of nonaligned countries, has not yet found full expression in concrete dealing with acute international problems. One of the reasons for this is surely the insufficient coordination of the efforts of the uncommitted countries. All of them have similar views regarding the essential problems on whose solution world peace depends. But this similarity of views has concrete applications in undertaking joint actions.

The lack until now of a systematic coordination of efforts by countries which are not committed to blocs has been well exploited by the bloc powers. By means of various maneuvers, and by using their old methods, the colonial, imperialistic, neocolonial, and other antidemocratic powers have been succeeding in many situations. As, let us say, in the Congo, in flaunting the U.N. resolutions. Or, what is more, they have been succeeding in hitching the world organization to their own chariot. It is also a total absurdity and an irony of the times in which we are living, that just at the moment of a further, great ascent of the anti-colonial and anti-imperialistic forces, it would happen that U.N. organs participated in a colonial conspiracy. . . .

Real possibilities exist for the world organization to transform itself into a means for equal, democratic international cooperation. The majority in the United Nations consists of the anticolonial, anti-imperialistic, and other peace-loving forces. For this reason their mutual attitude toward the most important problems appearing on the U.N. agenda is of primary importance.

The efforts in the direction of intensified cooperation by the uncommitted countries, and in particular the preparations for the conference of the chiefs of the governments of these countries, are being accompanied in a section of the world press by various tendentious and malicious articles. The propaganda stories about a "third bloc" have been revamped. It is known, meanwhile, that these stories have been invented by the protagonists of blocs with the aim of compromising orientations which are not in the direction of alignment behind blocs, to present such an orientation as unrealistic. The idea has been—and the various tendentious commentaries of late show that such attempts are still being made—to convince the world that those countries which criticize the existing blocs will in practice form a bloc of their own. In other words, that in the end they themselves will drop to the position of being a bloc.

"Those men," said President Tito in his speech in the Indian Parliament in December 1954, "cannot see the world otherwise than as divided into blocs and spheres of interest. Is it not absurd to think that we, who are so strongly opposed to division into blocs, now wish to form a third bloc? We wish to see an increase in the number of states and peoples to whom the preservation of peace is most important and who are fighting for equal relations, for peaceful cooperation among peoples, and for the active coexistence of states with different social systems, not by means of creating some kind of a third bloc but rather by means of active cooperation against those negative manifestations in the world which constantly hang like the

sword of Damocles over the heads of mankind and threaten to destroy it."

Certain circles in some of the big countries are asking: Why are the small countries so very active in connection with world questions? In many articles the thought is expressed that, at the present time of strong nuclear armament, no special role can be played in world politics by those countries which do not possess atomic bombs. And recommendations are made to the small countries to occupy themselves exclusively with their internal problems and to leave world questions to the atomic powers. Such observations and "advice" are a typical expression of old concepts that once existed in the world. The situation meanwhile has changed. The world of today, as Comrade Edvard Kardelj says, is not a world of yesterday. World peace is not and cannot be left to a narrow circle of big powers. World problems affect equally the interests of the big powers and those of the other countries of the world. Therefore, it is not the right, but also the obligation of the small countries to occupy themselves most directly with the burning international problems and to influence their proper solution. . . .

Worsening of relations between East and West has been doing harm to the entire world community, consequently equally affecting all the smaller members. Broader joint activity by the uncommitted countries is all the more important at the very time certain new possibilities present themselves for removing the consequences of this worsening of relations. It is known that in the recent past many objective opportunities for an improvement in the international situation were missed, so it is especially important that such opportunities should not be missed today. Besides, the uncommitted countries are most directly interested also in the solution of the difficult problems of North-South relations. While right after the World War II, international life moved mostly along the East-West line, now the new dimension expressed along the North-South line is becoming more and more important. This is a whole set of problems connected with relations between the one-time dominating powers and former subjects, of international relations between the old and the newly-liberated countries, between the former metropolises and the new independent countries, between the industrially highly developed and the economically backward countries. . . .

It is an indisputable fact that the uncommitted countries have not only acquired the right of citizenship, but also affirmed themselves as a new force in world events. In fact, it is a question of the appearance of a qualitatively completely new force in international relations, introducing a new content in world politics. And it is precisely for this reason that the uncommitted countries should, both in the definite formulation of and in the practical carrying out of world politics, assume that position which objectively belongs to them, both by the number of the countries which have taken the road of nonalignment in blocs, and by the positive concept they are championing and for which they are striving. The time has come for the voice of the uncommitted countries to be heard much more strongly than before.



# Eastern Europe Overseas

*The East European satellites have played a little-publicized but important part in the Communist drive to win friends and influence in the lands of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Trade missions, technicians and cultural delegations are in constant movement between the capitals of Eastern Europe and the "underdeveloped countries."*

## Cuba and Latin America

UNTIL FEBRUARY 1960, the efforts of the Communist countries to expand their economic and cultural influence had made comparatively little imprint on Latin America. In that month, Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan came to Dr. Castro's Cuba to open an exhibition, and stayed to buy five million Spanish long tons of sugar and to lend Cuba 400 million rubles. Soon his colleagues from all the capitals of Eastern Europe, as well as from Communist China, were in Havana signing similar agreements and staging the greatest show of "comradely love" ever bestowed upon the Western Hemisphere.

Mikoyan's sojourn in Cuba was clearly a turning point in Soviet and Eastern European relations with Latin America, as evidenced by the events which have followed. Just how successful the new phase will be is still not very clear. The Communists have had to wait for a long time for the opening they found in Cuba, and there is every indication that they intend to take full advantage of it.

### *Cuba As a Model*

Moscow seems to be using Cuba as a small-scale pilot model to demonstrate to the rest of Latin America the fruits of industrialization and collectivization attained with Communist aid. Massive aid is being poured into this small island of roughly 6.5 million people. In a little over a year, Communist loans to Castro's government have totalled about \$250 million, most of which is to be drawn upon over a five-year period. This figure amounts to about \$40 per capita. It is roughly half of what the US currently plans to loan all of Latin America with its population of 190 million (although the period of time in which the American loans will be utilized will probably be shorter).

In building the model, the countries of Eastern Europe are playing a vital part. Not counting unspecified amounts of credits from Poland and East Germany, Eastern Europe has contributed \$75 million (Communist China \$60 million). Altogether Czechoslovakia is extending \$40 million, a large portion of which will go for the construction of a tractor, truck and automobile plant. Hungary has granted a \$15 million line of credit, two-thirds of which will consist of the delivery of tele-communications equipment; in

addition to the credits, workshops for the repair of agricultural machines will be established as part of a program of technical aid. (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], January 1.) Romania is offering \$15 million worth of plants and equipment, especially for oil field installations; and Bulgaria has granted \$5 million to cover the costs of 30 plants which will be built in Cuba by 1965, of which 5 are to be completed by the end of 1962. (*Rabotnichesko Delo* [Sofia], January 13.) On May 1, Cuba's economic boss Ernesto Guevara went on the Havana radio with a long and detailed report on the future of the economy, citing a two-page list of factories and shops which Cuba would receive from the Soviet bloc in the next five years.\*

Along with the factories and plants are to come technicians. According to Guevara, on May 1 there were 79 technicians in Cuba from the Soviet Union alone, or more than were to be found in all of Latin America from the entire Sino-Soviet bloc in the period July 1-December 31, 1959.\*\* There were also 62 from Czechoslovakia, 3 from Poland and 1 each from Hungary, East Germany and Yugoslavia. More were coming, he said. The Soviet Union recently sent 300 young agricultural experts to work in Castro's new collective farms. Accords have been signed providing for technical training for 2,400 Cuban workers in the Soviet-bloc countries: at least one-third of these will be trained in the USSR; 200 are to be trained in Communist China; and 180 in Eastern Germany. According to *Rabotnichesko Delo*, January 13, around 100 workers will receive technical instruction in Bulgaria.

### *A Question of Sugar*

Until antagonism and reprisals finally disrupted Cuba's commercial relation with the United States, its trade with the Soviet bloc had been next to nothing. Turnover of goods with the Soviet Union in 1961 is now estimated at \$225-250

\* *The Soviet Union is to supply 100 factories by 1965, including a steel mill, a machine plant, an oil refinery and a number of electric power stations.*

\*\* COMMUNIST ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE LESS DEVELOPED AREAS, *United States Department of State Publication* (Washington), July, 1960, p. 2.

million, according to *The New York Times*, December 20, 1960. Trade with Czechoslovakia during the current year was raised to \$80 million as a result of a new trade protocol on June 4 (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], June 5); before that, trade had been set at 3.5 times the 1960 level. The exchange of goods with Poland has been put at \$44 million as compared with roughly \$5 million last year. The standard lists of goods exchanged consist of machinery and equipment and national specialties from Eastern Europe and the USSR (as well as some food, especially from Poland), in exchange for sugar, tobacco, hides and ferrous and non-ferrous metal ores.

The key to the exchange is sugar, Cuba's chief export. The bulk of it had been marketed in the United States, until the embargo, at well above the world market price. Mikoyan's deal, which provided for the purchase of one million tons annually—80 percent payable in merchandise and 20 percent in dollars—contracted for the crop at a price below that prevailing on the world market, but the Cubans argue that they made a good bargain since they will obtain their imports from the bloc at more attractive prices than could be obtained elsewhere. By the end of 1960 the Sino-Soviet countries had agreed to take 4 million tons of sugar during 1961, and the crucial issue became what to do with it.\* The problem is not particularly acute for Eastern Europe—although there is a surplus of sugar available for export in several of the countries—since they have contracted for only 300,000 tons of the total. The Soviet Union has a greater ability to absorb the imports domestically; however, it will hardly be able to handle 2.7 million tons, which it is slated to buy during 1961, in this way. (*Christian Science Monitor*, December 20, 1960.)

While the sugar trade is not very promising financially for the Soviet bloc (nor, for that matter, are the large deliveries of machines and equipment such as 2,000 tractors from Romania in 1961, amounting to 10 percent of that country's annual tractor production), some aspects of the new trade appear to be profitable. For one thing, Cuba is rich in minerals some of which are chronically short in Eastern Europe. Growing tensions between the Soviet bloc and Albania, where Czechoslovakia has sunk extensive credits into the development of nickel resources, may have placed this source of supply in jeopardy. Cuba offers a convenient alternative source and, at the same time, gives Prague an opportunity to play politics at both ends. The new trade protocol signed on June 4 was negotiated partly in response to "substantial increases . . . [in Cuban] mineral exports to Czechoslovakia," according to Radio Prague, May 31.

### Cultural Ties

With the economic base firmly secured, the Communist countries have attempted to buttress their beachhead in

Latin America with cultural contacts. Probably never in their history have the people of Eastern Europe seen and read so much about affairs in the Caribbean, or about Latin America in general. On March 1, the first air route was inaugurated from Prague to Havana. Cultural and scientific accords have been signed by Cuba with all the countries of Eastern Europe, and exchanges have been arranged between educational institutions and social organizations. Movie and television films are being exchanged, and cameramen from Eastern Europe are busy filming the life of the Cuban people and the recent "invasion battles." An agreement for radio and television exchange, for example, was signed between Poland and Cuba on June 5.

Recent comings and goings between Cuba and the Soviet bloc have been devoted almost exclusively to an expansion of these cultural ties. A ten-member delegation of Cuban educators, headed by Cuban Minister of Education Dr. Armando Hart, arrived in Prague on May 11 after visiting the Soviet Union; and on May 16 a new education and cultural pact was signed. Terms of the agreement stipulated that Czechoslovakia would accept 250 students in its educational institutions during 1961, help with the construction of Cuban schools, and build a Czechoslovak house of culture in Havana. It also provided that an exhibition of Cuban art and Cuban films would be held in Prague, called "Week of Cuban Films." (CTK [Prague], May 19.) On May 26, *Rude Pravo* announced that the director of the Cuban National Theatre in Havana and his company had come to Prague to study.

Another Cuban group appeared in Bulgaria and signed a cultural agreement on May 22. Again the pact provided for the exchange of personnel in the cultural and educational fields. The Cuban group, headed by Alejo Carpentier, Deputy Director of the Supreme Council for Culture in the Cuban Government, agreed that 25 students would study in Bulgarian universities and that 5 Bulgarian students would study Spanish in Cuba. (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, May 23.) The Carpentier group went next to Romania, where on May 27 they signed another accord which provided for 20 Cuban scholarships in Romanian universities. Next the delegation went to Hungary, where it agreed to establish closer cooperation in the field of communications. (Radio Budapest, May 29.)

Meanwhile, a delegation of five representatives of the Association of Young Rebels of Cuba visited Hungarian factories and collective and state farms, and at the end of a week of touring they were received by Party leader Janos Kadar. (Radio Budapest, May 27.) In Poland, Party chief Gomulka entertained another group of visiting youths from Cuba on May 11, according to Radio Warsaw.

Other movements between the capitals of Eastern Europe and Cuba included the arrival of Deputy Premier and Chairman of the Slovak National Council Rudolf Strechaj, and Minister of Heavy Machine-Building Karel Polacek, to attend the opening of the exhibition "Czechoslovakia—Country of Friends" in Havana on June 9. (CTK [Prague], June 3.) On June 3, a delegation of the Cuban National Office for Land Reform, led by Captain Rene Ortiz, arrived in Prague from Warsaw at the invitation of

\* The only publicized instance of "dumping" involved 1,500 tons sold to Jordan at \$84 per (metric) ton, or 2.6 cents a pound, while the prevailing price in Jordan was \$94 per ton and 3.25 cents per pound in the world market. This transaction evidently did not violate the terms of the accord with Cuba which requires the USSR not to export to "habitual importers of Cuban sugar."

the Czechoslovak Central Council of Trade Unions. (CTK, June 3.) Cuba's Minister of Foreign Affairs Raul Roa appeared in Czechoslovakia on June 14, according to Radio Prague; but no explanation was given for the presence of Castro's top diplomat. Jacinto Torras, Cuba's Foreign Trade Minister, was reported in Bucharest on June 19, negotiating further trade for the current year and preliminary terms for trading relations in 1961.

### The Other Countries

The Communists are taking a calculated risk in Cuba with a view to bigger game. They evidently feel that by playing off Castro's revolution with its anti-American sentiments against the poverty and unrest that prevail in so much of Latin America, they can make inroads into that continent where they have failed in the past.

The countries of Latin America have never been very interested in Communist economic assistance. In the period from July 1, 1954, to June 30, 1959, total Communist-bloc credits to Latin America amounted to only \$106 million, concentrated completely in Argentina and Brazil, as compared with \$962 million in economic assistance granted by the US to the same two countries.\* Of the Communist credits only \$2 million went to Brazil, and these were granted by Poland in 1956; the bulk of the rest consists of credits extended to Argentina by the USSR in the fall of 1958, and only \$32 million of that had been utilized by the end of 1959.\*\*

In strictly commercial relations, Eastern Europe did more buying and selling than did the Soviet Union, but altogether the turnover of goods amounted to a small percentage of the Latin American countries' total trade. Communist successes were largely obtained as a buyer-of-last-resort for surplus primary commodities which could not be marketed elsewhere in the world.

Even before their Cuban success, the Soviet bloc countries had stepped up their activities in Latin America. In the last six months of 1959, Brazil signed new contracts with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and East Germany; \$1.4 million worth of Hungarian combines were purchased, to be paid for in coffee over a five-year period. East Germany exchanged approximately \$5 million worth of automotive equipment for coffee and possibly cacao and sugar. Hungary offered Argentina a \$23.3 million credit in early 1959, but, if accepted at all, it was only partially accepted in a contract later in the year by which Argentina purchased 80 motor coaches from the Budapest regime.

With the success in Cuba, activities have recently been expanded. The new Quadros government in Brazil has given the green light to somewhat closer ties with the Soviet bloc. New trade pacts were concluded in April and May with the countries of Eastern Europe. The first of

these was signed in Sofia. (Diplomatic relations were restored with both Bulgaria and Romania during March.) Joao Dantas, who led the 22-member Brazilian delegation, was quoted by the Party daily *Rabotnichesko Delo*, April 21, as saying: "Brazil will take first place among the Western countries in imports of Bulgarian goods." The exchange of goods envisaged for the next three years was put at \$100 million. Commodities to be traded include Bulgarian chemicals, agricultural machinery, industrial and textile machinery and ferrous and non-ferrous metals, in return for Brazilian coffee, cocoa, tobacco, rice and sugar.

The Brazilian delegation went next to Romania, where the five-year trade agreement concluded on May 5 set the turnover of goods at \$320 million "with the wish expressed on both sides" that the volume be expanded to approximately \$440 million during the period. The agreement also stipulated that a \$50 million line of credit be made available for contracted deliveries by 1966 of plants and equipment (for oil refineries, chemical and petro-chemical industries, thermo-power stations, refrigerating plants and agriculture) to Brazil. A cultural pact was concluded for the period 1961-62. (Agerpress [Bucharest], May 15.)

The accord signed in Budapest was remarkable not for its provisions, but because the Hungarian regime felt obliged to remain reticent about the fact that \$30 million long-range credits had been extended to Brazil. Suffering from a meat shortage at home, the Hungarian government saw fit to announce the credit only in its French-language foreign broadcasts. Other provisions of this accord stipulated a turnover of goods of \$200 million in the next five years. In addition, scientific, technical and cultural agreements were also concluded. Provision was made for a group of Hungarian specialists to go on a water-processing and well-drilling assignment in Brazil. And discussions were opened regarding the establishment of a Hungarian-Brazilian airline, according to Radio Budapest of May 13. Diplomatic relations between the two countries, the radio said, would soon be re-established.

Czechoslovakia signed a similar set of agreements with the Brazilian delegation on May 19, although no credits were mentioned. The volume of trade envisaged will raise the average annual turnover during the five-year period to more than double that of 1960. The list of Czechoslovak exports included machines and machine tools, complete industrial installations and other industrial products, in exchange for iron ore, cacao, coffee, hides, etc. A protocol on cooperation provides for the exchange of technical experience, the education of technical cadres, and for technical services to accompany deliveries of industrial plants and equipment. (*Rude Pravo*, May 20.)

Another set of accords was concluded with Poland on May 25, according to PAP, the official Polish news agency, but few details were given.

The only other recently publicized contacts with the countries of Latin America were the visit of a Bolivian parliamentary delegation to Czechoslovakia (*Rude Pravo*, May 10) and the arrival in Warsaw of a delegation from the Brazilian Congress (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], May 29).

\* COMPARISON OF THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET ECONOMIES, PART II, Joint Economic Committee of Congress (Washington), 1959, p. 447.

\*\* COMMUNIST ECONOMIC POLICY IN LESS DEVELOPED AREAS, *op. cit.*, p. 35.



A heated peasant "debate" in a Hungarian village during the recent collectivization.  
Hungarian Review (Budapest), May, 1961

## *Khrushchev and the Peasant*

*Now that collectivization is virtually complete in most countries of the Soviet bloc, the chief problem is how to make it work.*

THE PRIVATE OWNERSHIP of land has now almost disappeared in the Soviet bloc. Except for Poland, where Gomulka has compromised with the peasants, most of the land has now been absorbed into the "socialist sector."\* What Stalin did in the 1930s by brute force, the East European Communists have achieved through what the Hungarian press refers to as "more refined and subtle forms of coercion."

Now instead of working on his small independent farm—ranging in size from 5 to 25 acres—the peasant works

\* The "socialist sector," which consists of both state and collective farms, now encompasses 98 percent of the arable land in Bulgaria, 90.4 percent in Czechoslovakia, 90 percent in Hungary and 83.5 percent in Romania (where most of the loose agricultural associations—all but about 5 percent of the arable land—were turned into collective farms in the first quarter of 1960).

alongside his neighbors on a giant common farm which varies in average size from roughly 1,000 to 10,000 acres. He goes off in the morning (or rides, if the collective is prosperous enough to have sufficient trucks and tractors) to join his brigade (some of them consisting of as many as 400 members). He works in the common fields or barns at the job the brigade leader tells him to do. And he receives a small income according to a variety of schemes which may depend on the job he does, or how well he works—or how many credits are entered in the brigade leader's notebook.

On paper the collective farms are run by the members, but there is very little evidence that they really work that way. Management has problems enough in fulfilling plans, keeping the farm in the black, and following the signals of



the Party to bother with membership meetings. Bulgarian Party leader Zhivkov recently gave a rather clear picture of the democratic process in the countryside: "There are collective farms where no delegate meetings are being held, and if they are held, they are very rare. . . . Delegates are not being elected, and on the day of the meeting trucks are sent to the villages to pick up anyone they meet as a 'delegate.'" <sup>1</sup>

### A High Price

For this kind of agriculture, however, the Communists have paid—and are still paying—a heavy price. They regularly announce to the impoverished nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America: "Look at us, we were poor, and we pulled ourselves up by our bootstraps." They can cite impressive figures of industrial growth to demonstrate their point. However, they neglect to point out that the bootstraps employed were those of millions of peasants.

A revolution in agricultural production has swept the advanced countries of Western Europe and North America in recent years; in the Soviet bloc, on the other hand, progress has been embarrassingly slow. Czechoslovakia—together with East Germany the most technically advanced of Communist countries—discovered that its rural production in 1955-57 was 3 to 5 percent below what it had been before the war (only in 1960 did it exceed pre-war levels), while Western Europe's was, on the average, 25 percent higher. The Czechoslovaks found, moreover, that productivity levels in Holland, Britain, Denmark and the United States (to cite only a few examples) were respectively two, three, four and six times greater than in Czechoslovakia.<sup>2</sup> Minister of Agriculture Lubomir Strougal made this admission recently: "Although in daily per capita food consumption we occupy one of the first places in Europe, this is not because of our own production."<sup>3</sup>

Eastern Europe, which in former years exported grain in quantity, is now importing more and more. The chief supplier, the Soviet Union, announced at the Moscow agricultural parley in February 1960 that "each country must exert a maximum effort toward obtaining sufficient grain out of its own production." (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], April 16, 1961.)

Nowhere have the Communist regimes come near the agricultural goals they set for themselves in the last decade. In the five-year period ending with 1960, Czechoslovakia managed an 11 percent increase in production as compared with a planned increase of 27 percent. Bulgaria, where so much time and effort was expended on the "big leap forward" which called for an increase in agricultural production of 73.9 and 32 percent in 1959 and 1960 respectively, ended the three-year period 1958-60 with an average annual growth of roughly 6.8 percent. Romania—where the publication of meaningful figures in the agrarian sphere is a rare event—has admitted that its farmers were able to raise output by only 4.4 percent over 1955 by the end of 1959.<sup>4</sup> There is a shortage of meat in the Soviet Union, Hungary and Bulgaria, as well as of some other food staples.

### Private Enterprise Socialism

THE COMMUNISTS have never been able to sell their system to the peasants. Late in 1960 a Slovak newspaper complained: "Agriculture is ten years behind what it should be if only available knowledge were introduced into the production process." In the spring, work lagged; in the fall, the harvest was slow. After canvassing various faults the newspaper concluded: "The decisive factor in agriculture, where every endeavor and every well-meant effort suffers shipwreck, lies elsewhere. That is to say, we have not succeeded to this day in interesting the majority of collective farmers in increasing production."<sup>5</sup> The editorial struck at the exposed nerve of collective farming, which is supposed to form the basis of a rational and scientific rural society.

### The Large and the Small

The one concession which the Communists have made to what Lenin called the "diabolic" side of the peasant—i.e., that part which favors bourgeois ideals of property and personal gain—is the private household plot. From that concession has sprung the most telling irony of their system. On these tiny parcels of land—most of them run about an acre in size—the peasant is allowed to grow vegetables, keep a cow, a few pigs, sheep or goats and some chickens. Despite the fact that this hybrid institution ought to be the kind of thing that withers away as the peasants develop into socialist men, it has become so important to the agricultural economy that a large portion of the population in the Soviet bloc would go hungry without it.

These small strips of land, which account for no more than 5 percent of the arable land in any of the countries, frequently raise half or more of the livestock as well as of other major food items. In Hungary, recently, "approximately 50 percent of the country's cattle and pig stock, 15 percent of the sheep and 90 percent of the poultry [were] on the private plots"; out of total production the following percentages of specific products were derived from the same source.<sup>6</sup>

Beef . . . . .	40	Poultry and eggs . . . .	98
Pork . . . . .	60	Wool . . . . .	15
Milk . . . . .	60		

The household plots loom just about as large in Bulgaria and Romania, although less so in Czechoslovakia. The same anomaly exists in the Soviet Union. The atomistic household plots (together with the workers' gardens) in the USSR contributed to total agricultural production in 1960 as follows: 48.2 percent of the meat and lard, 48.5 percent of the milk supply, 79 percent of egg production, 63 percent of the potatoes and 49 percent of the vegetables.<sup>7</sup>

In effect, the Soviet bloc has created two separate modes of agrarian production which, by any yardstick, stand at opposing ends of the scale. At one extreme are the state and collective farms which are large and growing larger; at the other extreme are the small private plots using great quantities of labor. An eminent American agricultural economist, who recently toured the USSR countryside,



wrote: "Nowhere in Western Europe is peasant farming so inefficient in the employment of labor." He suggested that if the private plots were enlarged to about 10 acres per household, and supplied with suitable machines and equipment, "the increase in agricultural output, I am convinced, would be impressive, chiefly in products that are presently very scarce."<sup>9</sup>

No orthodox Communist would propose to enlarge the private sector in agriculture, although the peasants themselves have never hesitated to infringe upon the collectively owned land. The Czechs estimated in early 1960 that on about 29 percent of their collective farms the permissible 1.2 acres per household had been exceeded. The peasants had also managed to acquire a cow or a calf or a few more pigs than the Model Statute allowed. "At Svatoplukove 18 members of the collective keep between 3 and 8 pigs each. In the collective at Mojmirovce 40 members keep 133 pigs. . . . At the state farm in Aleksince, 25 employees keep 90 pigs."<sup>10</sup>

Some experimental attempts have been made, chiefly in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, to do away with the private plots on more prosperous farms, and some success has been claimed. But when this was attempted on a large scale in Bulgaria in 1959, the results were disastrous. Faced with enormous pressure from the government to make bigger deliveries, the managers of the collective farms tried to extract more produce from the members' plots, and in many cases even turned the plots under the common plow. The peasants responded by selling or slaughtering their cattle, and "even chopped down fruit trees located in sectors assigned to the collective farmers for their private use." By the regime's own admission: "Abolition of the private use of land inflicted a most severe blow on stock breeding. Only 13 percent of the farmsteads in the collective farms are breeding cows or buffalo cows." In one of

the country's 30 districts, the numbers of cattle were reduced by 8,000, sheep by 26,000, pigs by 12,000 and poultry by 24,000; in another, the number of cows declined by more than one half.<sup>10</sup>

### Undisciplined Farmers

The fondness of the new socialist farmers for their private plots is accompanied by a reluctance to work on the common land. Last fall a Bratislava journalist toured the surrounding countryside and returned to write this tale of woe:

"It was Sunday yesterday, the day was lovely and there was the Sunday festive mood in the villages. . . . But the fields looked quite otherwise. It was sad to see them. There was not a human being in sight. The threshing machines were unattended and the corn bound in sheaves was rotting and sprouting. And this was not an exception, mind you, it happened everywhere, on hundreds of hectares. It was a sad thing to see the year's work of the peasants in the collectives turning to nothing.

"By all means, enjoy yourself—but only after you have finished your work. . . . Whilst you sing, grain is literally rotting in the fields."<sup>11</sup>

While this is a standard exhortation to spur the peasant into greater work on the collective farms—Sundays and all—at the same time it demonstrates rather plainly how the farmers must feel about this labor and its fruits. The norm seems to be: "Work as little as possible and take what you can get." The Hungarian provincial daily *Vas Nepe* (County Vas) summed up the peasants' view of collectivization in the Transdanubian region on October 30, 1960, as follows: "In many places common property is not respected at all, members do not care if the crops are ruined or destroyed. Frequently common property is looted. . . ." Informal courts, resembling the "comrades' courts" of the factories, have been established, or are now in the making, to discourage those who "regard common property as everybody's prey." But the effectiveness of such measures seems rather dubious when the pigs in the collective herd are commonly found to exist on "subsistence rations" while those on the private plots grow fat and the peasants have fodder to spare. "This state of affairs results in a situation where the plot owners can sell fodder at high prices while their collective applies to the state for fodder allocations."<sup>12</sup>

Another difficulty is to persuade able-bodied members to work regularly in the common fields—and this applies even to the Party members.\* Repeated attempts to "relieve the women of the drudgery of housework in order that they may join their men in the fields," have met with very little response. When the peasants show up on the job, moreover, they often make a point of avoiding unpleasant tasks. From Czechoslovakia comes the story of a doctor who was said to have examined 22 collective farmers for various ailments which they felt excluded them from unpopular work—"for



"Comrade Chairman, the tractors are ready to work."  
"Fine, the spare parts are over there in the stall."

László Matyi (Budapest), February 9, 1961

\* Bulgarian official statistics put the average number of work days per collective farm member at 209 in 1958, but according to *Ikonicheska Misl* (Sofia), No. 6, 1960, a group of 431 thousand members worked no more than 100 work days, 336 thousand worked from 101 to 150 and another group of 331 thousand worked 151 to 200 work days in 1958.

instance, in the cowshed"—and found only two with serious difficulties. "They prefer the so-called clean and easier jobs such as gathering poppyseed and corn, or working in vegetable production. But when it is necessary to handle manure in the fields or in the courtyard or to spread artificial fertilizers . . . only 15 to 20 of the most disciplined collective members come while the others stay at home. This lack of willingness on the part of the collective members is our first trouble."<sup>13</sup>

The peasants are also holding out for a shorter day. Part of the standard propaganda during the collectivization drives throughout Eastern Europe has been the promise of a new life with machinery to do the work. But the millennium is not at hand. The Hungarian farmers' weekly *Szabad Fold* (Budapest) declared last year on June 5, when the harvest was running seriously behind schedule for want of manpower:

"It is wrong to believe . . . that an eight-hour day can be introduced or that the work of family members can be done away with. When the farmers' collectives have become large-scale farms in substance as well as in form, when machines and chemicals have replaced manpower, then we can and must talk about it. But if we now draw away more of the labor force than can be replaced with machines, we commit a grave error."

### Vanishing Men

With the spread of collective farming there has been a rapid exodus of people from the countryside, and there is a growing lack of hands at harvest time. Migration from the country to the towns is a common historical phenomenon. With the introduction of industrialization and modern technology, peasants flock into the cities in search of larger paychecks and the amenities of city life. But in the Communist countries, where collectivization has given an additional push, the movement has gone too fast. In Hungary, the number of workers employed in agriculture dropped 25 percent between 1945 and 1960: in 1938, 2.5 million people were working in the fields; now there are 1.9 million, and 25 percent of these are said to be old or partially disabled. In recent years, the net losses of population from Hungarian villages were as follows (in thousands—the total population of the country is slightly under 10 million):<sup>14</sup>

1955 . . . . .	89.2	1958 . . . . .	186.9
1956 . . . . .	131.4	1959 . . . . .	197.2
1957 . . . . .	229.0		

In Czechoslovakia (whose total population is about 13.5 million), 400,000 persons left the farms during the past five years, according to Agricultural Minister Lubomir Strougal's report to the Party Central Committee last February.

The chief difficulty is that most of those who leave are the young people. "He wants to make money, to buy something for himself, to have his regular working hours and then be left alone. After all, can the collective farm give him ten hundred *koruny* in cash? He simply does not want to join the collective."<sup>15</sup> As Hungarian President Istvan Dobi has put it, the villages are growing "senile."

In one county, according to *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest), May 1, 1960, there were three collective farms where only three of the members were under 30 and the rest were over 50; in other villages, said the weekly, "there are hardly any members under 50." In another Hungarian county—one of the first to be collectivized—47 percent of the collective farm members were under 40 years of age in the first half of 1959, but by the fall of 1960 the figure had dropped to 25 percent.<sup>16</sup> In Czechoslovakia only 60 percent (41 percent in Slovakia) of the youth needed for agricultural schools, apprenticeships, etc. were actually recruited in 1960. The Prague regime sounded the following warning in the pages of its official daily *Rude Pravo* (Prague), on February 24, 1961:

"Exceptional attention ought to be devoted to the recruitment of youth. The average age structure is unfavorable in a number of collective farms today, so that not even the progress of mechanization will be sufficient to change the situation and make up for the shortage of labor."

The pinch in Hungary's rural labor supply during 1960 forced the regime to permit hiring of casual labor, on conditions similar to those "which prevailed for the agrarian proletariat in the old days." In addition to help from the Army, 30,000 "voluntary harvesting pairs" were recruited into youth brigades to aid in the harvest. Czechoslovakia, where the most acute shortages exist, has had to rely increasingly on labor brigades from the factories, on youth brigades and on soldiers to see the collective farms through peak work periods; and paradoxically, the same shortages occur sporadically in Bulgaria and Romania despite the fact that two-thirds of their population live in the countryside.

### The Struggle for Control

TO MAKE collective farming into a viable social institution, the Communists are trying to fill the empty idea with some of the stuff of human interest. The basic idea was expressed by Khrushchev in his angry address to the Party Central Committee last January on the sad state of Soviet agriculture:

"Comrades it is necessary to increase material incentives. Material incentives must occupy a definite place in our organizational work. We cannot get far on the moral factor alone. . . . People must see, must feel, what the material stimulus is. Does this contradict our principles? When marching toward Communism, in the first place there must be concern for the people. . . . For good work, for high productivity, there must be corresponding payment, material encouragement. . . . Some people may argue that this is not so important now. But comrades, this is wrong."<sup>17</sup>

Some measure of the need can be seen from the following data. In 1952, the total annual gross income of a peasant family in the Soviet Union was estimated to be 2,154 rubles (including income from the private plot). At the old tourist rate of exchange between the ruble and the dollar (10 rubles to the dollar), this amounted to \$215, and according to Western analysts this rate was overvalued in terms of

comparative purchasing power for most goods used by the farm family.\* Prices on staple foodstuffs were cheaper than in the United States, but those on manufactured consumer goods were markedly higher: clothing prices were about double, for example; and a bicycle cost from 600 to 700 rubles.<sup>18</sup>

Not only was the income level low, certainly far below that of the workers in the cities, but its distribution was marked by sharp inequities. Because of varying soil fertility and the vagaries of the dual pricing system for agricultural products (one price for compulsory deliveries and another for surpluses), wide disparities existed in the income of farms in different regions. Within the collective farms, the standard method of distributing earnings in cash or in kind was the cumbersome system of workdays, which provided little scope for rewarding quality or skill or effort. Moreover, the peasant generally saw little tangible reward for his labors until the end of the year; and then the results depended on how much of the collective's annual income was distributed to the members—and on how accurately and honestly the brigade leader and the accountant kept their books.

## Reforms

Nikita Khrushchev can claim most of the credit for trying to give the peasant a better deal. Upon his ascent to power, he began by reducing taxes and substantially raising the low prices which the state paid for farm produce. Cash incomes in the collective farms were said to have more than doubled between 1952 and 1956-57, and payments by the farms to their members reportedly trebled.

The real burst of reforms came after 1956. Khrushchev liquidated the Machine Tractor Stations, initiated a new spate of collective farm mergers and completely overhauled the pricing and procurement system. While the latter was the most important of the material incentives, the other measures may have had some effect. The mergers, for instance, were intended to reduce the disparities between income levels in different farms by uniting the prosperous and the poor.

The client governments of Eastern Europe fell into line with most of these reforms. A new pricing and procurement system was adopted in Czechoslovakia in June 1959. Compulsory deliveries were abolished and the dual price system abandoned. Purchase prices were raised on the average by 14.7 percent to individual farmers and by 15.3 percent to the collective farms. The prices of tractors were reduced by 15 percent and of spare parts by 25 percent. Individual farms were given a greater voice in the formulation of the annual plans, and purchasing organs were instructed to conclude long-range delivery agreements with the collectives in order to insure more stability. At the same time, the collectives were given greater control over the private plots of their members, one aim being to "abolish favorable price treatment." Prices were also structured to reduce the dis-

crimination against the collectives not favored by climate or soil. The new agrarian tax system was calculated so as to level the differences in incomes, and the proceeds were to be turned over to local governmental bodies in an effort to interest local officialdom in increasing production.

Throughout the satellite area, the regimes pressed for more imaginative methods of income distribution, such as premiums and bonuses aimed at improving both the quantity and quality of work performed. Distribution in kind was reduced, and a system of monthly or quarterly payments or "advances" was introduced into many collectives, rendering income more certain and prompt. Other measures were taken to increase incentives, such as certain decentralization moves in Bulgaria which gave the farms more freedom to adjust their methods of organization and payment of labor in order to bring them into line with "prevailing local conditions." Larger salaries and larger bonuses were also given to the agricultural experts and employees of the administrative apparatus.

On balance, the measures taken over the years have had a positive influence on the incomes of the collectivized peasantry. In 1958, the average annual income of a collective farm family in Czechoslovakia amounted to 26,206 *koruny*; out of the total, 63.7 percent was derived from the collective farm, 24.5 percent from the private plot and 11.8 percent from "other sources."\* The growth of income from various sources was given as follows (1953 equals 100):<sup>19</sup>

	Collective Farms	Private Plots	Other Sources	Total
1955 .....	137	103	116	126
1956 .....	143	112	139	134
1957 .....	132	93	180	126
1958 .....	124	134	181	131

On the average, the number of work units earned by a collective farm family was said to have increased by 14 percent during the 1953-58 period. In Bulgaria some idea of the variations in income, according to official statistics, was given as follows (in *leva*, income from private plots not included):<sup>20</sup>

1953 .....	2,501	1958 .....	3,566
1955 .....	3,059	1959 .....	4,290
1957 .....	4,042		

These figures compare with the 8,574 *leva* which the average worker in industry was said to have earned in 1958.

In Hungary, where only 30.7 percent of the arable land was in the "socialist sector" in December 1958, and less than 15 percent in the collective farms proper, total cash income to the peasantry increased 27 percent in 1957 but

\* "Other sources" evidently include income earned by some member of the family employed in the so-called "ancillary" enterprises operated by the collectives. These are small processing operations, construction cooperatives, repair shops, etc. Some farms have recently been criticized for regarding these activities as their main source of income. "Some collective farms make lighting conductors, TV aerials, and in Miletin they even repair churches! No wonder they neglect the main thing—agricultural production." (*Mlada Fronta* [Prague], March 25, 1961.)

\* The peasant family, however, did have a house to live in, free medical care and some social services.





Intense faces of Hungarian peasants as they reflect on the contract that, when signed, will put an end to their traditional way of living.

*Hungarian Review* (Budapest), March, 1961

dropped back below the 1956 level in both 1958 and 1959. On the collective farms alone, earnings increased by 3.5 percent in 1959, but the income derived from common work declined by 15.6 percent while that from the private plots increased by 26.9 percent. On the "efficient" collectives, the private plots accounted for 20-30 percent of the members' total income, while on the newly created farms this share amounted to 50-70 percent.<sup>21</sup>

### **Expediency and Dogma**

One of the principal difficulties in the effort to root out the old evils of the system and instill the peasantry with incentives to work on the common land has been the political drive for further collectivization, and the two efforts have often worked at cross purposes. In consequence, certain things have been done—notably in Hungary and Bulgaria—which are not in strict conformity with the tenets of official dogma.

In Hungary in December 1959, there were 7 pigs and 18 sheep less per 100 cadastral holds (one hold equals 1.42 acres) than one year earlier when the regime had commenced its collectivization drive. To overcome this, the government began to support the private plots. In April 1960, for example, a decree was issued requiring the management of the collectives to help increase the animal stock of the plots by providing fodder and pasture from the common land. In addition, members who had no cattle on their plots were authorized to buy breeding heifers on credit from the state; 10,000 such animals were to be made available during 1960 and another 20,000 in 1961.

Along with the decrees came theoretical innovations to justify these "transitory measures." "The private plot is a

complementary and organic part of the common farm. The collective farm is a more developed and higher form of cooperative farming which reconciles, through the private plot, the individual and everyday interests of the peasants with the public interest."<sup>22</sup> It was said that "household plots will remain during the entire course of socialism. . . ."

The regime in Sofia, whose deference to dogma is rarely in question, encountered the same dilemma during its "big leap" when it was obliged to assume the unpleasant task of protecting the private plots against the encroachments of the collective farm managers and local officials. "The private plot of the collective farm members does not hinder the development of the common economy. . . . At the present stage of collective farm development, the economic benefit of the private plot of the collective members is evident."<sup>23</sup>

The currents of compromise ran even deeper in Hungary, affecting in particular the methods of income distribution and labor organization, where the canon of "socialist principles" was extended to cover a multitude of schemes. The most dubious of these provided for parcelling out land to the collective members in a way that amounted to sharecropping: the peasant sowed, cultivated and harvested his own strip of land and received in return a certain percentage of the yield as his profit. Another, less extreme, version of the same approach provided for dividing the cultivation of row crops among the households and coupling it with liberal bonuses for above-plan production in order to draw more members of the household into the common fields. "The division of the land into plots does not mean a step back to small holdings," argued *Agrartudomány* (Budapest), February 1960.

Evidently not everyone in the Party agreed with these measures. Lajos Feher, CC member in charge of agricultural affairs, went on record in the pages of the theoretical monthly *Társadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), June 1960, against those who disagreed.

"In many places the transitory measures are described in a sectarian manner as 'capitalist tendencies' or are regarded as a 'crime and a stand taken against socialism.' Consequently people holding these views do little for the enforcement of the transitory measures and even impede them.

"These harmful, narrow-minded views have to be energetically liquidated. Everyone should be made to understand, particularly those concerned and responsible for the execution of the measures, that the country wants meat!"

### **Looking to the Future**

THE EFFORT to enlist the peasant's self-interest on the side of collective agriculture is only one phase of Khrushchev's program. He has spoken many times on the future of collective farming, and his proposals are well known: the gradual abolition of the private plots (or their severe limitation), the introduction of a guaranteed money wage like that in the factories, and a slow transition to "agro-cities"—i.e., the concentration of villages into urban-like settlements which possess more of the amenities of



In Czechoslovakia, two tractor brigades—each responsible for preparing 500 hectares for spring sowing—receive instructions from their group leader and the collective farm's agricultural expert.

*Svet v Obrazech* (Prague), April 8, 1961

modern life. All of these measures are of a piece. They will, according to their proponents, eliminate the corrupting influence of private farming which still distracts the members of collective farms from their common tasks; they will also offer the peasant a tangible and certain reward for his labors; and they will give him the benefits that go with urban life.

Various versions of these ideas have been applied experimentally in the USSR for some time. But what were mere straws in the wind appear now to have taken permanent root. Czechoslovakia, which is the most enthusiastic proponent of them in Eastern Europe, began to tinker with the idea of the guaranteed money wage in 1960 after a team of experts returned from a tour of Soviet experimental farms with the following appraisal:

"First of all, working discipline improved noticeably. . . . The shortage of workers disappeared. It was possible to discontinue calling for help from the towns, and gradually surpluses of workers appeared which made it possible to introduce more intensive production. Work now starts on time and does not stop too early . . . and the new method of remuneration, which resembles that applied in industry, is most attractive—especially for the youth. There is a strong tendency toward tightening up the norms, which shows that the monetary form of remuneration . . . also has a favorable effect on organization and facilitates the reduction of costs. . . . A big step ahead, furthermore, is the reduction in the proportion of the remuneration given in kind, and in this connection also a lessening of the interest in private-plot husbandry. . . ."<sup>24</sup>

Prior to the Fifth National Collective Farm Congress held last March in Czechoslovakia, over 800 collective farms were said to have gone over to the guaranteed wage system. At the Congress itself, Agriculture Minister Lubo-

mir Strougal made it plain that preferential treatment (especially under a new social and pension insurance plan which goes into effect at the beginning of next year) would be given to those farms "which introduce a permanent and incentive-creating pecuniary remuneration while preserving adequate appropriations for other collective funds, and which farm without private plots, and whose working members own only small domestic animals." As for the "agro-cities," the Minister urged local authorities to plan for the "concentration and construction of all that is necessary for the life of the citizens and for social life, that is, they should plan to build schools, creches, cinemas, cultural institutions, post offices . . . which today's and, even more, tomorrow's society will require. . . ."

"I want you, comrades, to understand thoroughly that these are important long-term problems of raising the cultural level of the countryside and adjusting the village to the level of the city."<sup>25</sup>

Just how far and how fast these new ideas are being translated into reality in the Soviet Union is not altogether clear. That the movement is underway, however, is evident. Khrushchev stressed the importance of the new method of regular cash payments at the January session of the Central Committee—although he had very little to say on the subject of private plots. Bank credits have been liberalized in order to help the farms finance wage payments during that part of the year when they have no income. Scattered reports, moreover, indicate that the "agro-cities" are springing up in various places, especially in the Ukraine. Construction of town-like settlements is said to be underway in Kiev, Kherson, Nikolayev and in the Crimean oblast. Private plots in these cases are reportedly cut to about half an acre and located on the outskirts of the town.

Elsewhere in Eastern Europe this new blueprint has met with cautious approval. Hungary has authorized the collective farms to apply the new guaranteed money wage system, and lets the National Bank extend credit, but only—and this point has been underscored—if the necessary security is at hand. In Bulgaria, some 300 collectives are said to have made limited and modified use of the system. But at the CC session on agriculture in April, Party leader Zhivkov criticized over-enthusiastic managers who adopted the new wage system too hastily.

The primary difficulty right now is that most of the collective farms cannot afford it. There are also numerous technical problems. The system is largely designed on a piece-work basis, and if this is difficult to administer in the factory it is even more troublesome on the farm where standardizing products and categorizing jobs is nearly impossible. Bad norms may destroy rather than increase incentives.

### **More Concessions**

Along with these moves have gone a number of smaller actions since the beginning of 1961, which suggest the concern with which the Soviet bloc leaders view the farm problem. Bulgaria raised purchasing prices for several prod-



ucts in January; the prices on meats were increased from 20 to 30 percent, eggs by about 13 percent and milk and milk products by 5 to 6 percent. In the following month, measures were taken to ease the depressed conditions of collective farms in the mountainous and semi-mountainous areas. On May 6, a decree provided higher wages and better working conditions for the men who care for the country's livestock.

Romania's efforts to spur livestock production resulted in a decree in February which granted 520 million *lei* worth of eight-year, interest-free loans to the collective farms during 1961 for the purchase of cows and calves for the peasants. Another 100 million was offered on the same terms for purchasing materials needed to build shelter for the animals, reducing, at the same time, prices which the collectives have to pay for such materials as timber and cement.

Social services to the farmers have recently been reviewed and extended in most of the countries of the area. Bulgaria raised retirement pensions in March and used the concession as an inducement to the peasants, especially the young ones, to remain on the land and increase their participation in communal work. Monthly payments were raised to 100 *leva* as compared with 60 *leva* set in 1957—when the collectivized peasants first became eligible for this benefit.

The Soviet Union, in February, granted major new concessions: taxes on the peasants were reduced, repayment time on loans extended, and interest rates lowered. According to TASS, the official Soviet news agency, the decisions will save the collective farms 887 million rubles annually and help to "raise the living standards of the collective farmers." Most of the income received by the collectives from livestock and dairy products (80 percent) was made entirely tax-free—a move plainly designed to shift output away from the private plots which now figure so large in animal production. Prices on trucks, tractors and other farm machinery were reduced, and the prices on spare parts and gasoline were cut by 40 percent. An additional five to ten years were given farms to repay debts incurred to the state when they acquired machines and equipment from the Machine Tractor Stations.

LIVESTOCK IN PRIVATE PLOTS, 1958  
(in percentage of total)

	Cattle	Cows	Pigs
Bulgaria	43	57	48
Czechoslovakia	18	28	34
East Germany <sup>1</sup>	27	35	32
Hungary <sup>1</sup>	36	41	56
Romania	61	84	73
USSR <sup>2</sup>	35	50	26

<sup>1</sup> After the collectivization drive beginning in January 1959, the share markedly increased.

<sup>2</sup> End of 1959.

Sources: KOZGAZDASAGI SZEMLE (Budapest), November, 1960; and SEL'SKOYE KHOZYAISTVO SSSR (Rural Economy of the USSR) Gosstatizdat (Moscow), 1960.

## The Realists of Warsaw

While the USSR and the collectivized countries of Eastern Europe are following this path, two countries of the Communist world have taken a different way. While each has its unique features, the agricultural policy current in Poland bears a remarkable resemblance to that of Yugoslavia.

Both countries have abandoned efforts to collectivize their agriculture, although both continue to speak of collectivism as the thing of the future. Tito's regime gave up the effort at the end of 1952; it allowed the peasants to disband the collectives, liberalized the discriminatory tax structure, permitted buying and selling of land (although individual holdings were limited to 10 hectares [24.7 acres], raised prices, and in the following years created a rough sort of market economy for agricultural produce. The collective farm structure crumbled in Poland in 1956 when Gomulka permitted the dissolution of unprofitable farms. The Polish reforms paralleled those which had gone before in Yugoslavia. Although Warsaw never went as far as Belgrade, it left the peasants alone, within broadly defined limits, to fend for themselves. Compulsory deliveries were not abolished (as they had been in Yugoslavia), but non-obligatory sales by the farmers to the state increased by 80 percent in the 1956-59 period. The income of the peasantry—in real terms—rose by 29 percent during the 1956-60 Plan, according to official estimate—although it continued to be lower than that of factory workers.\*

The cooperative movements which have since been introduced in the two countries seem to be intended to encourage mechanization and improved techniques, rather than as devices to collectivize the peasants. The agricultural circles in Poland, and the general agricultural cooperatives in Yugoslavia, are based on peasant groups which

\* The consumption of a peasant family amounted to an average of 6,444 *zloty* annually in 1958-59, for the worker's family 8,939 (1958) and for families of engineers and technicians 10,885 *zloty* (1958). Food accounted for 64.6 percent of the peasants' family consumption, 51.2 percent of the workers' and 45.9 percent of the engineers' and technicians'. (*Zycie Gospodarcze* [Warsaw], February 12, 1961.)



"About three more men and we would have large-scale production."

Rohac (Bratislava), May 5, 1961

had their origin in pre-Communist times. Their principal function is to provide peasants—over half of whom belong in Yugoslavia—with seeds, fertilizers, livestock and machinery for ploughing and harvesting. The Yugoslav cooperatives act as purchasing agents in the countryside (a power which the circles in Poland have not yet obtained) and also assist individual farmers on a contractual basis.

While these cooperative movements represent a cautious attempt at organizing the peasantry, the governments have taken into account the facts of life in the countryside and have not threatened the peasants with the loss of their land. The results have been heartening: Poland outpaced the rest of the Soviet bloc during the 1956-60 period with a 20.2 percent increase in production; and by the end of 1959, Yugoslavia had raised its agricultural output 54 percent over the average of 1955-56.<sup>20</sup>

### A Summing Up

THE MASSIVE revamping of agricultural policy that has occurred in the past few years has not been an exercise in futility. The recognition that human motivation is among the more potent forces in economic development was long overdue. However, the effort to increase material incentives is limited by the fact that human beings are not quite as malleable and predictable as Communists like to believe.

Soviet Premier Khrushchev was not talking about machines when, with rather shocking candor, he denounced crookedness and passivity at the Central Committee session in January—or when he spent the next month stumping the grass roots and exhorting officialdom high and low. He was talking about people. A few years ago he had promised that the Soviet Union would catch up with the United States in meat and milk production by the end of 1960, and the carrot had been held out most generously to those who could make his promise a reality. But when the results were in, only 8.9 million tons of meat were forthcoming compared with 17.9 million tons in the United States; and milk production had failed to expand for two years in a row.<sup>27</sup>

However, the important issue is not how well Khrushchev fulfills his pledges. More important problems face the economies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union: the days are gone when a Stalin could think of turning an agrarian country into a nation of steel mills with surpluses drawn from the land. Old dilemmas like inflation take on new significance in the present stage of development when economic problems are more complex. A sagging rural economy can be a major obstacle in the way of progress. If the Communists remain committed to the way of collectivization—as they show every indication of doing—the challenge which the peasantry has posed in the past may become even greater in the future.

#### SOURCES FOR THIS ARTICLE

<sup>1</sup> RABOTNICHESKO DELO (Sofia), April 15, 1961.

<sup>2</sup> NOVA MYSL (Prague), August, 1959.

<sup>3</sup> RUDE PRAVO (Prague), February 12, 1961.

<sup>4</sup> ROMANIAN FOREIGN TRADE (Bucharest), No. 4, 1960.

<sup>5</sup> PRAVDA (Bratislava), November 15, 1960.

<sup>6</sup> NEPSZABADSAG (Budapest), March 8, 1960.

<sup>7</sup> SEL'SKOYE KHOZYAISTVO USSR, 1960 (Moscow), 1961.

<sup>8</sup> Theodore Schultz, THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO MAGAZINE, February, 1961.

<sup>9</sup> ROLNICKE NOVINY (Bratislava), March 31, 1961.

<sup>10</sup> KOOPERATIVNO SELO (Sofia), April 7, 1960.

<sup>11</sup> PRAVDA, August 21, 1960.

<sup>12</sup> RUDE PRAVO, February 14, 1961.

<sup>13</sup> PRAVDA, January 23, 1961.

<sup>14</sup> MONTHLY STATISTICAL BULLETIN (Budapest), December, 1960.

<sup>15</sup> MLADA FRONTA (Prague), December 1, 1960.

<sup>16</sup> KISALFOLD (Gyor), August 4, 1960.

<sup>17</sup> Radio Moscow, January 20, 1961.

<sup>18</sup> United States Department of Agriculture, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF SOVIET AGRICULTURE: REPORT OF A TECHNICAL SURVEY GROUP (Washington), May, 1959.

<sup>19</sup> NOVA MYSL, February, 1960.

<sup>20</sup> NOVE VREME (Sofia), April, 1961.

<sup>21</sup> MONTHLY STATISTICAL BULLETIN (Budapest), May, 1960.

<sup>22</sup> TARSADALMI SZEMLE (Budapest), February, 1960.

<sup>23</sup> KOOPERATIVNO ZEMEDELIE (Sofia), September, 1960.

<sup>24</sup> ZA SOCIALISTICKE ZEMEDELSTVI (Prague), January, 1960.

<sup>25</sup> RUDE PRAVO, March 26, 1961.

<sup>26</sup> United Nations, ECONOMIC SURVEY OF EUROPE FOR 1959 (Geneva), 1960, Chapter VII, p. 46.

<sup>27</sup> IZVESTIA (Moscow), March 8, 1960.

# Facts and Figures

## An Abandoned Soviet Plan

by LYNN TURGEON

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IN SEPTEMBER 1957 the Soviet Union abandoned its Sixth Five Year Plan, which had been scheduled to run from 1956 through 1960, and replaced it with a Seven Year Plan covering the years 1958-1965. The official explanation was that newly discovered possibilities for long-term economic growth required an entirely new plan. Specifically, Moscow claimed that a faster rate of growth had been made possible through technical advances, the discovery of new mineral resources, and the reorganization of industrial administration carried out in mid-1957.

It had been a year of political crises in the Soviet bloc, beginning with the Hungarian Revolt in October 1956 and the simultaneous unrest in Poland, followed by policy struggles in the Soviet Union itself, and culminating in the expulsion of the "anti-Party group" of Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov and Shepilov from the Presidium. Western observers were notably skeptical of the reasons Khrushchev gave for scrapping the Five Year Plan. They pointed out that the performance in the first year and a

half of the period had been disappointing, and that the new goals set for 1965 implied an over-all reduction in the rate of economic growth.

What was to have been the final year of the abandoned plan has now passed, and the published results for 1960 give us enough data to warrant a judgment on the accuracy of the Western appraisal. A comparison of the 1960 results with the targets of the abandoned plan, as well as a glance at the developments of the intervening years, should also give us some clues as to the real reasons for the demise of the plan.

TABLE I makes this comparison with respect to some of the principal over-all measures of economic growth. The results are surprising. The output of producers' goods in 1960 was precisely what had been initially planned, while the aggregate production of consumers' goods was only six percent less than what had been scheduled. Since producers' goods account for between 70 and 75 percent of all industrial production, the original over-all target for

COMPARISON OF SOVIET ACHIEVEMENTS BY 1960 WITH TARGETS OF SIXTH FIVE YEAR PLAN

	Unit of Measure	Achievement in 1960	Target of Plan VI	Achievement as % of Target
National income	As % of 1955	156	160	97.5
Gross production of all industry:	As % of 1955	164	165	99
Output of producers' goods	As % of 1955	170	170	100
Output of consumers' goods	As % of 1955	150	160	94
Labor productivity in industry	As % of 1955	138	150	92
Labor productivity in construction	As % of 1955	153	152	101
Real income or wages <sup>1</sup>	As % of 1955	123	130	95
Number of workers and employees	millions	60.6	55	110
Housing constructed	million square meters (during 1956-60)	314	205	153
Retail commodity turnover	billion "light" rubles	777	750	104
Transfer payments and communal consumption	billion "light" rubles	245	210	117

<sup>1</sup> Target refers to planned increase in real wages while achievement refers to gain in real income.

COMPARISON OF PHYSICAL PRODUCTION INCREASES 1956-60 WITH TARGETS OF  
SIXTH FIVE YEAR PLAN

	Unit of Measure	Output in 1955	Output in 1960	Target 1960	1960 Output as %	
					of 1955	of Target
Pig iron .....	million tons <sup>1</sup>	33.3	46.8	53	141	88
Steel .....	million tons <sup>1</sup>	45.3	65.3	68.3	144	96
Rolled steel .....	million tons <sup>1</sup>	35.3	50.9	52.7	144	97
Iron ore .....	million tons <sup>1</sup>	71.9	107	114	149	94
Petroleum .....	million tons <sup>1</sup>	70.8	148	135	209	110
Coal .....	million tons <sup>1</sup>	391	513	593	131	87
Gas .....	billion cubic meters	10.4	47	40	452	118
Electric power .....	billion kwh	170.2	292	320	172	91
Mineral fertilizers .....	million tons	9.669	13.8	19.6	143	70
Automobile tires .....	million units	10.19	17.2	20.4	169	84
Turbines .....	million kilowatts	5.6	9.2	10.5	164	88
Generators for turbines .....	million kilowatts	4.526	7.9	11	175	72
Metal-cutting machine tools .....	thousand units	117.1	154	200	132	77
Forging and pressing machines .....	thousand units	17.1	29.5	25.8	173	114
Metallurgical equipment .....	thousand tons	172.1	218	280	127	78
Petroleum apparatus .....	thousand tons	48.8	92.8	120	190	77
Chemical equipment .....	thousand tons	111.2	224 <sup>2</sup>	208	201	108
Diesel locomotives .....	units	134	1303	1630	972	80
Electric locomotives .....	units	194	396	550	204	72 <sup>3</sup>
Motor vehicles .....	thousand units	445.3	524	650	118	81
Tractors .....	thousand units	163.4	238.5	322	146	74
Grain combines .....	thousand units	48	58.9 <sup>4</sup>	140	123	42
Industrial timber hauled .....	million cubic meters	212.1	247 <sup>5</sup>	264	116	94
Paper .....	thousand tons	1862	2400	2722	129	88
Cement .....	million tons	22.5	45.5	55	202	83
Collapsible reinforced concrete construction and parts .....	million cubic meters	5.3	32	30.7	604	104
Slate .....	million standard slabs	1488	3000	3050	202	98
Window glass .....	million square meters	99.8	147	155	147	95
Meat (industrial output) .....	thousand tons	2524	4400	3950	174	111
Fish .....	thousand tons	2737	3500	4200	128	83
Butter (excluding private households) .....	thousand tons	463	728	725	157	100
Granulated sugar .....	thousand tons	3419	6400	6530	187	98
Vegetable oil (excluding collective farm) .....	thousand tons	1168	1500	1840	128	82
Canned goods .....	million standard cans	3217	4800	5580	149	86
Cotton fabric .....	million meters	5905	6394	7270	108	88
Woolen fabric .....	million meters	252.3	347	363	138	96
Linen fabric .....	million meters	305.5	563	556	184	101
Silk fabric .....	million meters	525.8	817	1074	155	76
Knitwear .....	million pieces	431.7	582	580	135	100
Footwear .....	million pairs	295.7	449.3	455	152	99
Watches and clocks .....	million units	19.7	26	33.6	132	77
Refrigerators .....	thousand units	151.4	529	635	349	83
Washing machines .....	thousand units	87	953	528	1095	180
Sewing machines .....	thousand units	1611	3100	3780	192	82

<sup>1</sup> All tonnages refer to metric or long tons. The author was assisted in his calculations by Mr. Luke Fusco.

<sup>2</sup> Figure is believed to refer to tonnage rather than value as indicated in PRAVDA. If it actually refers to rubles, it undoubtedly is 2240 million rubles and overfulfillment is greater than calculated.

<sup>3</sup> Represents reduction from output in 1959 when fulfillment percentage was 79.

<sup>4</sup> Refers to self-propelled combines only, reflecting change from trailer-type units during period.

<sup>5</sup> Excludes haulage by collective farms. Total output in 1959 was 269 million cubic meters.



gross industrial production was but slightly underfulfilled. The goal for national income fell short by a little more, undoubtedly because the performance in agriculture was considerably lower than planned.

As in most Soviet planning to date, the target for increased industrial labor productivity was underfulfilled, while that for industrial employment was exceeded. However, since the workweek was reduced by roughly 15 percent during this period, actual output per man-hour (as distinguished from output per man) probably rose by about the percentage planned for "productivity."

In the construction sector, labor productivity even exceeded the goal. This was one reason why housing construction was 50 percent higher than originally planned. A more important reason was that in 1958 the target for housing was sharply increased, reflecting a major change in policy; the additional resources devoted to housing construction undoubtedly reduced those available for capital investment in industry.

Although the over-all target for consumers' goods production was underfulfilled by 6 percent, the retail sales goal was overfulfilled by 4 percent. A growing net importation of consumers' goods from abroad could easily account for this phenomenon. The considerable overfulfillment of the transfer payments and communal consumption target for 1960 undoubtedly reflects to a great extent the new pension law which became effective during this period.

When we examine the fulfillment of the physical output goals for individual commodities, as presented in TABLE II, we find that the fulfillment record is considerably less impressive. These comparisons indicate that most of the physical output targets were fulfilled within a range of between 70 and 110 percent of their original targets, with an average fulfillment of about 90 percent.

This dichotomy between the fulfillment of the individual physical targets and the aggregative goals is not without precedent. This was clearly the case in the previous Fifth Five Year Plan covering the period 1951-55. According to the official Soviet claims, gross production in this earlier plan was overfulfilled by 9 percent. But a detailed comparison of the fulfillment of individual commodity targets—particularly with respect to civilian machinery and consumers' goods—indicates that not only was there considerable variation in the individual fulfillment percentages but also that the average fulfillment was probably less than the 9 percent overfulfillment claimed.\* In general, the level of fulfillment of the physical output targets for Plan V seems to have been somewhat higher than it was for Plan VI.

There are a number of possible explanations for these phenomena. Newly-introduced products may have been priced into the gross production index at unusually high prices reflecting their initially higher costs of production. In addition, as Professor Strumilin in the USSR has recently disclosed, there has evidently been an upward bias in the aggregative indexes of gross industrial production

resulting from an ever-increasing tendency toward multiple-counting.\* That this bias was operating in the past five years is indicated by the fact that Strumilin showed an increase of only 8 percent in *net* industrial output in 1956 as compared with 1955, in contrast to the 11 percent rise officially claimed for *gross* industrial output.

There is also the possibility that the physical targets for military end products, about which there is no information, were overfulfilled to about the same extent that the physical targets for civilian products were underfulfilled. However, the very rapid rate of economic growth achieved during the past two years in the Soviet Union is *a priori* one bit of evidence which would tend to cast doubt on the likelihood of increased emphasis on the production of military end products. The production of military hardware, as an alternative to investment in producers' goods industries, tends to have a decelerating effect on the over-all rate of growth in much the same manner as investment in consumers' goods or service industries.

In retrospect, it is possible to list a number of factors any or all of which might have prompted the Soviet leaders to abandon the original plan. As mentioned above, it seems quite clear that there was a drastic shift in the investment priorities assigned to housing construction some time in the middle of the five-year period. In addition, it seems possible that the decision to lower substantially the compulsory work week may have been expected to cut into the expected growth potential, although in fact the decelerating effect of this decision may have been exaggerated. Certainly the troubles in Poland and Hungary in 1956 probably resulted in unplanned capital assistance for Eastern Europe generally. Finally, increased Soviet assistance for the developing countries has probably been greater than contemplated. Trade turnover with the United Arab Republic and India, for example, rose by over 600 million rubles or by almost 90 percent in 1957. It can be assumed that considerable quantities of capital equipment obtained on long-term credit entered into Soviet exports to these areas.

In view of these developments—all of which tend to slow down the Soviet internal growth rate—it is not difficult to imagine the anxiety that the Soviet planners must have felt with respect to the fate of the original plan. But, using hindsight, one cannot help but feel that the over-all showing these past five years would have satisfied Soviet "public relations" requirements, and that the scrapping of Plan VI was quite unnecessary. That the Soviet planners must be pleasantly surprised by the recent spurt in the rate of growth achieved in 1959 and 1960 is evident from Premier Khrushchev's suggestion that the 1965 goals of the current Seven Year Plan are too modest. Certainly those Sovietologists who feel that the Soviet rate of growth will surely continue decelerating, now that recovery from World War II has been completed, should begin reexamining their position.

\* S. G. Strumilin, *OCHERKI SOTSIALISTICHESKOI EKONOMIKI SSSR, 1929-1959 gg.* (Essays on the Socialist Economy of the USSR, 1929-59), Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1959. See *East Europe*, November 1960, pp. 16-18.

\* See Gregory Grossman, "A Note on the Fulfillment of the Five-Year Plan in Industry," *SOVIET STUDIES*, April, 1957, p. 366.

# Current Developments

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**INTERNATIONAL:** *Soviet bloc reacts with caution to the Kennedy-Khrushchev encounter in Vienna (p. 29).*

*Albanians and Communist Chinese shun Czechoslovak Party celebration (p. 37).*

**POLITICAL:** *High naval officer and three Party officials executed in Albania following trial for treason (p. 39).*

*Twelve Hungarian Catholics sentenced to prison for "conspiring against the state" (p. 38).*

*Bulgarian "anti-Party group" under attack; trade union management reorganized (p. 30).*

**ECONOMIC:** *Czechoslovakia purges rural Party workers (p. 38).*

*Polish government offers concessions to the agricultural circles (p. 35).*

*Bulgaria prepares new Five Year Plan and a prospectus for 1980 (p. 32).*

Students marching in the evening through the streets of Gdansk, where a Student Culture Festival was held in early May.

*It'd (Warsaw), May 21, 1961*



## AREAWIDE

### *Vienna, Before and After*

While President Kennedy was making his way to Vienna via Paris, and Premier Khrushchev his via Bratislava, the East European press and radio gave their cautious endorsement. Welcoming Khrushchev to Slovakia, Czechoslovak President Novotny wished the Soviet Premier "much success in his endeavours for peace" but warned the large Bratislava audience that "the talks with President Kennedy will not be easy. The question of disarmament with effective control is one of the main problems facing humanity today, along with the question of a peace treaty with Germany and the transformation of West Berlin into a free city." (*Ceteka*, June 2.)

The Hungarians emphasized the importance of the Vienna meeting for Kennedy by minimizing his visit to Paris. Claiming that the De Gaulle-Kennedy talks produced "meager results" and that the interests of the two men are "opposed to each other," a Hungarian correspondent also carped at the public fuss made over the President's pretty wife Jacqueline. "Kennedy's visit to Paris is merely a propaganda maneuver. Public success had to be secured by his wife, who looks like a movie star. But Kennedy is not going to Vienna to escort his wife. He himself regards his meeting with Khrushchev as of extreme importance." (*Radio Budapest*, June 2.)

After the two leaders had met, the comment was also cautious in tone. Generally it was agreed that the meeting had produced no visible changes, but that it had been useful, that it was good to see the two men together on the television screen, that it was a good beginning. The Poles maintained that the Vienna talks "confirmed the tremendous possibilities which a summit meeting can create if both sides display a matter-of-fact approach." But they hastily added: "Clearly, differences of views in fundamental matters probably remain; in fact, no one supposed that they would be removed in the course of a dozen hours of so of talks. One should be aware that a fuller evaluation of the Vienna meeting will only be possible later on." (*PAP Warsaw*, June 4.)

The Czechoslovaks echoed their previous pessimism. Radio Prague said: "Nobody thought that the Vienna meeting would miraculously solve everything and end all the difficulties that have accumulated in the world in the 16 years since the end of the war. What we see in the meeting, however, is the start on a new road which will not lack obstacles, but which can lead to the goal of peaceful coexistence and an attitude that all questions can be solved by negotiations and not by force. We do not believe the situation is ideal, but everything indicates that we must replace the uncertainty of terror."

### *Yugoslav-Soviet Bloc Skirmishes (Contd.)*

President Tito brushed off as an "impertinence" the Albanian effort to indict Yugoslavia in the recent purge trial, (see *East Europe*, June, p. 1), but the Yugoslav press

dealt extensively with the subject. Referring to the Tirana trial as "juridical murder," a "reign of terror," a "frame-up," and a "sad court farce," one paper added: "There can be no doubt that the government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia will certainly have to take measures to put an end to such provocations." (*Vjesnik* [Zagreb], May 17.)

The trial itself had been ignored by the Soviet bloc press, with the exception of Bulgaria (see below). Belgrade was quick to make an issue of this and delivered a "vigorous protest" to the Bulgarian ambassador. One editorial complained: "This action has revealed two things. First, by having morally united with the juridical murder in Tirana, the Bulgarian press has supported the edifice of political despotism in Albania. Second, it has also joined the anti-Yugoslav campaign of the Albanian leaders, thus supporting their attempts to spoil the atmosphere of mutual relations in the Balkans in the most reckless way, to create war-mongering tension which best suits the dirty intrigues against international relaxation." (*Delo* [Ljubljana], June 1.)

### *Macedonian Refugees*

Relations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were also exacerbated by the age-old Macedonian problem. Yugoslavia, with its incorporated People's Republic of Macedonia and its official concern for the Macedonian population in other countries, took the Bulgarian government to task for "violating the individuality of the Macedonian nation and acting against its fundamental interests and rights." (*Borba* [Belgrade], May 26.)

The Yugoslavs were particularly concerned about the alleged deportation of 5000 Aegean Macedonians from Poland (where they have been living since 1949, refugees from the Greek civil war) to Bulgaria. According to *Borba*, these refugees have been living contentedly in Poland for over a decade, speaking their own language and attending their own schools, but are now being forced by the Bulgarian government to return to Pirin Macedonia (which lies inside Bulgaria, near the Greek border), where every vestige of Macedonian culture has allegedly been obliterated. "Having failed in its effort to force the Polish government to impose Bulgarian language instruction on the refugees," another paper added, "the Bulgarians have now hit on another solution to isolate these people from all contact with their friends and relatives in the People's Republic of Macedonia." (*Nova Makedonija* [Skopje], May 27.)

### *An Exhibition in Prague*

Yugoslavia also singled out Czechoslovakia once again for "provocation." (The last time such charges were made, the Yugoslavs accused the Czechoslovaks of "forcibly drugging" the Yugoslav cultural attache in Prague. [See *East Europe*, May, p. 36.]) Complaining of deliberate efforts to misguide the Czechoslovak public, Belgrade cited an exhibition in Prague depicting Yugoslavia as a member of the NATO bloc, and spoke of other falsehoods published about Yugoslavia in the past two years. "These examples testify to the methods used by the inspirers of the anti-

Yugoslav campaign, unquestionably taint relations between our two countries," said one source, "and must not be allowed to continue." (Radio Belgrade, May 16.)

### Tito Speaks

On May 24, a day celebrated all over Yugoslavia as Youth Day, President Tito observed his 69th birthday. A delegation of young people paid a call on the aging but still vigorous Marshal and were treated to a short talk on the role of Yugoslavia in the world. "The entire world is looking at Yugoslavia," Tito said. "Our country has reached a position which, in regard to its international role and its relentless struggle for peace, no longer resembles the position of a small country, but rather that of a large country." (Radio Belgrade, May 25.)

Two weeks later he used the same tone in a speech at Bor where he addressed a crowd of 50,000 people who stood in a heavy rainstorm to hear him. With respect to the Soviet bloc he said: "Our neighbors continue to throw monkey wrenches in our work and attack us wherever possible—and this has been going on for years. They intensify the situation against us in various ways." Referring in particular to the recent Bratislava visit of Soviet Premier Khrushchev, Tito complained: "Everybody, including imperialists, capitalists and Eastern representatives, was invited to meet Comrade Khrushchev, but not the Yugoslav representative." (Radio Belgrade, June 7.)



Congolese President Kasavubu auctioning off the Congo to the highest bidder.

Lúdas Matyi (Budapest), May 18, 1961

### Economic Espionage

Although the trial received little attention, two government employees in Skopje last month drew hard labor sentences of four and five years for working with an unnamed foreign intelligence service. The two men, Stevan Stevanovic, former counselor with the Macedonian Reclamation Center and Aleksander Stefanovski, an employee of the Macedonian Secretariat of Industry, were linked with Vlastimir Popovic, sentenced earlier in Belgrade to 9 years of hard labor for attempting to set up an espionage network in Yugoslavia. (*Tanyug* [Belgrade], May 16.)

### Conference on "European Security"

An international conference on "European security" opened at the Prague International Hotel on May 23. In a session which lasted for five days, the speakers—East European "experts"—fulfilled the task of performing a "scientific analysis" of the forces that endanger European stability by attacking the rearming of West Germany, emphasizing the "peaceful policy" of East Germany, supporting the Soviet disarmament proposals, and insisting on the signing of a peace treaty with both German states. The conference ended with recommendations that problems connected with the danger of "German militarism and revanchism" undergo further "scientific study" and that relations be established with experts from the "capitalist states" who are concerned with the problem of European security." (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], May 24-28.)

## BULGARIA

### Party Turbulence

Just two weeks after the ouster of two Party officials for agricultural failures (see *East Europe*, June, p. 50), the Bulgarian press announced a reorganization of trade union management. Striking at the ubiquitous "anti-Party group" that has apparently grown larger, the government is now shifting the blame for other program failures and defects onto the trade unions. Without any prior public notice, the chairman and three of the six secretaries of the Central Council of Trade Unions were dismissed from their jobs. (*Rabotnichesko Delo* [Sofia], May 31.)

The trade union leaders who have been dismissed are Todor Prahov, Maria Kirilova, Nicola Alwxiev and Boris Blagoev. Prahov, a Politburo candidate-member since 1954, has been assigned a new job as chairman of the Union of Fighters against Fascism and Capitalism, but thus far the other three have not yet been reassigned. While none of these people have been officially identified with an "anti-Party group," their removal followed closely on the publication of an editorial entitled "Actual Problems of Party Work." It criticized those "former BCP members" who denied the Party line in favor of accelerating economic development and who offered foreign revisionist solutions, "hiding behind demagoguery their un-



healthy career ambitions," the article stated: "The successes and victories of the Party are based on its limitless fidelity to Marxism-Leninism, indestructible Party unity and iron discipline. It is for that reason that all Party organizations unanimously approve the measures of the Central Committee for unmasking and checking any fractional and anti-Party manifestations, no matter who is involved." (*Novo Vreme* [Sofia], May 1.)

The new members of the Central Council of Trade Unions are: Stoyan Guirov, Chairman, and Grigor Iliev, Rosa Koritarova and Alexander Manolov. Guirov's former post as chairman of the Committee on Construction has been filled by Marin Grashnov, formerly chairman of the Committee of Architecture and Public Works. Chairmen of both these committees hold the rank of Minister. (*Rabotnicheskoto Delo* [Sofia], June 2.)

### Productivity and Underfulfillment

While Central Committee members were touring the provinces to fight against flagging productivity and excessive production costs in agriculture, the same nagging phenomena were appearing elsewhere. These factors were said to be responsible for the failure of 248 industrial enterprises to meet their planned tasks in the first quarter of 1961. *Rabotnicheskoto Delo*, on May 10, lamented the loss of 130 million *leva* from these underfulfilled plans. Although industry as a whole overfulfilled its target by 7 percent, many enterprises "did not operate rhythmically" in consequence of poor work organization and sporadic shortages of materials. Not enough attention was paid to quality, use of materials and application of better techniques, the Party daily said.

There was not a single district in which all enterprises met their slated increases in labor productivity. The criticism is that productivity is not growing faster than average wages—and that this cannot go on for long without inflation unless the regime is willing to raise prices. "The number of cases in which the average wage is considerably ahead of the growth of labor productivity is not small. In many enterprises the increase in workers' wages last year was not accompanied . . . by measures aimed at improving the organization of labor, correcting norms . . . [etc.]. There are also enterprises which prefulfilled their quarterly plans, but only at the expense of hiring more workers than envisaged." The target for the reduction of production costs was also not attained for the quarter.

Export enterprises were castigated in particularly strong words for their continuing inability or unwillingness to meet quality standards. They "willfully change the assortment" and "strive to fulfill the plan in volume only," the paper said. It singled out a textile factory in Sofia which delivered 63,500 meters of poor-quality and sub-standard fabrics while, at the same time, failing to produce a number of other goods which the export plan had stipulated. "Can this be called fulfillment of the plan?" An especially telling weakness was found in the fact that even new plants were failing to meet their targets; their output was also said to be expensive and of low quality.

### THE REPORTER'S LIFE

A poll of Polish journalists revealed the following information about the rewards of their profession:

"One of the questions in the poll was: 'What do you consider the major difficulty in your professional work?'

"The material situation was most prominent: 21 percent mentioned wages, but only one-third of these stated 'low earnings' while the remaining two-thirds indicated the necessity of earning extra money at the cost of excessive physical and psychic effort, quality of work, family life and health. . . .

"Living conditions were described by 31.2 percent as good; 34.5 percent as average; 33.4 percent as bad. Only 10.7 percent had their own means of transportation (scooter, motorcycle, motor-bicycle, car); almost 40 percent did not have a telephone at home, 60 percent did not own a typewriter. A tape recorder was a rarity. . . .

"Only 18.5 percent considered their health good, 52.3 percent satisfactory, and 28.9 percent bad. Only 4.7 percent went to health resorts or sanatoriums during the last vacation period, while 18.5 percent spent their vacation at home. . . .

"A mere 6 percent rated the social prestige of a journalist high in Poland, 35.4 percent satisfactory, 37.7 percent unsatisfactory, 16.5 percent low, 4.7 percent expressed no opinion."

*Polityka* (Warsaw), May 6, 1961

"What does all this indicate?" asked the Party daily, and gave its own answer: "It indicates that there is still an underestimation of the problem of labor productivity, a failure to utilize the big reserves hidden in our socialist enterprises, and insufficient pressure by economic and Party officials." Special discussion meetings will be called, the paper said, in all departments of district governments and in the lagging enterprises.

### Gagarin Visit

Yuri Gagarin, the first Soviet astronaut, arrived in Sofia on May 22, at the invitation of the Bulgarian government. Welcomed enthusiastically by crowds at the airport, Gagarin was also treated to a speech by First Party Secretary Todor Zhivkov, who asserted: "Through you we cordially greet the heroic CPSU, the Party which was the first to lead the masses in a stormy attack against capitalism and imperialism, which was the first to carry out the socialist revolution victoriously and is today confidently and wisely creating in the Soviet Union the first Communist society." In the same exalted language, Zhivkov claimed that Gagarin's "exploit is a new and clear proof of the irrefutable and grandiose advantages of the socialist social order over

capitalism." Gagarin, in reply, conveyed greetings from the Soviet people and spoke of the "inviolable friendship" between the USSR and Bulgaria which he described as being forged by common battles against "foreign oppressors and aggressors." (Radio Sofia, May 22.)

On May 23, at a meeting organized by the Bulgarian-Soviet Friendship Committee, Gagarin was presented with the Georgi Dimitrov Order and awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor. Thanking the Bulgarians in the name of the Soviet Party and people, Gagarin delivered a speech identifying the USSR as a land of freedom and peace. Only a free country, he said, a country which had achieved "socialism," possessed all the possibilities for the complete development of science:

"Even in the most highly developed capitalist country, the USA, scientists admit that in the development of rocketry they are lagging behind [the USSR] by approximately three and one-half to four years; and this is very pleasant for us to hear. This is not pleasant . . . just because we have more powerful rockets, more powerful weapons than the United States. We pursue quite different aims. . . . The Soviet Union does not threaten, did not threaten and will not threaten anyone with weapons. We made my first flight in the name of peace on earth, in the name of prosperity for mankind, and in the name of progress. . . . We welcome the first American cosmonaut, Alan Shepard, and we are ready to work and cooperate with him and other Americans cosmonauts, but to work for the cause of a peaceful mastery of the cosmos. With our flights we did not pursue any military aims—absolutely none. The ship, the cabin of the ship Vostok in which I carried out my cosmic flight, had neither a camera nor any weapon." (Radio Sofia, May 23.)

### Prospectus for 1980

The first indication that new long-range economic targets will soon be announced came from Party leader Zhivkov in an address to a conference of "outstanding young agricultural workers" on May 15. The Bulgarian regime claims that its Third Five Year Plan (1958-62) was fulfilled by the end of 1960 as a result of the "big leap forward"—but since then no new long-range goals have been announced. Zhivkov said that "indeed amazing" targets were being set for 1980, but he did not say when they would be announced. He said merely that there would be "an unprecedented development of the basic branches of industry," and that agricultural development would show a "considerable increase." The basic task facing the Bulgarian people "in the next one or two decades," said the Party chief, was one of "surpassing the capitalist countries in the development of productive forces, of creating conditions for an almost simultaneous entry of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, together with the other socialist countries, into communism." The directives for this development, he said, would be expressed in a "general plan for . . . prospective development up to 1980."

Planning chief Stanko Todorov spent the last two weeks in April in Moscow discussing the prospectus for 1980 with specialists from other members of Comecon. Coordi-

nation of long-range plans to 1980 was the principal topic of discussion at the 14th general session of Comecon during March. (Radio Sofia, May 20.)

### Zhivkov Defends Bulgarian Agriculture

Speaking to a meeting of agricultural workers last month, Party chief Todor Zhivkov renewed an old debate when he told his listeners: "The Yugoslav newspaper *Komunist* is deeply concerned with the internal affairs of our country. Only a few days ago it published a long article . . . asserting that our agriculture has not made any progress." Accusing the Yugoslavs of trying to cover up their own failures, Zhivkov continued: "It is not at all accidental that in Yugoslavia almost no work is done for the socialist reorganization of agriculture. It is not accidental either that a large proportion of the Yugoslav peasants are in a wretched state." (*Rabotnichesko Delo* [Sofia], May 21.)

### Another Washington Mugging

About a month after two Bulgarian diplomats were attacked and beaten in Washington, D.C. (see *East Europe*, June, p. 50), a third member of the Bulgarian legation was assaulted by two unknown persons who beat him but did not attempt to rob him. On May 27th the Bulgarian legation filed its second protest with the US State Department. (*Washington Post*, May 27.)



American Secretary of State Dean Rusk arrives at the Geneva conference on Laos.

*Contemporanul* (Bucharest), May 19, 1961

## THE WELL-ROUNDED FUNCTIONARY

A peculiarly Communist conflict or "contradiction" is that between political and professional competence in the selection of petty functionaries. This "conflict" is again resolved—in an article in *Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], April 27,—with the perennial admonition that the functionaries must simply acquire both kinds of competence:

"We frequently encounter this strange contradiction: some leading Communist functionaries complain that their political work leaves them no time for further professional training. At the same time, they refuse to give responsible jobs to non-Party people whose training and loyalty toward the people's power would justify such action. Naturally, entrusting important posts to non-Party people does not mean that political abilities be regarded as a condition of third- or fourth-rate importance. However, if a Communist leader states with a certain deprecating air that someone is 'only an expert,' we are justified in asking him: 'What did you do to turn the expert into a Communist expert? Would it not have been your task to bring him closer to the Party's ideals, instead of showing mistrust? . . .'

"From whatever angle we examine the undoubtedly existing difficulties deriving from the requirements of political work and professional advance, we come to the conclusion that we cannot diminish the demands made of Communists in respect to both political and professional tasks."

In Bulgaria, radio broadcasts and newspapers reported the incident as a "new brutal violation of international rights." One broadcast added: "All facts indicate that this is not merely a criminal case. It is obvious that an insidiously designed and tenaciously executed plan is afoot to terrorize the personnel of the Bulgarian legation, to hinder its normal work." (Radio Sofia, May 29.)

## Philosophy of the "Leap"

Now that Bulgaria's "big leap forward" is over and the tempo of development—at least for 1961—scaled down to a relatively moderate pace, the press has attempted to give some ideological content to the "phenomenon of the leap." An article entitled "On the Variety of the Forms of the Leap," appearing on May 12 in *Vecherni Novini* (Sofia), expounded on the theme. The author argued that the Marxist explanation of historical development taught that it occurred in stages and that the transition from one stage to another was "carried out by means of a leap." However, all these leaps are not the same; a sample of his reasoning ran as follows:

"Leaps can be distinguished from one another according to whether they include entire historical epochs, or whether they apply merely to individual parts of a certain epoch. The transition from capitalism to socialism cannot be carried out in a day, it represents a whole historical epoch—the so-called transition period—whereas the seizure

of power, industrialization and collectivization represent only individual links, small leaps within the framework of the great leap—the revolutionary reorganization of old bourgeois society."

Leaps differ in character and intensity. The initial transition from capitalism is "explosive," while transitions within socialism such as industrialization and collectivization are "gradual": they "expand over a longer period of time, during which the nature of industry and agriculture is radically transformed. We must emphasize that the most important thing in this case is not the speed but the character of the process, namely, the fact that while in the explosive form of the leap the old elements wither away fully and at once, in a gradual leap the old elements wither away gradually, in stages."

So far as Bulgaria's "big leap forward" was concerned—in which economic planning was essentially abandoned and the enormous targets were instruments of exhortation rather than rational directives—the author seemed to be saying that it didn't matter that the goals were not achieved; the process, after all, was a gradual one. He backed his position with the words of Soviet Premier Khrushchev: "It would be wrong to think that communism will appear somehow at once. Entering into communism is not determined by any date on the calendar."

## POLAND


## Parliament Convenes

The newly elected Sejm (parliament) opened its first session on May 15 and quietly settled down to business as usual. Czeslaw Wycech was re-elected Marshal of the legislature and Joseph Cyrankiewicz was retained as Premier, a post he has held since 1947 except for a 2-year interruption in 1952-54. The resolution calling for Cyrankiewicz's re-election was introduced by Party chief Gomulka, and was unanimously adopted.

Two developments arising out of the early sessions are worth noting. One is the expansion of the Council of State (the executive organ) from 9 members to 11; the other is the failure to nominate a Government Plenipotentiary for Church-State Relations in the cabinet. Rumors circulating in Warsaw suggested that the post would go to Kazimierz Rusinek, until now Deputy Minister of Culture. The two new Council members are Ryszard Strzelecki, a Gomulka protege, and Jan Dab Kociol, once active in the postwar Peasant Party. Jerzy Albrecht, who resigned his position on the Council to become Minister of Finance, has been replaced by Edward Ochab. No reasons were given for increasing the number of Council members or for neglecting to nominate a Minister for Church-State Relations.

Premier Cyrankiewicz delivered his inaugural address on the third day. His speech followed the routine pattern: praise for the country's internal policies and successes, scorn for economic abuses and public indolence, and a





The Polish consumer at the mercy of the nationalized service trades. The signs read: No shoes repaired at present. No window panes. No dry cleaning accepted until August. No repairs done.

Szpilki (Warsaw), June 4, 1961

sharp warning to the "adventurous imperialists." Discussing international affairs, Cyrankiewicz devoted most of his attention to the German problem. He declared that "the Beitz mission [visit of Berthold Beitz, manager of West Germany's Krupp industrial complex] has yielded no results, for the Adenauer government still supports a revanchist campaign against Poland." He also managed to slip in a few unkind words about former US Vice President Nixon, whom the Premier accused of "backing out of his campaign attitude regarding Poland's western boundaries." Turning to Cuba, Laos and the Kennedy administration (which has taken no public stand on the Oder-Neisse frontier), Cyrankiewicz added: "We want to believe that the forces of common sense which seem to have come to the fore at the beginning of the new administration in the US will draw proper conclusions from recent failures of US policy." (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], May 19.)

### Party Statistics

Membership in the Polish Communist Party (PZPR) has increased 13.4% in 1959-1960. A statistical breakdown revealed that increases occurred among industrial and white-collar workers, and peasants, but were negligible among university students. (*Tygodnik Powszechny* [Warsaw], May 7.)

During the year some 3,000 members and candidate members either died or had been dismissed from membership, among them 340 plant directors and about 1,500 civil service employees. But the steady increase in membership over the past two years more than compensates for this loss, and not everyone is happy about it. The official Party organ actually complained:

"While the increase inspires optimism, we are reminded that success is due to consistent purges. Recruitment and purges are permanent features, and now purges should be intensified. The Party develops, it absorbs the most active people and sheds the ballast. Liberalism is, in fact, not only bad counsel but also an enemy of all progress." (*Trybuna Ludu*, [Warsaw], May 2.)

### Banker Turns Diplomat

Putting first things first in dealing with the largest capitalist country in the world, Warsaw has chosen a trained economist and bank executive to be the new Polish Ambassador to Washington. Edward Drozniak, former Deputy Minister of Finance and Chairman of the Bank of Poland, will replace R. Spasowski whose new assignment has not been made public.

A member of the Polish Communist Party since 1945, Drozniak has traveled abroad a good deal as an economic specialist and has visited the US several times. He is expected to devote much of his attention to the possibility of increasing trade and securing dollar aid. Poland's payments problem—the shortage of hard currencies—has severely restricted Polish attempts to trade outside the Communist bloc. (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], May 9.)

### Soccer Riot

Even for spectators a soccer match can be a convenient way to work off pent-up emotions. But enthusiasm for the home team got out of hand at the Warsaw stadium when a hundred thousand fans rained a barrage of bottles and other refuse on the visiting Soviet team after an injured Polish player was removed from the field in an ambulance.

The game had been hard fought with neither team scoring in the first half. After the intermission the crowd greeted the returning Soviet team with jeers and catcalls that continued to mount until the accident set off the demonstration. After the Polish goalie had been removed, the players resumed the game "albeit a bit nervously." Resentment was in the air, and the jeers turned to cheers only after the Polish team scored the only goal in the closing minutes of the game. (*Le Monde* [Paris], May 24.)

### Who's Missing?

Reports in *The New York Times*, May 29, that Deputy Minister of the Interior Antoni Alster had defected to the West have been "dismissed as ridiculous" by Warsaw officials. It has also been denied that Stanislaw Radkiewicz, former Security Minister during the Stalin era and known as the Polish Beria, has been given a public office. (*Le Monde* [Paris], May 29.)




With the security lids shut tight on both sides of the iron curtain, the identity of the missing Polish official has not yet been determined. Warsaw "neither confirms nor denies" that someone has defected, but it named Alster as one of the delegates who bid farewell to a Czechoslovak Army delegation a few days later at Okecie airport. (Radio Warsaw, June 1.)

### Student Arts Festival

More than 40 student artistic groups—choral, theatrical, jazz, etc.—participated in the All-Poland Student Culture Festival held this year in Gdansk, May 5-9. Of the popular Polish amateur satirical cabarets, *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), May 24, singled out for praise the Gdansk cabaret "To-Tu," Warsaw's "STS," the Lodz "Pstrag," the Cracow "Cyruklik" and the Szczecin Political Theater.

The paper noted approvingly that "the student groups are not closed clans simmering in the tight confines of excessive ambition and the pseudo avant-garde. As the many programs at Gdansk proved, they work with an expansive ideological breadth and social verve. . . ."

The date of the Festival coincided with the Communist-sponsored International Day of the Struggle Against Fascism (May 8), the anniversary of the end of World War II, and the Festival participants were obliged to take part in a protest against the "war-mongering" and "revanchist" policies of West Germany.



In the age of space exploration, Poles still dream of cars which, because of their high prices, are virtually inaccessible to the average man.

Przegląd Kulturalny (Warsaw), May 11, 1961

### Workers Slow Down

An ominous slowdown in work tempo in certain key Polish industries was recently reported. The Gomulka regime has repeatedly stressed the urgency of stepping up labor productivity in order to realize its economic goals. But the Radio Warsaw commentary of May 17 reported, among other examples, that production in a Wroclaw machine parts factory during the first several months of the year had declined by 12 percent and the work productivity rate by 20 percent in comparison with the same period in 1960. This slowdown in output has also been noted in maritime industries in Gdansk Province under Ministry of Navigation administration. Concomitantly the number of overtime hours claimed in the Szczecin dockyards, in deep-sea fishing enterprises, in the Warsaw foundry and elsewhere, has shot upward.

Workers' morale and labor conditions were the subject of a special conference recently held in Wisle, Silesia. In answer to the question: "What are the workers most afraid of?" which was widely discussed at the conference, representatives of the enterprises said that workers are most afraid of wage cuts. Next they fear work tempo increases, tightening of technical controls, and loss of their jobs. But representatives of the workers themselves at the conference maintained that their greatest fear is of industrial accidents and loss of employment.

The conference brought together factory directors, workers, economists and sociologists from throughout Poland. They discussed such matters as the organization of work to be performed, the question of material incentives, rest, safety provisions, labor laws, etc. (*Zycie Warszawy* [Warsaw], May 16.)

### More Incentives for Agricultural Circles

Because of the slow development of the agricultural circles—the hub of Poland's unique approach to organizing the peasantry—the government has loosened the purse strings on the Agricultural Development Fund, the chief financial instrument of the official program. These voluntary peasant groupings, which own machines and equipment in common but do not farm in common except on land taken over from the State Land Fund, are the channels by which mechanization, land improvements and more technical expertise, it is hoped, will be introduced into the countryside.

Now, by a resolution of the Council of Ministers on May 17, no down payment will be required for loans to buy agricultural machinery, farm buildings and improvements on land under cultivation. In addition, 20 percent of the money that was formerly earmarked for the district organizations of the agricultural circles will now be available to the local circles in the form of long-term loans. (Radio Warsaw, May 22.)

The move had two objectives. In order to qualify for the new benefits the circles must agree to take on at least 50 hectares or more from the State Land Fund for joint cultivation on a long-term basis. But more important, the government was anxious to overcome the peasants' reluc-

tance—out of fear of future collectivization—to have anything to do with the official program. Since the government undertook to sponsor the circles in June 1959, their numbers have failed to increase at anywhere near the pace they did when the state merely tolerated them; and 45 percent of the villages still have no circles. Moreover, the Agricultural Development Fund has been chronically underutilized; in the latter half of 1959 only 15 percent of the available money was used, and in 1960 the corresponding figure was 30 percent.

### Food Exports Rise Sharply

In comparison with the first four months of 1960, the value of food exports during the corresponding period this year rose by 67 percent, to 435 million foreign currency *zloty*, according to *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw), May 18. (The volume evidently increased even more, judging from the fact that the prices of Polish agricultural exports have declined.)

#### NOT VERY QUIET ON THE WESTERN FRONT

"Night duty at the road barrier will be no picnic, Reitr thought as he checked his arms. Better take a raincoat. Weather in the Sumava is as unreliable as an unfaithful wife. . . .

"Until midnight time passed quickly, but then, time seemed to stop. Alone in the perfect silence, one might believe a minute has 180 seconds. This is the time when one must control oneself to keep alert. Reitr, an experienced frontier guard, knew it. All was quiet—till suddenly a twig cracked. . . . Reitr held his breath. His mind worked quickly. His gun was ready. In the wan moonlight he saw several figures. They whispered, discussing their next move, unaware of his presence. What were they doing in this forbidden land? Reitr's voice broke the stillness. The figures were petrified. 'Step forward.' The three figures followed the order warily.

"'We walked to the village and lost our way,' they tried to explain. The usual nonsense. Nothing new to Reitr. Anyway, they didn't deny it. They had dreamed of sweet France, of the golden sun at Miami, Florida, where the most gorgeous Hollywood stars had villas . . . and they believed that this was the kind of life they would find over there. All they had to do was cross the border and everything else would automatically follow. A big American car! How much they had learned about life in their 16 years!

"Their romantic expedition was soon at an end. At the guard room they looked pretty sheepish. At home their parents had a feeling that the boys had something at the back of their minds, but how could they have guessed this? Now they know. Too late."

Ceskoslovensky Vojak (Prague), April 15, 1961

This expansion of agricultural exports comments favorably on the state of rural production in Poland in contrast to the shortages elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Although supplies are nowhere in abundance, the small private farmers of Poland have responded to higher purchase prices and higher income with more and more produce for the market. According to the leading economic weekly *Zycie Gospodarcze* (Warsaw), May 21, money incomes in the countryside were 27 percent higher in the fourth quarter of 1960 than in the same period a year earlier, and in the first three months of the current year they were 16.6 percent greater than in the corresponding period in 1960. Purchase prices for the farmers' produce were 16.6 percent higher in the first quarter of this year than in the same period last year, according to the same journal on May 28. Procurement of livestock products increased markedly, it said, during the first four months of the current year. A preliminary review of conditions in the countryside indicates a favorable outlook for the harvest in 1961.

### Disappearing Land

A considerable stir was created recently when the official press and radio announced that approximately 800,000 hectares (one hectare equals 2.47 acres) of land in the countryside had "disappeared somewhere." *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), May 12, explained: "It has not been registered with the tax bureaus and is, therefore, not subject to any regulations;" it is being farmed "on the side." The Party daily went on to explain that the peasants in the villages know where it is. "They know, for example, that someone is paying taxes on 5 hectares, but is actually farming 9. But, motivated by some kind of incomprehensible solidarity, they say nothing about it, claiming it is none of their business." Local national councils were called upon to oversee a "rapid liquidation of this festering problem."

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

### Sukarno Visit

President Ahmad Sukarno of Indonesia, accompanied by an official delegation, paid a State visit to Czechoslovakia, May 25-29. A welcoming address by President Novotny referred to the enormous changes in the world since Sukarno's last visit in 1956—primarily, the "historic victories of the national liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America," and the inevitability of the "complete disintegration of the colonial system." Novotny also referred to progress within Indonesia itself—"the smashing of the reactionary elements bent on thwarting free development in Indonesia by armed force," the country's new law on land reform, and its eight-year plan for overall construction and reconstruction. Novotny's emphasis, of course, was on the solidity of Czechoslovak-Indonesian friendship and Czechoslovakia's interest in Indonesian successes in the struggle for national and state independence,

the "liquidation of the last vestiges of colonialism on Indonesian territory" and the reuniting of all the people into a unified Indonesian Republic.

In reply, Sukarno spoke of friendship with Czechoslovakia, emphasized that Indonesia was still in a state of revolution, and declared that his aim was not only to strengthen independence but also to introduce a socialist system.

At the close of the visit, Sukarno and Novotny signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation between their two countries, agreed on the necessity for an international agreement on disarmament, condemned outside interference in the development of newly independent countries, reaffirmed recognition of the Gizenga government in the Congo, viewed the situation in Laos with "deep concern" and agreed on the need for reorganizing the UN. Czechoslovakia announced plans to participate in the Indonesian eight-year plan by supplying complete plant and production equipment, training Indonesian experts and receiving more Indonesian students and trainees in Czechoslovakia. (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], May 26-30.)

### Party Anniversary

Celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party provided further signs of the existing rift within the Communist camp. At the anniversary festivities at Prague Castle on May 13, representatives from China and Albania were notably missing from the list of delegations sent by the fraternal Parties. Both countries, however, sent their formal congratulations. *Rude Pravo* (Prague), May 14, printed the message from Peiping in full, but the greetings from Albania received only scant mention.

The main speaker at the occasion, President Antonin Novotny, paid ample tribute to Soviet leadership. At one point he stated: "The Czechoslovak Communists consider the relationship with the CPSU the main criterion of proletarian internationalism because the conclusions from and teachings of the revolutionary struggles of the Russian proletariat have the broadest international validity and are a source of the correct Marxist-Leninist orientation of the working class under conditions in all countries." He also said that the Czechoslovak Party was "proud of the fact that in its entire history there has been no instance in which its relationship to the CPSU has been vacillating or even when tendencies predominated which would aim from rightist or leftist positions at raising doubts about the binding character of the Great October Socialist Revolution for our Party. Consequently, there never has been room in our Party for prolonged factional disputes, because the effort for unity of action in its ranks has always developed in closest connection with the active utilization of the experiences of the CPSU."

Much of Novotny's speech was dedicated to recapitulating the Party's "glorious" history and reiterating current foreign policy slogans. Although he had words of praise for former Communist President Antonin Zapotocky, he implied that the ex-President's attitude had not been impeccable at all times. Referring to the Party's struggles in



Indonesian President Sukarno greets Czechoslovakia's President Novotny at a reception for the Asian leader in Prague Castle.

*Svet v obrazech* (Prague), June 3, 1961

the early 1928-29 period, he said that the "transition from a Social Democratic to a Communist Party" was all the more difficult because "not all members and officials had rid themselves of all incorrect views. This even affected outstanding leaders of our party—Bohumir Smeral and Antonin Zapotocky, to mention two—who fought against the opportunism and right-wing tendencies of the Social Democrats. . . ."

As for another former Party leader, Rudolf Slansky, Novotny's criticism was comparatively mild. In reference to the former Party Secretary-General, sentenced to death and executed for high treason and Titoism in 1952, Novotny said: "The Party knew during its march to socialist building how to settle in time with the incorrect methods of Slansky and his partners. Slansky introduced into the work of the Party harmful anti-Leninist methods which, in essence, consisted in bureaucratic forms of work, in the deadening of inter-Party democracy, in the creation of an atmosphere of mutual suspicion . . . and in an incorrect cadre policy. . . . This activity was harmful and in its substance hostile." (*Rude Pravo*, May 14.)

### Broadening the Base

The 1960 annual report of the Party Central Committee regarding Party membership has recently been made public. On the whole, the report expressed satisfaction with last year's developments.

The admission of over 53,000 industrial workers and several thousand housewives, along with a decrease in the proportion of administrative employees, represented "defi-



nite improvements." But failure to reach the goal of a 20 percent increase in the number of agricultural workers in the Party was a negative factor. More attention should be paid in the future to this problem, the report added, as well as to the "problem of education of new candidates for membership." Of the new candidates, almost 50 percent are under 26 years of age. The total membership of the Party is now given as 1,600,000. (*Zivot Strany* [Prague], April, No. 8.)

### Rural Party Workers Criticized

Another of the government's ambitious schemes aimed at straightening out some of problems of the countryside is going awry. In spring and summer 1960, several thousand Party secretaries were removed from their desks in the cities and sent into the villages. Their new function was to supervise and watch out for the Party's interest in the villages and on the farms as more and more power was transferred to the local national committees (governmental bodies) following the territorial reorganization—a move which brought the administrative structure of the country more in line with that of the Soviet Union. However, according to *Rude Pravo* (Prague), June 8, because of "insufficient experience," many of these cadres have been recalled.

The Party daily admitted that their tasks were difficult: "They had to seek the cooperation of the people, help to further the work of the national committee as a whole, and mobilize all forces in the community. . . ." But many of them got bogged down in routine bureaucratic matters, the newspaper said—such as "counting the meat and milk" production—while forgetting their organizational and political assignments. The solution: more supervision from above. *Zemedelske Noviny* (Prague), May 23, had already announced that Party members and teams of experts from the district national committees would, in the future, go on regular visits to the villages to check up on local activities. The plea is to fill the secretaryships of the local national committees, as well as the chairmanship of the collective farms, with abler men to replace those who have failed.

## HUNGARY

### Trial of Catholics

The trial of 12 Hungarian Catholics, five of them priests, eight monks, concluded on June 19th. All defendants received sentences ranging from two and a half to 12 years. Indicted two months previously for "conspiring against the state" (see *East Europe*, May, p. 44), and denounced by the pro-regime "peace priests," the defendants all faced the possibility of a death sentence. Proceedings of the opening session were carried in the Rome newspaper *Il Popolo*, in an article from Vienna datelined June 12.

"According to this account, one of the defendants, Father Odon Lenard, pleaded 'Not Guilty.' The judge visibly surprised, urged the defendant to change his atti-

### THE TAX MAN

The bureaucratic machinery in a Communist state knows no bounds. From Poland, the latest example of this phenomenon:

"In 1955 I bought a motorcycle for 4,640 zloty. After six years of use I decided to sell it. I found a customer and we both went to the notary to settle the formalities. And this is what happened:

"The official: 'What price have you agreed upon?'

"I: '2,000 zloty.'

"Official: 'How much did you buy it for?'

"I: 'For 4,640 zloty.'

"Official: 'A new motorcycle costs 7,000 zloty. . . . Gentlemen, I must go to the financial department to establish the tax because the sum declared is too low.'

"I: 'But this is an old motor which needs thorough repairs.'

"Official: 'I know. But the financial department will never accept it.'

"I: 'What is the tax on 2,000 zloty?'

"Official: '147 zloty.'

"I: 'And on 5,000 zloty?'

"Official: '227.'

"I: 'All right, since we're losing time, I agree to pay the additional 80 zloty.'

"Official: 'In that case I shall add to the "declaration on the sale of the motorcycle" that in order to fix the charge, its value was established with the application of norms and amortization indicators for the sum of 5,000 zloty.'

"So you see—I bought it for 4,640 zloty, I sold it for 2,000 because such was its value, but I paid tax on 5,000, because such are the alleged norms. Good heavens! I have just realized that on this sum I should pay tax for unpaid acquisition of property rights because if I do not report this, I could be fined for violating Article 131 of the Penal Treasury Statute."

*Express Wieczorny* (Warsaw), May 6-7, 1961

tude. "If you plead guilty," he told him, "I will keep it in mind when I decide on the sentence. A confession could be useful to you in every way." But the priest refused. "No," he said firmly, "I am not guilty."

The exchange between the priest and the judge then took on an even sharper tone. Replying to the judge's charge that he had carried on illegal activity by giving catechism lessons to young people, the priest replied: "If music lessons can be given, why are gospel lessons prohibited?" And again when the judge queried: "What do you think of theology students who refuse to attend lessons on Marxism?" the priest answered: "There are many Marxists who refuse to go to church."

### Will the Red Army Leave?

In the course of two speeches in Budapest recently, Party leader Kadar seemed to hint that the Soviet Army may soon be withdrawn from Hungary. While he made



no mention of the Soviet troops, Kadar spoke about Hungary's defense requirements and the need for a modern army, stressing that Hungary should not rely entirely on her friends to defend her frontiers. (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], May 24.)

Western sources noted that Kadar had made similar remarks before. In the past these hints led to nothing, and they are now considered to have been sops to public opinion, particularly during the frequent campaigns to tighten norms and raise productivity. In his second speech Kadar asked: "How can we expect to win over capitalism unless our productivity increases? Naturally, the intensity of work must also increase. We knew in advance that the tightening of norms would not be greeted with cheers. But since the progress of the country requires us to produce more cheaply, our conscience has prompted us to raise the issue." *Nepszabadsag* and *Magyar Nemzet* [Budapest], May 24.)

### Polytechnical Education

As part of the educational reform now underway in Hungary, the Ministry of Culture has amended the curricula of the general schools. Polytechnical courses will be added in 40 more schools next year, factories have been designated in every district to which students will be assigned for "practical studies," and courses in literature and history will be considerably cut. (*Magyar Nemzet* [Budapest], May 6.)

The new step seems to have been inspired by the growing realization that social scholarships, awarded to promising students by factories and cooperatives, were not paying off. One journalist explained it thus: "The reason for this is that applicants for social scholarships are not the best students. Many students think it unwise to commit themselves in advance to employment in a particular job. They prefer to wait, hoping they'll find something better. It is the duty of the universities and the Communist Youth League organizations to change this wrong way of thinking." (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], May 6.)

### MASTER OF UNDERSTATEMENT

Enroute to Vienna for a conference with President Kennedy, Soviet Premier Khrushchev's train stopped at the station in the Czechoslovak town of Strba for a few minutes. He appeared at the open door of his car and greeted the small crowd assembled.

"Will you come to an agreement with Kennedy?" a little old woman shouted when the cheers had died down.

"That's easy to ask—you ought to go to Vienna yourself to try to reach an agreement," Khrushchev laughed. "If I were going to Bratislava for talks with (Czechoslovak President) Novotny, I could give you a definite answer in advance that we would agree—but with Kennedy it won't be that easy."

Smena (Bratislava), June 1, 1961

### Ask Death for Economic Crimes

The adoption by the Soviet Union of a new law providing the death penalty for "economic crimes" has already found an echo in Hungary. In a recent trial, the Public Prosecutor complained that the court's sentence of life imprisonment for Ferenc Szabo was insufficient and demanded the death sentence. Szabo had been convicted of "crimes against socialist property, fraud, forgery and the illegal operation of a law practice." Another court will decide the appeal. (*Dunantuli Naplo* [Pecs], April 26.)

### Budapest Industrial Fair

In an effort to improve the foreign trade balance and meet its indebtedness to other Soviet-bloc countries, Budapest went all-out this year to make its Industrial Fair a successful event. It opened on May 19 with exhibits from 20 countries; a total of 432 firms, trade organizations, etc., participated as against 398 in 1960. The non-Communist countries in the show were predominantly Western European, especially Great Britain and Austria which were represented by 85 and 78 firms respectively.

During the Three Year Plan (1958-60), state trading organizations managed to increase exports more than imports, 75 percent for the former and 30 percent for the latter, but the effort was not as successful as had been hoped: while exports exceeded the planned amount by 37 percent, imports exceeded the limit by 44 percent. The country is still struggling with the deficits and debt incurred as a result of the 1956 Revolt which necessitated huge imports of food and materials, and the state of affairs has not been improved by the large importation of agricultural machinery needed to shore up the recent collectivization drive.

As for the future, *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest), May 14, said that exports were slated to grow by 13.1 percent and imports by 7.2 percent during 1961. Sales to the Communist bloc would increase by 14.9 percent and to non-Communist countries by 8.6 percent; imports from the two areas would expand respectively by 6.4 and 9.1 percent.

### ALBANIA

#### The Trial Ends

The 12-day trial of conspirators in Tirana (see *East Europe*, June, pp. 1, 52) ended, May 27, as the counsel for the defendants concluded in his summation that all the charges by the state had been proved. Convicted of attempting to overthrow the government in favor of a capitalist dictatorship, 9 men received harsh sentences which were hastily imposed. The former commander of the Albanian Navy and three Party officials were executed by firing squad; the remainder received prison terms ranging from 15 to 25 years. With the identifiable opposition out of the way, Party Secretary Enver Hoxha is now master in his own house. At 50, he is the only remaining member of the original 14-man Central Committee set up by the Communists in 1943.


The trial, a noisy spectacle in Albania, went virtually unnoticed in the Soviet and satellite press. Only the Chinese paid it wide attention in the press and in their foreign-language broadcasts. *Trud*, a Bulgarian paper, also reported the trial. But for the Albanians it was a glorious opportunity to strike out in several different directions. As well as accusing the defendants of conspiring with "Yugoslav revisionists, Greek monarcho-fascists and US imperialists," the Albanians also managed to indict the Soviet Union by implication. Two of the firing squad victims, Admiral Sejke and Comecon representative Tahir Demi, had long records of cooperation with Moscow. By claiming that the Yugoslav-Greek-American plot had been brewing since 1955, the period of the Khrushchev-Tito honeymoon, they have managed to question the foreign policy of the Soviet Premier.

The assumption that Soviet-Albanian relations have worsened in the last few weeks draws support from a report that 8 Russian submarines and a submarine tender have left their base at Saseno Island, Albania. The subs are believed headed for the Baltic for fleet operations, but the presence of the tender may indicate that the Russians have been invited to leave.

### Hoxha: More Revelations

Albanian Party chief Enver Hoxha accused the Soviet Union of trying to starve the Albanians into submission to its policies when he addressed the Communist leaders in Moscow last November, according to an article in the London *Daily Telegraph*, June 9. Describing the critical economic situation in his country, Hoxha declared: "Only a 15 days supply of wheat remained in stock. After a delay of 45 days the Soviet Union promised us 10,000 tons, or 15 days supply of wheat to be delivered in September and October. These were unbearable pressures. The Soviet rats were able to eat while the Albanian people were dying of hunger, and we were asked to produce gold."

Hoxha also allegedly stated that the Russians tried to ram through a condemnation of the Peiping Communists at the Bucharest Party conclave in June 1960. Said Hoxha: "We insisted that the Chinese Communist Party should be able to defend itself."



Yugoslav comment on the recent Albanian spy trial, labeled "Justice in Tirana." The judge is asking the jailer: "Can't you read? Instead of a confession, you give me nothing but a recording."

Barba (Belgrade), May 28, 1961

## ROMANIA

### Western Writers Criticized

Taking one of their periodic slaps at Western culture, Romanian commentators recently launched an attack on such popular Western writers as Laurence Durrell, John O'Hara and Terence Rattigan. The charges were familiar: immorality, preoccupation with vice, and total ignorance of burning social and political issues. Durrell's *Alexandria Quartet* was described as "a panorama of vice," and Rattigan's *Ross* as "a glorification of British imperialism." O'Hara was criticized for "hailing the capitalist way of life." "To what level has bourgeois literature sunk," asked one broadcaster, "if it is forced to look for heroes among people standing on the lowest rung of moral degradation." (Radio Bucharest, May 24.)

#### PEIPING AND TIRANA (continued from page 9)

control of its own Macedonians and its aspirations to incorporate all Macedonians.)<sup>80</sup> Recent articles in the Bulgarian press have taken differing positions on the dangers of revisionism (i.e., Yugoslavia)<sup>81</sup> and dogmatism and sectarianism (i.e., China and Albania). Furthermore, Sofia has recently announced the purging of probably right-wing oppositional elements which allegedly had contacts with Terpeshov and Panev.<sup>82</sup> This followed upon the (perhaps not entirely coincidental) expulsion of the Yugoslav military attaché in Sofia,<sup>83</sup> with whom oppositional elements may have been in contact.<sup>84</sup> Chervenkov and his sympathizers, previously and perhaps still pro-Chinese, also probably still retain some influence.

The extent of Yugoslav involvement is still far from clear. Given the existence and present status of Yugoslavia, a Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence implies a Soviet rapprochement with Belgrade and thereby "objectively" an anti-Albanian Moscow posture. Post-1951 Yugoslav internal policies (economic decentralization and a market economy, relative cultural liberalization, the end of agricultural collectivization and mass secret police terror, large scale Western economic aid) must automatically be considered hostile by a Communist China in an extremist internal and foreign phase and even more so by a hostile and still Stalinist Albania.<sup>85</sup> Yugoslav ambitions for political and ideological influence in the Bloc and particularly in Eastern Europe automatically antagonize the Chinese and the Albanians. Finally, the new factor since 1956, the rise in importance of the underdeveloped areas has made them a subject of increasing controversy between Moscow and Peiping, and the increased Yugoslav activities in them<sup>86</sup> have made Belgrade a factor in this controversy. Polemics between Yugoslavia on the one hand and Albania and China on the other hand have greatly intensified, as more recently between Yugoslavia on the one hand and Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia on the other.<sup>87</sup> Moscow, although apparently not at present favoring a total rapprochement with Belgrade, appears to be opposed to an all-out attack against it.<sup>88</sup> Given the Soviet cultivation of such leaders of underdeveloped neutralist states as Nehru, Nasser, Kassem, Nkrumah, and Sekou Touré, with whom Tito also maintains close and friendly relations, Moscow is the more unwilling to risk an all-out attack against Belgrade since this would endanger its thus far successful offensive in the underdeveloped world. Peiping, strongly opposed to the extent of Soviet favor and aid to these neutralist regimes, has thus one more reason to denounce the Yugoslavs, whose friendship with and influence on these regimes is to the Chinese only another proof of Belgrade's dastardly plots. (For example, Moscow gives assistance in the peaceful use of atomic energy *inter alia* to Yugoslavia, Egypt, Iraq and Indonesia, but gives none to Albania.)<sup>89</sup> Finally, the Chinese take a very dichotomic view of the international situation. Their especially violent hostility to the United States makes them all the more hostile to Yugoslavia, which accepts American economic aid. (Poland, which also receives U. S. aid, has all the more reason to be anti-Chinese on this as other issues in the Sino-Soviet dispute.)

In the 1955-1956 period much of the concealed con-

troversy among the various Bloc and non-Bloc Communist parties as to the proper policy toward Yugoslavia was carried on in the ideological framework of the validity of the 1948<sup>90</sup> and 1949 Cominform resolutions against Belgrade.<sup>91</sup> (The former declared the Yugoslavs national deviationists, the latter branded them an imperialist *agentura*.) The aspect of the Sino-Soviet controversy involving Yugoslavia appears in fact, although not as yet in theory, to be proceeding similarly. The Albanians and the Chinese consistently maintain that Yugoslav actions at home and abroad are those of conscious agents of the American imperialists.<sup>92</sup> The Yugoslavs, in pointing out and denouncing this<sup>93</sup> appear to have been attempting to get the CPSU and other parties to take a clear stand on this issue;<sup>94</sup> as of this writing, Moscow has not yet clearly done so. Belgrade also hopes, by publicizing the extremism and terror of Tirana, both to further its own cause and to hurt the Chinese (and perhaps the Soviets) in underdeveloped areas. Tito's recent trip to Africa has had an especially polarizing influence.<sup>95</sup> The declarations by such pro-Soviet African leaders as Sekou Touré of Guinea in praise of Tito's "building of Socialism"<sup>96</sup> contrast sharply with Albanian declarations (faithfully reprinted in Peiping) that the Yugoslav president is an American agent carrying out American directives to wreck socialism in Africa and elsewhere wherever and however possible. Gomulka, on the other hand, has clearly albeit not sharply indicated<sup>97</sup> that he does consider Yugoslavia to be a socialist country. Khrushchev as of this writing has not committed himself publicly on this issue.

Moscow has recently made several pro-Yugoslav gestures: A five-year trade agreement doubling the 1960 trade volume<sup>98</sup> (as opposed to the one-year trade agreement which increased turnover 7 per cent with Albania), favorable propaganda gestures,<sup>99</sup> and the announcement of an exchange of visits between Gromyko and Yugoslav Foreign Minister Popovic. Albania remains isolated in the Balkans.<sup>100</sup> The fact that Yugoslavia has again become an element of the Sino-Soviet controversy, when added to the increased freedom of maneuver of the Eastern European parties which the controversy has produced, may well mean that Yugoslav intrusion into Eastern European Communist affairs will again increase.

#### One Church or Many?

PREDICTIONS OF THE future, particularly in Balkan politics, are best avoided. In this instance they are particularly and paradoxically difficult: one can advance reasons why the Albanian situation can neither continue nor significantly change. The longer it continues, the more the Soviet inability to subdue this most backward, bloody and minuscule Balkan satellite becomes increasingly clear, Moscow's authority and prestige diminished, and the likelihood of additional deviations increased. For the Soviet Union (after its probable first attempt failed) to end Albania's defiance seem equally difficult: such a move would threaten the Soviet policy not to force its differences with China to a total break. The Albanians themselves certainly prefer their present position; not since the Ottoman Empire have they played such a role on the international scene.



The Chinese probably will continue to support them. The Yugoslavs might again try to intervene in Albania,<sup>101</sup> but probably not without support or at least acquiescence by Moscow. In view of general Soviet interests, and in particular their relations to China, Soviet support for a Yugoslav move against Albania seems at present unlikely.<sup>102</sup> The Yugoslavs, like the Poles, gain as long as the controversy between Moscow and Peiping and between Moscow and Tirana continues.

Immediate or startling developments, therefore, are not necessarily likely. Nor is this controversy likely to be publicly reflected to any significant degree in Communist international organizations: except for low-level Albanian delegations to them in 1960-1961, there is no published evidence that their organization or activities have changed. Khrushchev showed with Poland after 1956 that he knew how to gain by waiting; he may well do the same with Albania. Furthermore, the genuine extent and even more the public signs of Albanian defiance of Moscow can vary greatly. The closer Khrushchev comes to a rapprochement with Mao, the more he can reduce the abrasive effects of Albanian defiance. Albania, like China, will in the near future probably remain in that varying, complex and unclear state of "divergent unity" with the Soviet Union whose appearance in 1960 has so profoundly changed the picture of our times.<sup>103</sup>

But the fact of the Albanian option against Moscow for Peiping while remaining within the Bloc continues to have reverberations in the world Communist movement. The Italian Communist leader Palmiro Togliatti, whose extreme sensitivity and successful adaptation to changing events reminded one of Ilya Ehrenburg, recently used his public criticism of Albanian errors to justify, indeed to praise, the existence of differences among ruling Communist parties (including the Polish) and by implication the impropriety of any intervention to prevent their continuation.<sup>104</sup>

"When we have learned, for example, from our comrade who was present at the recent Congress of the Albanian Party that at that Congress questions of the life and internal debate of the party were posed in a manner which to us seemed erroneous and dangerous, we made known our opinion, but the direct responsibility and correction do not belong to us . . . it is interesting to us, at the end of our discussion, to underline the diversity and richness of the political and economic forms which, in those regimes, have been adopted in the work toward the solution of the most serious problems of socialism, such as those of the relationship between industrial development and that of agriculture and handicrafts, of the proper equilibrium between the output of the producer and consumer goods, of the terms of collective management of the countryside, of the international division of labor on a socialist basis and of the attitude to problems of coexistence and collaboration among various parties, of the activity of a parliament (the Polish one, for example) as an effective organ of direction and control over all economic life, etc., etc. They have already accumulated, in these diverse fields, enormous experience, which cannot be rejected, but which must be studied profoundly and attentively, because, if one wants it or not, it contains a precious contribution to the solution to the most grave problems which weigh on men in our advance toward the creation of a new society, liberated from the exploitation and the oppression of capitalism."

The medieval conciliar movement, the first ecclesiastical attempt to cope with nationalism, lasted for decades before it gave way to apparent unity, only to see Luther and the Council of Trent later confirm the division of Christendom and make possible the rise not just of two churches but of many sects. For Moscow, the "third Rome," and for Eastern Europe the Stalinist days of *Roma locuta, causa finita* are over;<sup>105</sup> the Eastern European Communist parties must now face up to, as they can gain from, the age-old question: *quis custodiet ipsos custodes?*

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> I have benefited greatly from comments on an earlier draft of this paper by Zbigniew Brzezinski, R. V. Burks, Paul Collins, Herbert Rittvo, Stavro Skendi, Peter Wiles and Robert L. Wolff.

<sup>2</sup> Vd. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *THE SOVIET BLOC: UNITY AND CONFLICT* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1960), pp. 269-382; William E. Griffith, "What Happened to Revisionism?", *PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM*, IX, 2 (Mar.-Apr. 1960), pp. 1-9.

<sup>3</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Patterns and Limits of the Sino-Soviet Dispute," *PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM*, IX, 5 (Sept.-Oct. 1960), pp. 1-7 and "The Challenge of Change in the Soviet Bloc," *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, XXXIX, 3 (April 1961), pp. 430-443; Donald Zagoria, "Strains in the Sino-Soviet Alliance," *PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM*, IX, 3 (May-June 1960), pp. 1-11 and "Sino-Soviet Friction in Underdeveloped Areas," *PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM*, X, 2 (Mar.-Apr. 1961), pp. 1-13; Richard Lowenthal, "Diplomacy and Revolution: The Dialectics of a Dispute," *THE CHINA QUARTERLY*, No. 5 (Jan.-Mar. 1961), pp. 1-24, of which a later version is "The Sino-Soviet Dispute," *COMMENTARY*, XXXI, 5 (May 1961), pp. 379-394; ok. [Alexander Korab], "Der ideologische Streit Moskaus mit Peking," *NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG*, June 17,

1960 and "Chruschtschews Kampf mit der chinesischen Konkurrenz," *NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG*, Nov. 11, 1960; Boris Meissner, "Zur Auseinandersetzung Moskau-Peking," *OST-PROBLEME*, XIII, 3 (Feb. 3, 1961), pp. 87-89. For a summary of unpublished documents, which, in spite of allegations of their being forged (Branko Lazitch, "Une nouvelle mystification," *EST & OUEST*, XIII, 253 (March 1-15, 1961), pp. 1-4 and Paul Wohl in the *CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR*, Feb. 14, 1961), I would consider (with Harsch, *CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR*, Feb. 15, 1961) reliable and in general probably reflecting the actual course of events, vd. Edward Crankshaw, "The Moscow-Peking Clash Exposed" and "Sino-Soviet Rift Far From Healed," *THE OBSERVER* [London] and *THE WASHINGTON POST*, Feb. 12 and 19, 1961; for his analysis, "Khrushchev and China," *ATLANTIC MONTHLY*, CCVII, 5 (May 1961), pp. 43-47. For an alleged summary of the June 1960 CPSU letter against the CCP, vd. *DEUTSCHE ZEITUNG*, Sept. 30, 1960; for a general account and for Soviet-Chinese polemics at the North Vietnam Party Congress, *LINK* [New Delhi], Oct. 16 and Dec. 18, 1960. Vd. also Ulbricht in *NEUES DEUTSCHLAND*, Dec. 18, 1960 and Matern in *NEUES DEUTSCHLAND*, Feb. 12, 1961.



<sup>4</sup> Allan S. Whiting, *CHINA CROSSES THE YALU* (N. Y.: Macmillan, 1960).

<sup>5</sup> Vd. Brzezinski, *THE SOVIET BLOC*, p. 251; Flora Lewis, *POLAND: CASE STUDY IN HOPE* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1958), pp. 182-184; conversations by the writer in Poland, 1959 and 1960.

<sup>6</sup> Crankshaw, *OP. CIT.* That this is true seems doubtful.

<sup>7</sup> *IBID.*, cf. Brzezinski, *THE SOVIET BLOC*, pp. 304-332 and Peter Wiles, "China in Kräftepiel der Ostblockstaaten," *OSTEUROPA*, IX, 1 (Jan. 1959), pp. 31-38.

<sup>8</sup> Brzezinski, *THE SOVIET BLOC*, pp. 336-339.

<sup>9</sup> Kang Sheng to Warsaw Pact meeting in Moscow, NCNA, Feb. 5, 1960; Yu Chao-li, "On Imperialism As the Source of War in Modern Times and on the Way for All Peoples to Struggle for Peace," *HUNG CH'U*, Mar. 30, 1960; Long Live Leninism, "by the editorial department," *HUNG CH'U*, April 22, 1960 and *PEKING REVIEW*, No. 17, (April 22, 1960), and Lu Ting-yi, "Get United Under Lenin's Revolutionary Banner," NCNA, April 22, 1960.

<sup>10</sup> Moscow Conference Statement, *PRAVDA*, Dec. 6, 1960; Khrushchev speech, *KOMMUNIST* No. 1, Jan. 1961 and *WORLD MARXIST REVIEW*, IV, 1 (Jan. 1961), pp. 3-28; vd. George Armstrong, "Ideological Unity and Historical Responsibility," *IBID.*, IV, 2 (Feb. 1961), pp. 18-24; for pro-Chinese Albanian CC Resolution, *Radio Tirana*, Dec. 21, 1960, 0530 GMT for pro-Soviet ones, vd. Gomulka at Katowice, *Radio Warsaw*, Dec. 3, 1960, 1525 GMT; Artur Starewicz, "On Reading the Declaration of the World Communist Movement," *POLYTIKA*, Dec. 17, 1960; Janos Kádár, "Marxism-Leninism Lights the Way Ahead," *PRAVDA*, Dec. 23, 1960.

<sup>11</sup> Crankshaw, *OP. CIT.*; the fact that the statement does not mention "fractionalism" indicates that the issue was not solved.

<sup>12</sup> I take this felicitous phrase from Brzezinski, "Patterns and limits of the Sino-Soviet Dispute," *OP. CIT.*

<sup>13</sup> For sympathy re the Chinese people's communes, vd., for the DDR, Grotewohl in *ADN*, Nov. 5, 1958; Sindermann in *NEUES DEUTSCHLAND*, Jan. 24, 1959; Matern in *ADN*, June 3, 1959; *TRIBÜNE*, July 11, 1959; *DEUTSCHE AUSSENPOLITIK*, Jan. and Oct. 1959; Diekmann in *DER MORGEN*, June 7, 1959; and especially Paul Wandel in *EINHEIT*, Dec. 1958 and Dec. 1959. For Czechoslovakia, Vinar in *Radio Bratislava*, Oct. 24 and Dec. 30, 1958; Hejzlar in *Bratislava PRAVDA*, Oct. 25, 1958, Michal Faltan in *Bratislava PRAVDA*, Jan. 10, 1959 and in *Bratislava EKONOMICKY CASOPIS*, Feb. 1959; Janous in *Bratislava PRAVDA*, Sept. 19, 1959; Novotny in *Peking*, Sept. 28, 1959 (somewhat less enthusiastic); *RUDÉ PRAVO*, Dec. 1, 1959 and Koucky in *RUDÉ PRAVO*, Dec. 10, 1959 (the Soviet line). For Bulgaria, Chervenkov in *Peking*, JEN-MIN JI-PAO and *RABOTNICHESKO DELO* (less favorable excerpts), Oct. 30, 1958; formation of communes, in *ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME*, Nov. 12, 1958 and *RABOTNICHESKO DELO*, Dec. 7, 1958, retracted in *IBID.*, Dec. 8, 1958; Chervenkov in *RABOTNICHESKO DELO*, Jan. 15, 1959; none thereafter. For Albania, extensive favorable coverage until late 1958, then nothing until a *Radio Tirana* broadcast, Oct. 15, 1959.

<sup>14</sup> *NEUES DEUTSCHLAND*, Dec. 18, 1960.

<sup>15</sup> Palmiro Togliatti, "A proposito di socialismo e democrazia," *RINASCITA*, XVIII, 4 (Apr. 1961), pp. 353-363, at p. 361; cf. *NOVA MAKEDONIJA*, April 7, 1961.

<sup>16</sup> Ho Chi-minh, according to at least one Indian press report, has done this (K. V. Narain in *THE HINDU WEEKLY REVIEW*, Feb. 6, 13, 1961).

<sup>17</sup> Crankshaw, *OP. CIT.*, and the Albanian Party Congress, fn. 42, *INFRA*.

<sup>18</sup> For analysis, cf. Wolfgang Leonhard, "Moskaus albanische Sorgen," *DIE ZEIT*, March 10, 1961; V. [iktor] M. [eier], "Der Parteitag der albanischen Kommunisten," *NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG*, Feb. 20, 1961 and "Der Alleingang der albanischen Kommunisten, Ein Problem für die Einheit des sozialistischen Lagers," *IBID.*, April 23, 1961; Anton Logoreci, "Albania: A Chinese Satellite in the Making?" *THE WORLD TODAY*, XVIII, 5 (May 1961), pp. 197-205. I do not find convincing the thesis of Branko Lazitch, "Une rebellion imaginaire: Les desaccords du parti communiste albanais," *EST ET OUEST*, XIII, 256 (April 16-30, 1961), pp. 14-18, that the Albanian "rebellion" is both greatly exaggerated in the West and in part staged to delude the non-Communist world.

<sup>19</sup> The official speeches and final joint communique (*PRAVDA*, June 1, 1959) were notable for their ecstatic praise of Soviet-

Albanian friendship and absence of anti-revisionist invective. Vd., e.g., Wohl in *THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR*, June 13, 1959.

<sup>20</sup> Explicit praise of CPR communes, *Radio Tirana Home Service*, Jan. 23, 1960, 1900 GMT; speech by Ramiz Alija, attacking Yugoslav "Trojan Horse" treachery during periods of international detente, *Tirana, ATA in French to Europe*, April 23, 1960, 0923 GMT.

<sup>21</sup> Chief of delegation: Hysni Kapo, third-ranking Politburo member and AWP CC Secretary, also Sulejman Baholli, AWP CC member, and Thanas Nano, deputy director of the Agitprop department of the AWP CC Bucharest, *Agerpres, Radioteletype in English to Europe*, June 19, 1960, 0910 GMT.

<sup>22</sup> Crankshaw, *OP. CIT.*, and Ulbricht to SED CC, *NEUES DEUTSCHLAND*, Dec. 18, 1960.

<sup>23</sup> *THE ECONOMIST*, Feb. 11, 1961, p. 547; "Let the Plotters and Revisionists of Belgrade be Unmasked Through and Through," *ZERI I POPULLIT*, July 16, 1960; Hoxha report to the IV. AWP Congress, alleging an abortive attack against Albania by Yugoslavia, Greece, "some Albanian traitors," and the U. S. Sixth Fleet (*Tirana, ATA in French to Europe*, Feb. 13, 1961, 2330 GMT), and the trial of Sejko ET AL., *Radio Tirana*, May 15, 1961 et seq.

<sup>24</sup> *Tirana, ATA in French Morse to Europe*, Sept. 9, 1960, 0900 GMT.

<sup>25</sup> *Radio Tirana*, May 15, 1961 ET SEQ.; cf., for indications of Soviet involvement, Zorza in *THE GUARDIAN* [Manchester] May 19, 1961. Sentence: *Radio Tirana*, May 27, 1961, 1900 GMT. Execution: *Radio Tirana*, May 31, 1961, 2100 GMT.

<sup>26</sup> *THE NEW YORK TIMES*, Mar. 19, 1961; Bernard Ullmann, "The Long Shadow of Mao Tse-tung," *THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE*, Apr. 16, 1961. The USSR has signed a 1961 trade agreement with Albania (TASS, Jan. 4, 1961) which does not include wheat, but no long-term trade or credit agreements; the East European satellites, however, have: Czechoslovakia, *Radio Tirana*, Feb. 7, 1961; East Germany, *Radio Tirana*, Jan. 12, 1961; Romania, *Radio Tirana*, Jan. 14, 1961; Hungary, *Radio Tirana*, Jan. 23, 1961; Poland, *ATA*, Dec. 19, 1960; Bulgaria, *Radio Tirana*, Apr. 29, 1961. For a survey of the Albanian economy through mid-1960, which, however, throws no light on the impact of the Sino-Soviet dispute on it, vd. *ECONOMIC SURVEY OF EUROPE*, 1960 (Geneva: ECE, 1961), ch. V, pp. 1-15.

<sup>27</sup> Vd. Chinese-Albanian trade agreement, NCNA, Feb. 2, 1961.

<sup>28</sup> *THE NEW YORK TIMES Magazine*, April 16, 1961, p. 19; CPR greetings on Albanian National Day, *Peiping, NCNA Radioteletype in English to Europe and Asia*, Nov. 28, 1960, 1523 GMT.

<sup>29</sup> Vd., e.g., "Marxism-Leninism is the Victorious Banner of Our Age," *PRAVDA*, Nov. 28, 1960.

<sup>30</sup> *THE NEW YORK TIMES*, Nov. 6, 1960; *Radio Tirana Home Service*, Oct. 10, 1960, 2100 GMT.

<sup>31</sup> NCNA in English to Europe and Asia, Feb. 28, 1961, 1834 GMT; Chinese-Albanian economic communiqué, NCNA in English to Europe, April 25, 1961, 1422 GMT.

<sup>32</sup> *THE NEW YORK TIMES*, Nov. 6, 1960.

<sup>33</sup> *IBID.*, Sept. 30, 1960.

<sup>34</sup> Shehu to the Albanian Parliament, *Radio Tirana*, Oct. 25, 1960.

<sup>35</sup> AP from Belgrade, *NEW YORK HERALD-TRIBUNE*, March 31, 1961. The summary of Hoxha's speech is based on a report by Victor Zorza in *THE GUARDIAN* (Manchester), June 9, 1961.

<sup>36</sup> *THE NEW YORK TIMES*, March 31, 1960.

<sup>37</sup> For recent signs, vd. Sino-Soviet economic communiqué and arrival of Chinese delegation re economic, scientific and technical cooperation, *PRAVDA*, April 9, 1961.

<sup>38</sup> For Albanian announcements re intensification of the struggle against revisionism, vd. Hoxha to the Party Congress, Feb. 20, 1961 and the Congress Resolution, *ATA*, Feb. 22, 1961; for continued Albanian and Chinese extremism and mutual solidarity, speeches at Albanian Trade Union Congress by Rita Marko (*Radio Tirana*, April 24, 1961, 1900 GMT) and Ku Ta-chun (NCNA in English to Asia, April 26, 1961, 1833 GMT).

<sup>39</sup> Albanians (and Yugoslavs) not addressed as "Comrades," *PRAVDA*, Dec. 13, 1960, Jan. 3, 1961, TASS Russian to Europe, Jan. 10, 1961, 2102 GMT; cf. *THE ECONOMIST*, Jan. 14, 1961,

p. 118. Only two Communist leaders have attacked the Albanians specifically, Ulbricht and Togliatti; (vd. fn. 14-15, SUPRA.)

<sup>40</sup> Li Hsien-nien speech to IV AWP Congress, Peiping, NCNA in English to Europe and Asia, Feb. 15, 1961, 1700 GMT; JEN-MIN-JI-PAO editorial, Jan. 11, 1961; Chou En-lai and Spiro Koleka at banquet in Peiping, NCNA in English to Europe and Asia, Jan. 17, 1961, 1805 GMT; Chiang Nan-hsiang, chairman of Chinese-Albanian Friendship Society, in Peiping, in Radio Tirana, March 17, 1961, 1900 GMT.

<sup>41</sup> According to the Sino-Albanian economic agreement of Feb. 2, 1961 and protocol of April 23, 1961, the CPR will grant Albania a 112.5 million (new) ruble credit (i.e., about \$123 million) as well as "complete equipment and technical assistance." Radio Tirana Home Service, April 25, 1961, 1400 GMT. Vd. THE ECONOMIST, April 29, 1961.

<sup>42</sup> For Albanian declarations at the Congress, vd. ZËRI I POPULLIT Radio Tirana, Feb. 3-20, 1961 and "The Party's General Line Has Been and Will Always Be Correct," ZËRI I POPULLIT, Feb. 17, 1961; for the critical Polish one (by an ex-Stalinist and Natolinist, Roman Nowak, TRYBUNA LUDU, Feb. 19, 1961; Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Albania Defies the Kremlin," THE NEW LEADER, XLIV, 13 (March 27, 1961), p. 8. Vd. particularly the Malayan CP greetings, ATA Feb. 19, 1961. For further indications re North Korea, vd. "Policies of War and Aggression Doomed," MINJU CHOSON [Pyongyang] Jan. 23, 1961, in KCNA in English Morse to the Far East, Jan. 23, 1961, 1723 GMT and "A Great Contribution to the Development of Friendship Between the Two Countries Korea and Albania," NOJONG SIMMUN [Pyongyang] May 2, 1961; re "balancing" position of North Vietnam, vd. resolution of III. Plenum of Vietnam Workers Party CC, in VNA [Hanoi] Radioteletype in English to Europe and Asia Jan. 12, 1961, 0518 GMT, Nguyen Chi-Thanh, "Peaceful Coexistence," HOC TAP [Hanoi] No. 1 Jan. 1961, and Premier Pham Dong to the DRV National Assembly, VNA in English to Europe and Asia, April 12, 1961, 1541 GMT.

<sup>43</sup> Shehu to the Congress, Radio Tirana, Feb. 17, 1961, 1900 GMT.

<sup>44</sup> PRAVDA, Jan. 26, 1960 and Jan. 5, 1961.

<sup>45</sup> RAZVITIJE EKONOMIKI STRAN NARODNOI DEMOKRATI (ORBZOR ZA 1958 G.). (Moscow, 1959), p. 109.

<sup>46</sup> THE NEW YORK TIMES, March 19, 1961.

<sup>47</sup> For the trial, vd. fn. 25, SUPRA.

<sup>48</sup> Salisbury in THE NEW YORK TIMES, March 19, 1961; THE NEW YORK TIMES, March 5, April 20, and May 18, 1961.

<sup>49</sup> Tatu from Moscow in LE MONDE, June 13, 1961; Vienna Dispatch in THE TIMES (London), June 13, 1961; THE OBSERVER [London] May 21, 1961, quoting Belgrade reports and information "from a Western legation in Tirana."

<sup>50</sup> PRAVDA, March 31, 1961.

<sup>51</sup> AFP Belgrade, March 16, 1961; Salisbury, LOC. CIT.

<sup>52</sup> Radio Tirana, April 24, 1961.

<sup>53</sup> Among the members of the new AWP CC, 10 are married couples, 12 are in-laws, and 8 are otherwise related. (Dragutin Solajic, "Eloquent Facts—What Political Reality in Albania Testified To," BORBA, March 22, 1961.)

<sup>54</sup> Robert L. Wolff, THE BALKANS IN OUR TIME (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1956); L. S. Stavrianos, THE BALKANS SINCE 1453 (N. Y.: Rinehart, 1958); R. V. Burks, THE DYNAMISM OF COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton, 1961); Stavro Skendi, ALBANIA (N. Y.: Praeger, 1956); and "La République populaire d'Albanie," 1 ère partie: "L'évolution politique, LA DOCUMENTATION FRANÇAISE, Notes et études documentaires, No. 1843, March 2, 1954; 3 ème partie, "Evolution économique et sociale," IBID., No. 1845, March 6, 1954.

<sup>55</sup> Rev. Henry Fanshawe Tozer, RESEARCHES IN THE HIGHLANDS OF TURKEY, INCLUDING VISITS TO MOUNTS IDA, ATHOS, OLYMPIA AND PELION, TO THE MIRDITE ALBANIANS, AND OTHER REMOTE TRIBES, WITH NOTES ON THE BALLADS, TALES, AND CLASSICAL SUPERSTITIONS OF THE MODERN GREEKS, 2 v. (London: John Murray, 1869), I, p. 281.

<sup>56</sup> Stavrianos, OP. CIT., p. 501.

<sup>57</sup> For the history of Albanian Communism, vd. Wolff, OP. CIT.; Burks, OP. CIT.; Julian Amery, SONS OF THE EAGLE (London: Macmillan, 1948); Brigadier 'Trotsky' Davies, ILLYRIAN VENTURE (London: Bodley Head, 1952); "History of the Albanian Com-

munist Party," NEWS FROM BEYOND THE IRON CURTAIN, IV, 11 (Nov. 1953), pp. 3-10 and V, 1 (Jan. 1956), pp. 22-30; Vladimir Dedijer, JUGOSLOVENSKO-ALBANSKI ODNOSI (1939-1948) (Belgrade: Borba, 1949), translated into Italian as IL SANGUE TRADITO, RELAZIONE JUGOSLAVO-ALBANESI 1938-1949 (Varesi: Editoriale Periodici Italiana, 1949); V. [iktor] M. [eier], "Politische und ideologische Wurzeln des albanischen Kommunismus," NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG, April 13, 1957; Stavro Skendi, ALBANIA and "Albania within the Slav Orbit: Advent to Power of the Communist Party," POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, LXIII, 2 (June 1948), pp. 257-274.

<sup>58</sup> Vd. proceedings of II. Plenum of Albanian CC, Berat, Nov. 1944, quoted in Dedijer, IL SANGUE TRADITO, pp. 94-99. There Xoxe criticized Hoxha for anti-proletarian attitudes, Liri Gega was expelled from the CC, and Spiro (supported by Mallehova) unsuccessfully tried to persuade the Yugoslavs to remove Hoxha.

<sup>59</sup> Vd. Vladimir Dedijer, TITO (N.Y.: Simon & Schuster, 1953), pp. 272-273, 302-303, 321.

<sup>60</sup> According to a Yugoslav report, in the present 53-member Albanian CC there are 5 couples, 12 blood relatives, and clan groups of 5 to 12 members. Vd. Solajic, BORBA, March 22, 1961.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. for the above Meier, NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG, April 23, 1961.

<sup>62</sup> For a list of those purged with him, vd. Dragutin Solajic, in BORBA, March 21, 1961.

<sup>63</sup> That Spiro and Hoxha were at this time less pro-Yugoslav than Xoxe seems clear. (Vd. Dedijer, IL SANGUE TRADITO, pp. 182-184.)

<sup>64</sup> Radio Tirana Home Service, August 2, 1953, 0600 GMT.

<sup>65</sup> Radio Tirana Home Service, July 20, 1954, 1330 GMT.

<sup>66</sup> For details on 1949-1953 purges, vd. Solajic in BORBA, March 21, 1961.

<sup>67</sup> Vd. Solajic in BORBA, March 22, 1961. For detailed Yugoslav documentation, 1945-1961, vd. the Yugoslav WHITE BOOK ON ALBANIA (Belgrade: Jugoslavija, 1961). The May 1961 trial of Sejko ET AL. gives several further interesting indications; vd. Radio Tirana, May 15, 1961 ET SEQ. One of the presumed dissidents in the Albanian leadership at that time, Panajot Plaku (who fled to Yugoslavia in 1957) recently stated: "As to my position and views up to 1957 on the situation in Albania, especially as regards the leadership of the Albanian Workers Party, they were made clear in a letter I sent to the leadership of the CPSU. Later I also acquainted the leadership of the Yugoslav league of Communists with its contents." (TANYUG in English to Europe, May 26, 1961, 1709 GMT. At the May 1961 Tirana trial the defendants were accused of having organized this opposition (especially at the 1956 conference of the Tirana party organization) at Yugoslav instigation (e.g., in the final speech by the prosecutor, in ATA in French to Europe, May 25, 1961, 1700 GMT).

<sup>68</sup> Dragutin Solajic, OP. CIT.

<sup>69</sup> E.g., Hoxha to the Albanian CC, ATA in French Morse to Europe, Feb. 1, 1957, 0900 GMT. Vd. Salisbury (on a visit to Albania) in THE NEW YORK TIMES, Sept. 10-13, 1957.

<sup>70</sup> Brzezinski, "Albania Defies the Kremlin," THE NEW LEADER, XLIV, 13, (March 27, 1961), p. 8.

<sup>71</sup> IBID.; Zagoria, "Sino-Soviet Friction in Underdeveloped Areas," OP. CIT.

<sup>72</sup> Zagoria, OP. CIT.; -it- [Fritz Schatten], "Kommunismus in panafrikanischer Verpackung," NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG, Feb. 7, 1961.

<sup>73</sup> THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 25, 1961, p. 742.

<sup>74</sup> Gomulka at Katowice, TRYBUNA LUDU, Dec. 4, 1960. Kádár also strongly supported this position; vd. his "Marxism-Leninism Lights the Way," PRAVDA, Dec. 23, 1960. For Warsaw declaring the Albanian Ambassador persona non grata, vd. Halperin from Warsaw in the MÜNCHNER MERKUR, Oct. 10, 1960.

<sup>75</sup> Polish-Albanian relations continue to worsen: The Polish ambassador in Tirana left on April 1 and as of late May 1961 had not been replaced, Albania (with North Vietnam) was the only East European state not to send party-government greetings to Polish President Cyrankiewicz on his fiftieth birthday (April 22) and at the Albanian trade Union Congress in late March only the Polish delegation was not mentioned by Tirana as having spoken.

<sup>76</sup> Griffith, "Warsaw Notebook," SOVIET SURVEY, No. 35 (Jan.-Mar. 1961), pp. 26-30.

<sup>77</sup> Vd., e.g., Gomulka's speech re agriculture in Poznan, Radio Warsaw Home Service, April 9, 1961, 0955 GMT and re handicrafts to the VII Congress of the Democratic Party, TRYBUNA LUDU, Feb. 7, 1961.

<sup>78</sup> Gomulka to the VII. PZPR CC Plenum (TRYBUNA LUDU, Jan. 22, 1961.)

<sup>79</sup> Vd. fn. 13, SUPRA.

<sup>80</sup> Vd. V[iktor] M. [eier], "Die Mazedonienfrage als historisches Erbe des Tito-Regimes," NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG, Oct. 25, 1958; Ganev in RABOTNICHESKO DELO, Sept. 22, 1958. However, before 1948 Bulgaria recognized the existence of a Macedonian nation (RABOTNICHESKO DELO, Jan. 16, 1947), and had the Greek Communists won, an independent Macedonia (in a Balkan federation) would probably have been created. For recent polemics, vd. NOVA MAKEDONIJA, Feb. 18, 1961. The most recent example is the Yugoslav denunciation of the Bulgarians for forcing the transfer of Greek Communists of Macedonian origin from Poland to Bulgaria. (Vanco Apostolski, "An Act Directed Against the Individuality of the Macedonian Nation," NOVA MAKEDONIJA [Skoplje], May 27, 1961.) Vd. Burks, op. cit., pp. 100-101 and Meier, LOC. CIT.

<sup>81</sup> E.g., re revisionism, Lt. Col. D. Dimitrov in NARODNA ARMIJA, March 15, 1961 and Mishko Zakpariev, "Revisionism—The Main Danger for the Unity of the Communist Movement," VECHERNI NOVINI [Sofia], March 25, 1961; re dogmatism, T. Tishev, "The Creative Development of Marxism and the Struggle Against Dogmatism and Sectarianism" NARODNA ARMIJA, March 21, 1961.

<sup>82</sup> PARTIEN ZHVOT, No. 3, March 1961; cf. THE ECONOMIST, April 22, 1961, p. 305. THE PARTIEN ZHVOT article refers to the CPSU as the "natural center" of the world Communist movement and states that the Bulgarian Party is against "treacherous revisionism" [i.e., Yugoslavia] but is also "alien to dogmatism and left-wing sectarianism [i.e., China and Albania.] For later Bulgarian coverage of these and other purges, which appear to be reaching major proportions, vd. "Actual Problems of the Party Work," NOVO VREME, May 1961. In the USSR and throughout all the Eastern European countries only the Bulgarian trade union paper TRUD, (in a short reference of May 28, 1961 entitled "A Just Sentence Against the People's Enemy in Albania) even mentioned this Albanian trial.

<sup>83</sup> TANYUG in English to Europe, March 8, 1961, 1943 GMT; vd. BORBA, Mar. 11, 1961.

<sup>84</sup> THE PARTIEN ZHVOT articles refers to them as sold to foreign agents.

<sup>85</sup> Albanian 1960 birthday celebration and uncritical praise for Stalin, ATA in French, Dec. 21, 1960, 0900 GMT.

<sup>86</sup> E.g., first meeting of Yugoslav-UAR Joint Committee for Economic cooperation, in TANYUG in English to Europe, March 21, 1961, 2030 GMT, and especially the June 1961 "Summit Conference of neutralist leaders in Cairo, jointly sponsored by Nasser and Tito." Vd. Radio Cairo, June 5, 1961, 1130 GMT: "The Yugoslav ordeal, and the bitter attack to which the Yugoslav Communist Party was subjected, showed that in Moscow there are people who are determined to use beliefs as a means for political domination. For, despite the devotion of the Yugoslav Communists and the Communist Party to Marxist dogma, their support for natural experience and its effects, and their independent thinking within the framework of the dogmas could not save them from a poisonous and concentrated attack. Arab public opinion has been fully aware of this ordeal and has understood its lesson of insistence on domination and subservience."

<sup>87</sup> E.g., Kristl in VJESNIK [Zagreb], March 31, 1961; BORBA, April 7, 1961; "Gangsterism in Prague," POLITIKA, April 12, 1961; denial by Prague, CTK in English to Europe, April 10, 1961, 2118 GMT.

<sup>88</sup> For Soviet comment stressing the need for Soviet-Yugoslav cooperation, vd. Radio Moscow in Serbo-Croat to Yugoslavia, April

6, 1961, 1930 GMT and April 26, 1961, 2130 GMT. For relatively neutral May Day slogan re Yugoslavia, vd., e.g., M. Baskin in SOVETSKAYA KULTURA, Feb. 2, 1961. For the new and expanded five-year Soviet-Yugoslav trade agreement, vd. "The Commercial Links are Expanding," PRAVDA, April 4, 1961.

<sup>89</sup> Petr Romashkin in SOVETSKOE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO, March 1961, cited from TASS in English to Europe, March 11, 1961, 1438 GMT.

<sup>90</sup> For a Yugoslav discussion of Albania's role in this, vd. KOMUNIST, (Belgrade), quoted by TANYUG in English to Europe, April 12, 1961, 2001 GMT.

<sup>91</sup> Texts: THE SOVIET-YUGOSLAV DISPUTE (London: R.I.I.A., 1948.)

<sup>92</sup> The Struggle against Revisionism as the Principal Danger in the International Communist and Workers Movement is the Imperative Task of all Marxist-Leninist Countries, ZERI I POPULLIT, Jan. 20, 1961; "Facts are Facts and Slander Slander," ZERI I POPULLIT, March 12, 1961; (reprinted in JEN-MIN JI-PAO, March 17, 1961); Vice Premier Li Hsien-ninen at Peking banquet, NCNA in Mandarin, April 13, 1961, 1552 GMT; "On the Youth Seminar in Dubrovnik," ZERI I RINISE, Feb. 1961, quoted in ATA in French Morse to Europe, Feb. 4, 1961, 1020 GMT, and (re a Stockholm meeting of the Committee for Solidarity with the Algerian Youth) TANYUG in English to Europe, March 1, 1961, 1906 GMT.

<sup>93</sup> Notably in the report submitted by Veljko Vlahovic to the enlarged session of the Executive Committee of the CC of the LCY, Feb. 10, 1961, and published in BORBA, Feb. 23, 1961 and as A STEP BACKWARD (Belgrade: Jugoslavija, 1961); vd. esp. pp. 24-27.

<sup>94</sup> In a KOMUNIST article in April 1961, quoted by TANYUG in English to Europe, April 12, 1961, 2001 GMT; Vd. also N. Nacevski, "A Distorted Policy," NOVA MAKEDONIJA, April 7, 1961 and Zoran Zujovic, "Clash with Reality," POLITIKA, March 10, 1961.

<sup>95</sup> Vd. an interview by Tito at Conakry, Radio Belgrade, March 30, 1961, 1830 GMT.

<sup>96</sup> Vd. speech by Sekou Touré welcoming Tito in Conakry, TANYUG in English to Europe, March 20, 1961, 1247 GMT.

<sup>97</sup> E.g., by listing Yugoslavia (in a statistical chart) with the socialist and not with the capitalist countries; vd. his report to the VII. PZPR CC Plenum, TRYBUNA LUDU, Jan. 22, 1961.

<sup>98</sup> Radio Moscow, March 30, 1961.

<sup>99</sup> Radio Moscow in Serbo-Croat, April 6 and '26, 1961.

<sup>100</sup> E.g., No Albanians were present at the meeting in Athens, Apr. 15-18, sponsored by the fellow-traveling Greek "Committee for Balkan Understanding," with Bulgarian, Romanian and Yugoslav participation. The Albanian delegates, as they had been the previous December, were denied visas by the Greek government; i.e., the Bulgarians and Romanians held the meeting knowing that Albania could not participate. Vd. TANYUG, April 18, 1961; Radio Tirana, Dec. 17, 1960.

<sup>101</sup> For an Albanian allegation that the Yugoslavs have threatened to break off diplomatic relations, vd. ATA in French to Europe, April 8, 1961, 1700 GMT.

<sup>102</sup> Khrushchev may even, in part but not entirely within the context of his wooing the Greeks, be threatening Albania with detaching the southern part of the country (what the Greeks call "Northern Epirus") and giving it to Greece. Vd. Sophocles Venizelos in TO VIMA (Athens), June 25, 1960; ZERI I POPULLIT, Sept. 3, 1960; Panayotis Pipinelis, "Griechenland und die Balkanpolitik Moskaus," NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG, March 21, 1961; "Why is Rankovic Going to Athens?," ZERI I POPULLIT, May 2, 1961.

<sup>103</sup> For a relatively frank recent Communist definition of this situation, vd. Karol Hradecky, "Unity—the Basic Prerequisite for Success," PRAVDA [Bratislava] April 9, 1961.

<sup>104</sup> Togliatti, LOC. CIT.; cf. his "9 Domande Sullo Stalinismo," NUOVI ARGOMENTI, No. 20, June 16, 1956.

<sup>105</sup> I owe this analogy to Lowenthal, op. cit.



# Texts and Documents

## KOLAKOWSKI ON THE STRUGGLE AGAINST RELIGION

*Last April a curious debate took place in a closed room in Warsaw. On one side of the table were four Catholic journalists from the weekly Tygodnik Powszechny in Cracow. On the other were several eminent atheists. The discussion, which concerned the possibility of co-existence between believers and non-believers in contemporary Poland, was not published; however, the very fact that it was held is of interest in the light of the tense relations that have existed between the Catholic Church and the Communist government of Poland in the last two years.*

*One of the participants was Leszek Kolakowski, the well-known representative of the revisionist movement in Marxist philosophy. In the May 7 issue of the atheist weekly Argumenty, he published an article "Small Theses 'De Sacro et Profano'" which we print below with minor excisions. In it he discusses the ideological struggle between atheism and Catholicism in Poland, and concludes that the techniques favored by the Communists in the past were ineffective. He argues for "more subtle and difficult" methods of fighting religion, along with the recognition that, in Poland, "believers and non-believers are members of the same society, the same culture and essentially the same tradition."*

### I

POLISH CONFLICTS and ideological struggles vary in significance according to the way in which we look at them: in the framework of academic philosophy, the framework of the intelligentsia or the framework of society as a whole. In this essay we are concerned with the middle framework of the intelligentsia, where the conflict between secular, socialist humanism and the Catholic world is a situation in itself, perhaps even a central one. In this framework, despite the influence of factors favoring secularization, the importance of the conflict does not diminish but increases.

### II

Leaving aside the fact that the political authority is a secular one, there are two factors in Poland which obviously tend to favor secularization and can be shown to have an objective force in the country: 1) the urbanization of the country and 2) the spread of education. But they do not act in a direct way that leads automatically, as it were, to the extinction of the social and psychological sources of religious feeling. Environments in which the pressure of these factors is the strongest keep religious attitudes to a very large extent: about 60 percent of the college-educated people living in towns profess to be believers (according to a study by Anna Pawelczynska). It is not true that

religion persists only because of backwardness and a lack of civilization, and that it declines with the progress of urbanization and the spread of knowledge. Many countries can be cited to prove the contrary: there are highly civilized countries where public life is very strongly clericalized (Austria); in the US, mass conversions and the great rise of Catholicism do not go to show that the degree of civilization has an inverse relation to religious life. If the material property of religious communities does not prove the degree of religious feeling, the number of conversions does prove that religious life has certain peculiar values which, in the feeling of those communities, cannot be replaced by anything else. The general processes of civilization, which encourage secularization, diminish the degree of religious feeling and change its character, but they do not automatically liquidate it. . . . Statistical studies support the common opinion on this matter: it is true that the intelligentsia are less religious than the workers, the skilled workers less religious than the unskilled, city people less so than country people, and students whose parents belong to the intelligentsia are less religious than students from other backgrounds; such studies also show that the education of believers encourages their transition from intolerant and fanatical attitudes to more open, more tolerant ones in which they tend to treat religion as a private

matter and are less inclined to proselytize and impose their beliefs on others. Civilization also tends to affect the outward manifestation of religious feelings: Catholicism becomes more civilized. All those elements of society which represent lay socialist humanism must highly favor these changes.

### III

Poland has felt the influence of those worldwide changes which, in the past few score years, have tended to deprive the Church institutions of their political power and to decrease their material possessions. The changes, which limit the ability of the Church to exert pressure in material or political ways, at the same time improve its ideological weapons and help to create a Catholic culture of an incomparably higher degree than that possible under the mental and political dictatorship of Church institutions. The secularizing factors also give rise to new, more vital and creative, units in religious communities which have been forced to greater efforts in order to maintain their existence. Catholicism in power, tied to state institutions, Catholicism which has at its disposal immense financial means and a monopoly or quasi-monopoly in culture, is by nature more primitive, fanatical, backward and culturally barren. Catholicism which finds itself to a certain extent in opposition to the political structure under which it lives, grows more powerful to a certain degree—not in numbers and in the ability to exert pressure, but in the tools of culture: it creates a much better intelligentsia and has more valuable cultural achievements. In the 20th century Catholicism lost great areas of political and material power, but at the same time it came out of its cultural isolation—created its own cultural elite, literature, poetry, philosophy, which doubtless belong to world culture.

In many areas of culture where in the second half of the 19th century Catholic creativity vegetated, as it were, on the borders of spiritual life, there exists today an authentic Catholic culture—the social result of a regenerative effort made under the pressure of progressive re-Christianization. We can also observe in postwar Poland the analogous growth of a Catholic intellectual elite which was almost nonexistent before the war—limited in number but of great importance on the level with which we are concerned here: a well-educated, agile elite, capable of initiative and at the same time far removed from the fanaticism and backwardness which are still prevalent elsewhere. Ideological conflicts, in which



this elite is one of the contestants, will certainly grow in importance; the appraisal of these conflicts should not be based on a simple enumeration of the people engaged in them, but should consider the dynamic trend of the situation.

It can be said that socialism in Poland has helped the Church—for which it can expect no thanks—by depriving the Church of political power and reducing its material possessions: it has changed the social structure and function of Church institutions, as well as of religious life. Anticlericalism, arising from the old connections between the Church and the privileged classes, has lost its *raison d'être*; the awareness of other countries where such connections exist is not sufficient to rekindle the Church's social vitality. The Church does not have great feudal holdings. Catholic theoreticians have generally abandoned the effort to show that a class hierarchy is necessary for society. The focus of conflict shifts to other areas.

#### IV

The Catholics themselves distinguish—in a very broad and simplified outline—between an “integrist” current in their community and a current of “open Catholicism” . . . . The first of these currents, which fights stubbornly to continue or recapture the old possessions and refuses to give up its demand for total supremacy over all of social life, naturally dominates the Church's center of authority; it also dominates the upper hierarchy, which to a great extent—though not entirely—falls within the bounds of the former. The support for this element comes from the sum of traditional, backward, fanatical and obtuse Catholicism, generally of a rural character. The progress of urbanization and public education, demographic changes and the greater participation of the population in the results of technological development, slowly diminish the social foundations of this kind of Catholicism. It is, however, a slow and arduous process. On the other hand, the progress of the so-called “open Catholicism”—modest but real—is something quite apart from the spread of religious indifference in society. “Open Catholicism” has nothing to do with indifference, it is not religious feeling reduced to “private conscience.” One must differentiate clearly between indifference—as shown by the reduced participation in religious practices and the weakening of religious ardor, the transformation of “practicing believers” into “non-practicing believers” and the believing “apostles of intolerance” into believers for private

consumption—one must distinguish between this indifference and the phenomena from which arises a new Catholic elite, culturally fertile and at the same time aware of the need for reforms. Open Catholicism is a social aspect of Catholic consciousness which accepts the necessity of giving up the traditional aspirations of the Church to hold political power and which, from the political point of view, is prepared to coexist with socialism and to compete with it in ideology. It attempts at the same time to assimilate various elements of culture that have arisen outside of Christianity, not only in the material realm but also in that of the intellect; it attempts to adapt, to adjust to Christianity, certain values that have been created by the lay culture, including Marxism.

This kind of Catholicism develops a form of religion which contains certain aspects of the counter-reformation. Just as the French and Italian counter-reformation of the 16th and 17th centuries was the result of a political effort to break the one-sided ties connecting Christianity with feudal institutions, and of a cultural effort to assimilate and neutralize various elements of culture created outside Christianity—just so is the contemporary open Catholicism an attempt to assimilate the values of present-day technical, intellectual, artistic and political civilization. Counter-reformation is at the same time a reformation—hence the conflicts which often arise in its relations with the traditional structure of the Church authority. These conflicts are not surprising, any more than were the conflicts in which the leaders of the counter-reformation in the 16th and 17th centuries found themselves. Counter-reformation is a response to significant losses suffered in the ranks of organized Christianity, an attempt to fortify the positions through internal reform and to transform outside criticism into internal criticism; it is also an attempt to take over horizons opened by lay culture and to give them a Christian aspect. Contemporary open Catholicism has all the aspects of counter-reformation: 1) it attempts to assimilate into Christianity those elements which offer ideological power to the opponent, for instance, the acceptance of egalitarian and even socialist ideas, the acceptance of the theory of the rights of man, the social criticism of capitalism not only for its “excesses” but also for the nature of its social relations . . . an attempt which takes its departure from the so-called social encyclicals; 2) it makes efforts at internal reform, depriving its competitors of their monopoly of various social demands, not

limited, obviously, to Marxism and socialism, and it also makes efforts—characteristic of counter-reformation—to turn religious life inward, to understand faith more existentially than intellectually, more as an expression of a human situation in the world than as a conglomeration of ready-made dogmatic statements. This is connected with 3) a certain retreat from scholastic and realist philosophy, also typical of religious counter-reformation. . . . This statement might seem questionable in the light of the near-monopoly that Thomism has in Catholic higher education and in much of the philosophical literature. Indeed, the new kind of religion finds expression mainly outside the universities, and we have reason to believe that it is on the increase in the young intellectual generation and that—unlike Thomism, which has a barren look—the religiosity of the new counter-reformation may prove philosophically fertile. The increased interest in patriotic thought, in historical inspiration, and in the anthropological and humanist fields is one of the philosophical manifestations of a modernized Catholicism.

#### V

The Polish version of open Catholicism is easier to reconcile with “integrist” trends, and more conformable to them, than are some of its versions in other countries. This is to be explained partly by the various conflicts and frictions between the Church and the state. Tension in these relations acts, through the simple mechanics of political and ideological quarrels, to make the pressure of “integrist” factors more effective upon innovators. But even in these countries where the currents of open Catholicism find themselves in relatively greater conflict with the Church authorities, their counter-reformatory inspiration is unquestionable. Counter-reformation is an aspect of reformation, and by its own momentum it creates phenomena that lie outside its intent (Jansenism, too, was a counter-reformatory undertaking).

#### VI

From the viewpoint of secular socialist humanism in Poland, the rise of religious indifference is, obviously, desirable; it is also the main cause of apprehension in the Church. From that same viewpoint, the advances which open Catholicism makes in the ranks of fanatical and conservative Catholicism are also desirable, even though the activity of the former does not lead to religious indifference but to a deeper and less archaic religious feeling. The various social pressures that

might be employed to transform fanatical Catholics into fanatical atheists are very ineffective. There is, however, a social influence which can lead to a gradual transformation of backward, fanatical and intolerant Catholics into tolerant and enlightened Catholics—and this is the best of all possible influences. Open Catholicism tends to favor such a transformation, although it does not favor indifference. We are in a situation that calls for steady, elementary changes in the field of spiritual culture just as it does for the destruction of lice and the use of soap in the field of hygiene. It seems easy to combat a primitive and conservative Catholicism—but it is easy only for the type of “unmasking” activity which appeals to already convinced atheists. The secularist criticism of Christianity must, in order to be successful, become a more difficult and subtle type of work than that required for traditional, reactionary, rural Catholicism; but despite all difficulties we can anticipate an increased influence of open Catholicism among the faithful.

## VII

The assumption that the most effective kind of propaganda is the spreading of biological and technical knowledge is greatly mistaken: this idea is based on the ideological attitude of the late 19th century. For many centuries the Catholic world had great difficulties in adapting to any progress in the natural sciences, and all that was achieved in this respect was achieved in spite of the Church and religion. “The Church does not hurry,” it was said; the Church might wait three centuries to accept the revolution of the earth around the sun, and one century to accept evolution. Today, the Church must “hurry,” as we all must. In the general race and hurry, Catholicism has developed a relatively efficient technique for adapting to new biological discoveries, and is prepared in advance for further progress in this field. It is preparing in advance to interpret such achievements as the creation of a living cell from inorganic matter or the discovery of intelligent non-terrestrial beings. Despite the opposition still existing among Catholic groups, despite the fact that many people still treat Darwin as a kind of anti-Christ—even Catholic ideologists—the trend in Catholic evolution is clear: intellectual criticism is increasingly concerned with the area of humanist culture, and that is where most of the really vital and tormenting problems are to be found. Even though the natural sciences still have their secularizing value, on the level of

elementary faith, a humanist education is much more effective in secularization than an education in the natural sciences.

The percentage of believing professors and lecturers at universities (according to unpublished studies by Irena Nowakowska) is much lower in the departments of humanities than elsewhere—lower than among professors and lecturers in medicine, natural sciences, mathematics, technology, law, etc. There is an analogous situation among students; there also the percentage of believers is lowest in the humanities departments and there also an abandonment of faith is most frequent in the course of studies (according to studies by Anna Pawelczynska and Stefan Nowak). This can be explained by changes in the ideological situation. In this connection, one may conclude that the preferential treatment given to scientific knowledge at the expense of the humanities, although justified for other reasons, will not—in the long run—advance the cause of secularization.

## VIII

Anti-religious propaganda among the intelligentsia is very often acceptable only to atheists. A primitive and fanatical atheism is a product of the conditions under which we live, the inevitable by-product of a primitive and backward Catholicism. Nevertheless, the primitive propaganda sometimes carried on by followers of atheism serves mainly the atheists themselves. The successful propagation of a secular culture through the written and spoken word requires media which will reach the believers; only things that believers can absorb will have any chance of furthering the cause. In the last year two Polish works have attracted the understandable condemnation and sometimes even the fury of Church authorities: Breza's “The Bronze Gate” and Kawalerowicz's film “Mother Joan of the Angels.” Neither of these works has anything in common with infantile atheism; they both show an understanding of the “reasons” of the believers, and they both show the secular character of those reasons. Successful anti-religious propaganda must be able to address the faithful, not the atheists, and this demands an understanding of the reasons that support their faith—not intellectual reasons, obviously, since there are none, but psychological ones. Even if institutionalized religion often plays a condemnable role in society, it shows amazing stupidity to spread atheist propaganda which attempts to persuade a Catholic reader or listener that the mo-

tives of his faith are contemptible; good propaganda cannot demand that its audience should first admit that they are idiots and villains.

## IX

The developing forms of Catholic religion, although capable of adapting themselves fairly swiftly to the intellectual civilization of the age, are not infinitely so. The most difficult things for a Catholic mind to accept are not scientific developments but the secular and historical view of human life, historical changes, the very history of Christianity and religion. Adaptation is being attempted in the area of history and the humanities in general; in the field of history of Christianity there are efforts being made to separate the religious substance itself, unchanging and of transcendental origin, from the incidentals, that is, the changing historical and civilizational forms in which Christianity appears. But the possibilities for this kind of adaptation are limited. The training of a completely secular outlook on the world, history, the Church, religion—the unmasking, without undue excitement, of the mundane origins of religious life and the mundane history hidden under holy history—the integration of religious history, Christianity and the Church into history proper as one of its aspects—in one word: the use of a humanist point of view in social education, all this constitutes the most effective form of anti-religious influence in society. Propaganda which emphasizes carefully selected monstrosities from the history of the Church—the crimes of the inquisition, the cupidity of the Roman Curia, the evil deeds of Renaissance popes—will not succeed: a backward and primitive Catholic will obviously treat it as a Bolshevik-Masonic lie; an enlightened Catholic will answer: this is true, but Renaissance prelates did not believe in God (which is hard to deny). Rational and secular humanistic studies of Church history and of religions easily open horizons which can scarcely be adapted to a Catholic point of view.

## X

The most banal fact, and yet the hardest for believers and non-believers both to accept—but a fact most urgently in need of acceptance—is the following: believers and non-believers are members of the same society, the same culture and essentially the same tradition. They are made along the same physical lines, too. It is a fact worth thinking about.

# Book Notes

**Secret Diary from Red China**, transcribed by S. T. Tung (Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1961, 224 pp., \$3.95). In the mid 1950s, four volumes of classic Chinese novels were smuggled out of Communist China; on the back of each page, written in pencil, was the barely legible diary of a Chinese school teacher. This diary now appears in book form, transcribed by S. T. Tung, who had himself been a professor in China and later escaped to this country. The narrative covers six months. It tells the story of a schoolteacher who, refusing to sign a report denouncing abuses by landlords, is discharged from his teaching post, turned out of his home and eventually thrown into jail. After his release he begins life as a farmer; when he and his family find it impossible to grow enough to feed themselves after paying the heavy government grain tax, they try their hands as laborers. Mr. Tung's book portrays what has happened in Communist China from the point of view of the most oppressed element of the Chinese population.

**Stalinist Rule in the Ukraine**, by Hryhory Kostiuk (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960, 162 pp., \$4.95). This is a survey of the Stalinist regime in the Ukraine from 1929 to 1939, the decade of mass terror, purges of Ukrainian intellectuals and Russification. The book was published for the Institute for the Study of the USSR. Bibliography, index of names.

**The Russians**, by Stephen Strogoff, translated from the Russian by Constantine Fitzgibbon (New York: Random House, 1961, 170 pp., \$3.75). Mr. Strogoff is a young Russian writer now living in Paris, who is interested primarily in questions of good and evil. Set in contemporary Russia, at the very end of the war and in the years that follow, his novel is only incidentally political: the realities of Soviet life, as well as the German occupation, with their background of terror and frustration, are taken for granted. It is the story of a man who betrayed his country and helped the Nazis exterminate his own

village, and of a woman forced to serve in a Nazi brothel. The tragedy stems from the stultification and twisting of minds and morals during the long, sterile years of Stalinism. Preface by Joseph Kessel.

**The Grand Tactician: Khrushchev's Rise to Power**, by Lazar Pistrak (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1961, 296 pp., \$6.00). This is a political biography of Khrushchev. The author concentrates on Khrushchev's past rather than on the post-Stalin developments. The earlier phases of his life and political activities are analyzed in detail on the basis of available documents. The book covers Khrushchev's early life as shepherd and locksmith, his political career, his role during the Stalinist period, and his position in the factional struggles in the Party and during the Great Purge. A few chapters are devoted to his role at the time of the invasion of Poland in September 1939, and to his war record. His policy of peaceful coexistence is analyzed and compared with Lenin's view on the matter. The author also treats the struggle for power after Lenin's death, Soviet policy on nationalities, the period of "Yezovshchina," the continuous re-writing of history, etc. Notes, index.

**Russians as People**, by Wright W. Miller (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1961, 205 pp., \$3.95). Mr. Miller is an information officer in the British government who has lived in Russia and made numerous visits there since 1934. His book is a description of "the climate and landscape in which Russians have to live, and the character and habits which have been bred by the climate and the landscape, by serfdom and peasant farming, by the Tsars and the Russian Church, and by the impact of the Soviet Revolution on all these as well as the impact of what the Revolution has itself created." These are matters which the voluminous literature on the Soviet Union has largely ignored and which, as Professor Alexander Dallin observes in his preface, require "prolonged exposure to Russia, a thorough knowledge of lan-

guage and culture, and an ability to listen, observe and communicate." Twelve illustrations. Index.

**Soviet Economy, 1940-1965**, by Vladimir Katkoff (Baltimore: Dangary Publishing Co., 1961, 559 pp.) Based strictly on Soviet statistics, this volume is a general textbook for courses in Soviet Economics and a reference book on the Soviet economy, covering all its major aspects. In the words of the author, "it describes the organizational and operational patterns of the Soviet economy prior to and since Stalin's death. This background is indispensable for comprehension of the development of the Russian economy since 1917. Second, it examines the Soviets' capability to produce industrial goods and foodstuffs. Third, it evaluates the socio-economic adjustments which have taken place under Khrushchev. Fourth, it probes the recent Soviet infiltration into underdeveloped areas. Fifth, it appraises the Soviet economic potential under the current Seven Year Plan and the projection of the targets to 1970." Mr. Katkoff maintains that we should not belittle Soviet economic progress, just as we no longer ridicule Soviet science. "Evidence seems to be accumulating that the giant is awakening and flexing his muscles; the prospect for reevaluation of our attitude toward the USSR appears to be reasonably certain." Index.

**Ashes to the Taste**, by Irena Penzik (New York: University Publishers, 1961, 378 pp., \$4.95). The book contains: 1) the story of two former Communists—the author, who once worked for the Polish Delegation to the UN, and her husband who was formerly an American Communist; 2) descriptions of the life of Polish government representatives abroad during the Stalinist years; and 3) impressions from a trip to Poland in 1951 which contributed signally to the author's change of heart about Communism. Miss Penzik feels that despite the relaxation under Gomulka, "the total picture continues to remain little different from the one I describe in these pages."

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